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Abstract
In recent decades, vehicles have been equipped with an increasing number of
electronic features and controllers. They have become a vital part of automo-
tive architecture. This architecture consists of an internal network of micro-
controllers and small computers, called Electronic Control Units (ECUs). Such
ECUs may be part of an entertainment system, which will interact with the
driver, or they complement technical and mechanical systems such as power
steering, brakes, or engine control. Every ECU is usually connected to one or
more networks as well as a number of sensors and actuators.
Vehicles have become multi-connected places: i) Entertainment systems al-
low data to be retrieved directly from the internet, typically traffic conditions,
weather or navigational information, ii) Increasingly consumer devices are being
connected by wired and wireless interfaces in order to control vehicle functions
or distribute multimedia content, iii) Assistance functions to augment traffic
safety and efficiency are currently being standardized, allowing vehicles and in-
frastructure units to communicate autonomously via dedicated radio channels.
All of these new communication interfaces should be properly secured, as failure
to do so could have severe consequences, such as loss of control over the vehicle
or private data being accessed by third party applications, which could, for
example, record conversations or track usage behavior. Recent security analyses
show that current vehicle architectures are vulnerable to the above described
threats. It has been shown that by exploiting implementation flaws, attackers
can control the vehicle’s behavior from a device inside the car or even remotely.
This dissertation focuses on securing in-vehicle networks. Historically, vehicle
buses such as the Controller Area Network (CAN) were considered as isolated
embedded systems. However, an effective isolation of on-board networks is
difficult if not impossible to achieve with the rises of connectivity inside the
vehicle for internal functions and, at the same time, for third party devices and
internet services. Upcoming safety and assistance functions use Car-to-Car and
Car-to-Infrastructure communication (Car2X). These assistance functions rely
on remotely received data. It is imperative that these data are trustworthy. A
high level of trust can only be achieved by securing the on-board platform as
a whole, and by protecting both the integrity and the authenticity of network
communication as well as software execution.
v
vi
The main contributions of this thesis are i) an approach to securing the com-
munication of in-vehicle networks, ii) an approach to applying dynamic data
flow analysis to the distributed embedded applications of on-board networks,
by using taint-tag tracking in order to detect and avoid malicious activities, iii)
working prototypes for different aspects of the overall security problem, showing
simulations and real-world results of the techniques developed in this thesis.
The approach that is presented combines multiple mechanisms at different layers
of the vehicular communication and execution platform. Cryptographic com-
munication protocols are designed and implemented in order to authenticate
data exchanged on the buses. Hardware Security Modules (HSMs) are used
to complement the actual microcontroller by providing a secure storage and by
acting as a local root of trust. We distribute usage-restricted symmetric key
material between HSMs. Their use is limited to certain functions, like generat-
ing or verifying authentication codes. Thereby, they can be used asymmetrically
for group-communication patterns. This is a common communication paradigm
in automotive applications, in particular for distributing vehicle-wide signals. A
proof of concept system has been implemented as part of this thesis, showing
the feasibility of integrating security features on top of automotive buses and for
use with Car2X communication. We simulated the behavior of a CAN network
and compare our results for different network designs with data collected from
a real vehicle and with simulations based on a Simulink toolkit.
In order to account for untrusted program code, we use a distributed data
flow tracking based approach for securing code execution on the ECUs of the
automotive network. This means that a high level of trust can be placed in
applications even when mechanisms, such as software review and applications
signatures, fall short of the desired security levels, or cannot be applied at all.
If this approach is taken then the use of applications of unknown origin along
side those controlling critical functions becomes possible. In addition to plain
policy rules, we use a declarative approach to represent the kind of data used
on communication links. Binary instrumentation techniques are used to track
data flows throughout the execution and between control units.
For the Car2Car Communication Consortium Forum in November 2011, a part
of the prototype implementations was integrated into two research vehicles to
demonstrate an “Active Brake” safety scenario using secure in-vehicle and Car2X
communication. It demonstrated the effectiveness and applicability of our com-
munication security solution.
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Zusammenfassung
Die Entwicklungen und Neuerungen rund um das Automobil ist in den let-
zten Jahren in zunehmendem Maße von elektronischen Funktionen und einer
Ausweitung der Kommunikationsschnittstellen gepra¨gt. Durch die Zunahme an
Schnittstellen ist das Automobil zu einem Knotenpunkt der Vernetzung gewor-
den. Applikationen verarbeiten interne Fahrzeugdaten, Daten aus dem Internet
und von Mobiltelefonen, sowie in Zukunft auch von anderen Fahrzeugen mithilfe
der sogenannten Car2X Kommunikation.
Durch Abha¨ngigkeiten ko¨nnen die verschiedenen Systeme nicht komplett isoliert
werden ko¨nnen. Daher mu¨ssen die untereinander verbundenen Bussysteme und
Computerplattformen entsprechend abgesichert werden. Der erste Teil dieser
Dissertation bescha¨ftigt sich mit Techniken, die den sicheren Austausch von
Daten im Fahrzeugnetz, speziell dem CAN Bus, ermo¨glichen. Hierzu wird
ein Protokoll zur sicheren Verteilung symmetrischer Sitzungsschlu¨ssel zwischen
Steuergera¨ten vorgestellt, das auf sogenannte Hardware Security Module (HSM)
aufbaut. Das HSM erlaubt der Schlu¨sselverteilung eine asymmetrische Nutzung
von symmetrischem Schlu¨sselmaterial in 1:n Kommunikationsgruppen, wie sie
im Fahrzeug typischerweise verwendet werden.
Der zweite Teil bescha¨ftigt sich mit der Erkennung von Angriffen und einem
Ansatz zur Nachverfolgbarkeit von Informationsflu¨ssen. Diese DIFT genannte
Technik zur Verfolgung von Informationen wa¨hrend Ausfu¨hrung und Kommu-
nikation wird fu¨r zweierlei Zwecke benutzt. Im Sinne klassischer Intrusion De-
tection ko¨nnen Datenstro¨me hinsichtlich der verwendeten Daten analysiert wer-
den, wodurch eine Erkennung von fremd eingebrachten Daten (z.B. durch Soft-
wareschwachstellen) ermo¨glicht wird. Weiterhin wird das Verfahren eingesetzt,
um nachladbare Applikationen, wie sie im Automobil bereits Einzug halten, bei
der Nutzung von Daten zu kontrollieren, so dass private Daten nur fu¨r zula¨ssigen
Kommunikationswege eingesetzt werden ko¨nnen.
Beide Ansa¨tze sind in einer Middleware umgesetzt worden und werden anhand
dreier fahrzeugspezifischer Szenarien demonstriert und evaluiert. Hierbei wird
besonders auf die Anwendbarkeit im automobilen Umfeld geachtet.
Im Rahmen des EU Projekts EVITA wurden Ergebnisse dieser Dissertation in




L’informatique de bord est maintenant devenue partie inte´grante de l’architec-
ture re´seau des ve´hicules. Elle s’appuie sur l’interconnexion de microcontroleurs
appele´s Electronic Control Unit (ECU) par des bus divers. On commence
maintenant a` connecter ces ECUs au monde exte´rieur, comme le montrent
les syste`mes de navigation, de divertissement, ou de communication mobile em-
barque´s, et les fonctionnalite´ Car2X. Des analyses re´centes ont montre´ de graves
vulne´rabilite´s des ECUs et protocoles employe´s qui permettent a` un attaquant
de prendre le controˆle du ve´hicule.
Comme les syste`mes critiques du ve´hicule ne peuvent plus eˆtre comple`tement
isole´s, nous proposons une nouvelle approche pour se´curiser l’informatique em-
barque´e combinant des me´canismes a` diffe´rents niveaux de la pile protoco-
laire comme des environnements d’exe´cution. Nous de´crivons nos protocoles
se´curise´s qui s’appuient sur une cryptographie efficace et inte´gre´e au paradigme
de communication dominant dans l’automobile et sur des modules de se´curite´
mate´riels fournissant un stockage se´curise´ et un noyau de confiance. Nous
de´crivons aussi comment surveiller les flux d’information distribue´s dans le
ve´hicule pour assurer une exe´cution conforme a` la politique de se´curite´ des
communications. L’instrumentation binaire du code, ne´cessaire pour l’industri-
alisation, est utilise´e pour re´aliser cette surveillance durant l’exe´cution (par data
tainting) et entre ECUs (dans l’intergiciel).
Nous e´valuons la faisabilite´ de nos me´canismes pour se´curiser la communication
sur le bus CAN aujourd’hui omnipre´sent dans les ve´hicules. Une preuve de
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Chapter 1
Introduction
“The three golden rules to
ensure computer security are: do
not own a computer; do not
power it on; and do not use it.”
Robert Morris Sr.
This Chapter provides an introduction to the application domain and goals of
this thesis as well as its contributions towards solving today’s problems in the
field of embedded vehicular communication, in which vehicles have turned into
“computers on wheels” [RH05].
1.1 Vehicle Electronics
In recent decades, vehicles were equipped with an increasing number of elec-
tronic controls. Without electronics, today’s vehicles would no longer be able to
comply with current emission standards and the driver’s expectations of comfort
and entertainment. They have become a vital part of the automotive architec-
ture. This architecture consists of an internal network of small computers, so
called Electronic Control Units (ECUs). Such ECUs may be part of entertain-
ment or Human Machine Interface (HMI) systems to interact with the driver,
or complement technical and mechanical systems. Every ECU is connected to a
network as well as a number of sensors and actuators it is controlling. Typically,
the sensor values are part of a closed loop that controls the actuators. We
will give an overview on how vehicle electronics and on-board networks have




The Connected Vehicle In addition to sensor and control loops that are an
integral part of today’s vehicles, the automobile has become an entity with
various internal and external interfaces and connections. The vehicle connects
to the internet for various online services as OnStar, ConnectedDrive, and many
others. It no longer only plays digital music from physical media, but also from
devices such as mobile phones using wired and wireless connections and various
protocols. The recent trend of creating WiFi networks in vehicles for connecting
mobile devices, brings yet another new communication stack into the car. This
includes high-level protocols such as UPnP and DLNA. All these interfaces and
protocols create an attack surface that can be used to mount attacks on the in-
vehicle network. Even tire pressure sensors transmit their data wireless, thereby
exposing another, albeit proprietary, interface.
Today, the primary threats targeting on-board networks are vehicle theft, odome-
ter and firmware manipulations, component fraud, and unlocking paid function-
ality. We have however seen that devices with increased connectivity receive
more attention from the malware industry, as for example mobile phones have
become increasingly connected in the past and thereupon attracted attacks. A
comparable development can be expected for the connected vehicle.
Road Safety In addition to the existing interfaces, a dedicated radio link at
5.9 GHz is currently being standardized for road-safety applications. These
safety applications based on wireless communication are promising with respect
to the reduction of fatal accidents. While communication-based safety scenarios
introduce a new era of safety applications, new security threats need to be con-
sidered for successful application deployment. Besides safety scenarios, internet
services and their seamless and intuitive integration into vehicles becomes an
integral part of automotive scenarios.
These safety scenarios enable new application domains, in which new security
threats are posed against the communication infrastructure between vehicles and
infrastructure. The terms Car2X, or sometimes V2X have been coined for inter-
vehicular communication. Solutions to secure communication between entities
of Car2X scenarios, vehicles and Road Side Units (RSUs), have been investigated
in recent years. However, security with regard to protecting against attacks on
the on-board network has only been partially addressed even in research work.
Today, there exists a gap between what is possible to achieve with inter-vehicle
communication and the trust required in the data received, originating from
possibly vulnerable in-vehicle networks. This means that genuine pieces of soft-
ware rely on information sent by other vehicles. This can directly influence the
behavior of the vehicle, e.g., in an emergency brake situation. While information
can be certified and cryptographically secured, a cryptographic signature and
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certificate may only provide the assurance that the sender is authentic and the
information has not been changed between the generation and the verification
of the signature. However, no statement about the content can be made, i.e.,
one is not able to assure the correctness of data, as the sender or an earlier
data source may have been compromised and could have generated false data
before data was cryptographically signed.
While certificates with different assurance levels may provide trust in the sender
up to a certain extent, the data source may still be compromised. Other secu-
rity measures such as plausibility checks provide means to mitigate this risk of
obvious attacks.
This problem is also found elsewhere: A cryptographic signature can only ensure
authenticity and integrity of some data, but it does not assure the validity or
the benign nature of data itself. An example are software bundles, where the
distributor has to be trusted that a piece of software does what it is advertised
as. Especially self-signed certificates do not provide authenticity at all, so that
a signature provides only integrity protection for the download – and even this
can be circumvented by man-in-the-middle attacks that change the certificate
on-the-fly.
Loadable Code More and more platforms, mostly in the mobile world, allow
the owner to install custom applications. In the early days of smartphones,
for example, no security was integrated, e.g., into the palm platform or the
windows mobile operating system. With an increasing number of threats like
viruses and worms targeting an attack of embedded platforms, in particular
highly connected mobile platforms, security now plays a major role for runtime
loadable program code. We see a similar movement in the automotive world,
where after-market customization of electronic features become available for
clients. This ranges from weather applications at the head unit up to mobile
applications on connected smartphones, accessing vehicle functions1.
In contrast to common computer systems, automotive systems are highly safety
critical and thus need adequate security protection, especially with the rise of
a multitude of new attack surfaces. On the other hand, the vehicle platform is
an embedded environment: Cost constraints, latency and function constraints
are the primary concerns until now. Cost, for example is the main reason
why asymmetric cryptography cannot be deployed on typical control units and
sensors.
1In 2010, an iPhone application was released, allowing owners of the latest MINI vehicles
to read out and configure vehicle data [BP10b].
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1.3 Problem Description
In this emerging system of systems data is exchanged between domains: Bound-
aries become less prevalent and even user-added applications that access parts
of the automobile are features in next generation vehicles.
Attack Contexts
We anticipate novel threats towards automotive systems coming into the vehicle
via three new very exposed interfaces. Those attack contexts are broader than
particular attack vectors. In addition to existing interfaces, such as OBD-II or
the wireless interfaces mentioned in the beginning of this Chapter, the three
novel attack contexts spawn a completely new surface for mounting attacks on
the vehicle. Namely, these contexts are:
1. Vehicle to Vehicle or Infrastructure Communication Channels, used for
safety and comfort functions.
2. User operated consumer devices accessing well-defined interfaces.
3. An execution platform inside the vehicle that can execute foreign code,
e.g., user-added applications [Lut11, MTV09, GEN09] and on-demand
ITS services [Kom10].
Figure 1.1 illustrates at which parts of the vehicle more or less openly accessible
interfaces are located.
Especially the execution of code with unknown and untrusted origin poses a
problem that can not be addressed by a single protection technique. In Sec-
tion 2.2 we show different techniques and classify them with regard to complexity
and security, and how some of them may be combined.
Scenario The three attack contexts are merely connected today. While ap-
plications within the vehicle already now have several distributed data sources
and provide their data to other nodes in the vehicle network, they do not re-
quire on-line access. In the future, these data sources and sinks will be even
more distributed, i.e., applications will access back-end services, ITS services, or
internet services. Boundaries between these services diminish and after-market
applications are integrated with vehicle internal services. Thus, the three attack
contexts will grow together, posing potential threats to all of the domains.










































Figure 1.1: Novel Attack Contexts of the Connected Vehicle: Car2X, mobile devices,
and loadable applications are the main exposed interfaces. Diagnosis and wireless
interfaces (e.g., wireless tire pressure sensors) are currently not protected adequately.
Vehicle in background from BMW.
Problem In the scenario, actors are heavily interconnected and may even
change roles. Several domains, of which some are heavily restricted (the vehicle
on-board network) and some are freely accessible (internet services), come to-
gether although they do not share common security measures. Currently, some
security measures are only based on isolation (i.e., the non-accessibility of the
vehicle network). Others are based on cryptographic measures and certification
(authentication for internet servers) or security policies (firewall rules). The
scenario thus cannot easily be assessed with classic security techniques, such
as cryptographic signatures, static access control policies or trusted platforms.
Due to cost and functional requirements, security techniques may not be applied
to the overall vehicle platform and infrastructure. The electronic components of
a vehicle naturally constitute a distributed system. Therefore, security must be
regarded as a whole, and not isolated to a specific ECU. As information flows
exist also across different domains, a security solution needs to be designed that
complies to the security requirements of inter-domain application scenarios.
1.4 Goals
The overall goal is to mitigate the risk of attacks arising from the three attack
contexts and their combination. A central unsolved problem of vehicle networks
today is to maintain and attest the authenticity and correctness of the internal
vehicle network between components, which is far more exposed than it was
several years ago.
While the three attack contexts seem, at first sight, orthogonal, a combination
of techniques may allow us to achieve the goal to prevent and mitigate attacks
and ensure the system’s privacy. The third attack context explicitly demands
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for privacy and runtime security, as foreign code can be loaded at microcon-
trollers of the vehicle and access personal information, such as payment details
or navigation history and vehicle services. Today we already see examples of
data theft targeting mobile devices: Applications can secretly submit location
data for advertisement companies, or take over the device itself in order to
commit fraudulent payments or calls. This type of privacy infringement may
as well affect vehicular platforms, which currently open themselves up for the
same types of applications.
We have contributed our implementations and design approaches in the scope of
the EU FP7 project EVITA. We describe the EVITA prototype environment that
was used in the scope of the thesis work in Chapter 3. In particular, the software
framework and the hardware security module were important building blocks for
our implementations. As we specifically target the vehicle context, we emphasize
some specific constraints and prerequisites for automotive communication and
execution platforms.
Communication A classic approach to address the validity of received data
is cryptography. Within the vehicle, there is currently no practicable technique
to address this problem: ECU’s microcontrollers do not offer enough processing
power for additional cryptographic operations and communication buses do not
allow for additional payload in data packets, a requirement for digital signa-
tures or authentication codes. An additional constraint is posed by real-time
requirements for certain automotive applications.
Platform While cryptographic mechanisms can assure the freshness, authen-
ticity, and integrity of data, the receiver must have confidence that the sender’s
platform is in a trusted state and not compromised. This means that the run-
time environment and the piece of software that generated the received data
have not been modified by a third party. In personal computer systems, this is
addressed by a technique called remote attestation, in which trusted hardware
like a TPM chip, measures the integrity of running software. Although cer-
tain problems, for example regarding the privacy or the freshness of attestation
may arise [CGL+11], we regard the approach as viable for attesting platform
security within the vehicle. Due to technical restrictions and for reasons of
cost (e.g., the need to use symmetric ciphers), remote attestation of in-vehicle
components to secure communication between vehicles (Car2X communication)
is out of question. For external Car2X communication, approaches either rely
purely on cryptography in various forms (asymmetric [GFL+07], group [GBW07],
timed [HL06]), or on dynamic reputation information [Ray09] as additional in-
dicator.
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Contributions
We have developed techniques and protocols for vehicular on-board networks,
which can assure the authenticity and freshness of data (security), as well as
the actual use of data (security and privacy) within the vehicle’s network and
inside control units.
1. Specification and Design
• An on-board key distribution protocol.
• A distributed IDS for vehicle networks and execution platforms based
on Dynamic Information Flow Tracking (DIFT).
• A policy-based approach for DIFT to describe allowed information
flows.
2. Simulation and Evaluation
• Evaluation of latency and error rates of the transport protocol on
simulated CAN nodes.
• Overall performance of key distribution on simulated CAN bus and
on actual prototype Ethernet implementation.
• Prototype evaluation of the distributed information flow tracking
approach.
3. Prototype Implementation
• Key distribution, integrated with the HSM and the framework.
• Secure communication for CAN and Ethernet, integrated with HSM
and the framework.
• A CAN–Ethernet gateway.
• An Intrusion Detection System for the vehicle, integrated with the
framework.
• Distributed Dynamic Information Flow Tracking (DIFT) based on lo-
cal taint engines using binary instrumentation and taint propagation
via secure communication links.
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1.5 Structure of the Thesis
This thesis is divided into seven Chapters. Following this introduction, Chap-
ter 2, the State of the Art , gives a comprehensive summary of current indus-
trial practices and research approaches for both, the vehicular domain and other
embedded computing environments such as mobile phones or computers. In
Chapter 3, Environment , we introduce scenarios, which we have chosen to ex-
emplify the approaches developed in this thesis. We provide an attacker model
and a description of the vehicular experimentation environment, the European
FP7 project EVITA, in which most of the work of this thesis was done, and to
which it contributed.
This thesis continues with the two major Chapters: In Communication Secu-
rity , Chapter 4, a protocol for Key Distribution in automotive environments
and a protocol to establish secure communication on the CAN bus, are pre-
sented. Subsequently, Chapter 5, Dynamic Platform Security , assesses the
overall dynamic security of the automotive platform: An approach that is based
on dynamic information flow tracking to leverage runtime security. It also allows
to restrain privacy infringing software. In addition, a classic intrusion detection
system that is integrated with the vehicular security framework is presented. In
addition, another approach that is suited to secure low-performance ECUs is
introduced.
In Chapter 6, Prototypes and their Evaluation, we present simulations and
measurements of our prototype implementations, as well as selected design
decisions and details of the implementation.
The thesis concludes with the Conclusion and Outlook in Chapter 7. We dis-
cuss the feasibility of our approaches to secure the automotive on-board network,
the applicability of individual techniques and their benefits and drawbacks. We
also give an outlook on future work to the topics covered in the thesis, as well
as perspectives in research and industrial development.
In Annex B, we provide Additional Measurements and Implementation De-
tails. In Annex C.1 (page 181) Abbreviations and Acronyms , which are used
throughout the thesis are expanded and explained. In the electronic form of the
document, you can easily navigate to this page by clicking on an abbreviation.
At the end of the thesis, you can find lists of Figures, Listings, and Tables.
A list of publications during the work on this thesis is given thereafter. The
Bibliography which lists references to cited work completes this thesis.
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Chapter 2
State of the Art
“If I had asked my customers
what they wanted, they’d have
said a faster horse.”
Henry Ford
We have divided this Chapter into different parts: In the first part, we discuss the
current state of the art in the vehicle domain. We give a broad overview about
the domain of in-vehicle communication, in particular how today’s “computer
on wheels” has evolved from the mechanical automobile. Recent related work
in relation to enhancing information security in this domain is explained and
discussed in the first Section.
We then present a state of the art in software and embedded systems security
with a focus on classic intrusion detection and containment approaches. Only
a few solutions of these approaches can directly be employed in the automo-
tive world. In the embedded system ‘automobile’, a different communication
paradigm is used, latency requirements are strict and microcontrollers and net-
works cannot cope with additional overhead. We classify existing solutions with
regard to complexity, overhead and applicability to the automotive domain, and
show for which environments the different techniques are currently used. We
deliberately take a broad view of security issues in related fields like security
in mobile applications (e.g., smartphones), since a number of solutions, which
may be appropriate also in the automotive domain, have been proposed or im-
plemented in other domains. For the same reason we also discuss recent work
in car-to-car security, albeit the focus of this thesis being in-car security. In-
deed the vehicle domain is not fundamentally different with regard to onboard
infotainment systems: Android is the operation system of Renault’s R-Link: An
App-Store enabled head unit introduced in December 20111.
1Market introduction is scheduled for November 2012.
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(a) Relevant sensors and control units for eCall ,
an EU-wide emergency system [Eur09a], shown
for internal networks of BMW’s L6 architecture.
(b) CAN bus and electronic compo-
nents of BMW F800 motorbike.
Figure 2.1: Today’s networks consist of multiple control units, subnetworks and inter-
face with external devices and networks. Shown is only a fraction of all control units
for the vehicle, in particular those which provide relevant data for an eCall emergency
notification. Pictures from BMW press portal [BP10a].
The strong motivation for security in vehicular environments arises from increas-
ing complexity of electronic infrastructures and availability of communication
interfaces for users aboard vehicles. This means in particular that consumer
devices can be coupled with on-board networks [BP10b]. Standard hardware,
such as Ethernet and IP, are integrated in today’s vehicles [Jon10, JH08] next
to USB and Bluetooth. In research, even the feasibility using IP as the main
network protocol is examined [GHM+10]. Due to the fact that these interfaces
are standardized and available to everyone, including hackers with criminal in-
tent, attacks on vehicles are becoming increasingly likely. In Figure 2.1 a part
of today’s on-board networks in an automobile and a motorcycle can be seen.
With increased financial incentive, the risk of successful attacks increases like-
wise. Already today, odometer manipulations or pirated navigation material
are a growing market for criminals. Manipulations of the on-board network to
overcome legal restrictions also exist. An example of this is the injection of
fraudulent velocity signals in order to watch TV or DVD while driving.
2.1 Automotive Security
In this Section, we give a comprehensive overview of the state of the art of
software and network security in vehicular systems today, and show ongoing
and future developments.
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2.1.1 Vehicle Components and Vulnerabilities
Vehicles have traditionally been a mechanical domain. In recent decades, this
has changed drastically. Starting with electronic engine management in the 70s,
vehicles have evolved to a multi-connected computerized platform. At the same
time, safety systems that are not only based on mechanical but also on electronic
equipment (electronic stability, anti-lock brakes) have been introduced with
great success. Vehicle-to-vehicle systems take a first step towards autonomous
driving. Although a commercial deployment of completely self-driving vehicles is
unrealistic, recent DARPA challenges for autonomous driving have impressively
shown the feasibility [MBB+08, TMD+06] and actual on-the-road tests have
been conducted in a larger scale between 2010 and 2012 [Mar10]. This led to
an official license to be issued for the road use of autonomous vehicles in the
state Nevada in May 2012 [Slo12] and for California in September 2012.
Electronics Sensors and control units have become increasingly complex in the
last years. This is also due to the fact that redundancy plays an important role
for risk-mitigation in safety considerations. An example for placing redundant
sensor is the ‘brake-by-wire’ setup: there is not one main physical sensor at the
pedal anymore, but a set of multiple redundant sensors, which measure different
physical values. One of the sensors is used for the measurement of the brake
pedal tilt and another one for sensing the pressure applied to the pedal. Such
sensors are usually integrated into a sensor box connected to the vehicle’s buses.
An example implementation of an electronic brake pedal sensor box is described
in [ISS02] from 2002. We have schematically depicted it in Figure 2.2. While the
gas pedal is electronic in most of the vehicles sold today, electronic brake systems
without mechanic fallbacks do not yet meet legal requirements in all markets.
A flaw in the brake unit’s software was the cause of a major recall of Toyota
vehicles in 2010 [Wil10]. In October 2012, Nissan announced to introduce a
steer-by-wire system in serial production for Infiniti vehicles within one year
[Nis12]. Their system uses a setup of three redundant ECUs and a mechanical
backup system to electronically control the vehicle’s steering system, and give
feedback to the steering wheel only selectively. The mechanical steering column
can override electronic signals by using a clutch, which decouples the steering
wheel from driving wheels at normal operation. Since 2005 such a backup
would not even be required according to a revision of the ECE regulation that
particularly embraces steer-by-wire systems [Uni05].
Current research topics, which in particular focus on enabling e-safety services
are covered in this Section. In the near future, safety services and applica-
tions will be deployed in vehicles as well as in roadside infrastructure. This
is envisaged by the Car-to-Car Communication Consortium or the European
Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) standardization body.
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Figure 2.2: Multiple physical sensors (A1–A3 and B1–B3) are attached to one brake
pedal for redundancy. The microcontroller chips, network transceivers and power sup-
plies are redundant, cf. [ISS02].
In order to provide a trusted base for inter-vehicle communication, secure on-
board communication for vehicles is crucial.
In first generations of multi-connected communication, vehicles will use infor-
mation provided by RSUs and will be aware of other vehicles in the vicinity, thus
being able to warn the driver of upcoming dangers early and adequately. While
typically proprietary security solutions have typically been applied for classic ve-
hicle functions, such as digital odometers and physical access control (e.g., key
fobs to open the doors using wireless radio communication), inter-vehicle com-
munication must rely on well-defined standards that have to be acknowledged
and adhered to by all manufacturers and suppliers.
These novel applications provide new surfaces for attacks, which may even be
exploited remotely and can result in serious consequences. Without additional
security measures, false alerts can be created and attackers may exploit safety
applications for their benefit, thus endangering the safety of drivers. We show
examples of successful attacks to illustrate the need for security.
Attacks The current in-vehicle network architecture, which is used to ex-
change data between sensors and control units (ECUs), has grown over time.
The industry has not yet seen the need to secure buses as they were not con-
nected to the user domain or to the outside of the vehicle. However, experiments
on vehicle bus systems show the severe impact an attack may have [KCR+10].
Similar experiments have been conducted earlier by [HKD08b]. The roadside
infrastructure that exists today for traffic management and tolling systems has
also successfully been attacked: In 2007 it was shown how TMC [TIS] over RDS
may be manipulated with limited effort [BB07]; in 2008 weaknesses of the Cal-
ifornia FasTrak tolling system were demonstrated [Law08]. Both attacks were
based on reverse engineering the systems and revealed that no cryptographic
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security was present.
While low-profile privacy infringing attacks have been successfully mounted on
cheap radio sensors, such as tire pressure sensors [RMM+10], more sophisticated
attacks have succeeded to extract cryptographic material of remote controls with
the help of timing and differential power analysis [IKD+08, EKM+08]. Even
where cryptography is in place, relatively simple attacks such as relaying radio
signals over analog channels (due to latency requirements) can lead to successful
attacks and break-ins on vehicle anti-theft components. How to unlock and start
a vehicle has been successfully demonstrated on a large number of vehicles from
different manufacturers in [FDC11].
In general, we can distinguish between two types of attacks:
1. Attacks on the integrity of the vehicle.
2. Attacks to infringe the driver’s privacy by means of collecting and tracing
personal data at vehicle operation.
We do not take attacks aimed at stealing a vehicle explicitly into account but
regard it as a subset of attacks on the vehicle’s integrity.
Vehicle Interfaces As shown in the previous paragraph, vehicles offer a va-
riety of interfaces already today. With the introduction of WiFi and Ethernet
in current vehicles [Jon10, Bru10], vehicle interfaces are gaining more attack
potential, as no special knowledge is required to access such interfaces. We
believe that especially the integration of consumer-oriented interfaces needs to
be secured. The following list shows which services and interfaces are exposed,
and thus prone to be attacked.
• Mobile Devices (Device Integration of Consumer Devices for Infotainment)
• Diagnosis and Reprogramming (Workshop Access and Maintenance)
• Remote Services (OEM back-end accessible through network connectivity
of vehicle)
• Applications/Widget (Small programs being run on vehicle computers,
not yet on the market)
• Car2X (Safety and Service applications, not yet on the market).
All of these domains have in common that they explicitly involve a great level
of interaction with the vehicle’s on-board network. While diagnosis and flashing
(reprogramming) require a deep access to vehicle functionality, infotainment
devices only need limited access to enable commodity functions, e.g., controlling
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the heating or A/C remotely. While a separation of such functionalities seems
trivial at first, current vehicle network architectures ignore this fact [KCR+10].
Recent trends in automotive development move towards the centralization of
electronic control units. This means that instead of a multitude of single-
purpose ECUs, fewer multi-purpose ECUs will handle a variety of tasks. A side-
effect of this centralization is that different functionality on such ECUs need to
be isolated or separated, e.g., by means of virtualization approaches. While there
exist approaches for other embedded devices, such as cell phones, this approach
is relatively new to potentially safety critical systems. The trend will most likely
initially be adopted for infotainment systems, as envisaged in [GEN09, HH08].
2.1.2 Vehicle Security Concepts
VANET Security After the first cooperative vehicle-to-vehicle communica-
tion systems were successfully tested in the early 2000s [FFH+04], the need
for security has become evident, as successful attacks on safety functions may
not only perturbate the system, but can lead to fatal accidents. The SeVe-
COM project [SeV08] assessed this need for security and conducted several
experiments in 2006. It turned out that certificates, which are needed for com-
munication partners to authenticate remote vehicles, cause the main overhead
in communication. Thus Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) was chosen as pre-
ferred algorithm. It features a shorter key and signature size, but offers the
same security level as RSA using longer keys [LBH+06]. Optimizations of chan-
nel usage, e.g., by intelligently omitting certificates if possible [Pap09], have
been developed in this project. The network of excellence in IT system secu-
rity, SysSec, has published a report on the state of the art of security in the
connected vehicle [Sys12]. It covers Car2X as well as in-vehicle security.
In-Vehicle Security Although it is mentioned in many vehicle security projects
that in-vehicle security systems must eventually establish the necessary trust for
cooperative applications [Kun08, EB06, GFL+07], none of these projects have
investigated possible solutions and the implications of a secure in-vehicle plat-
form. The EU project EVITA aims at exactly this: provide security and trust
inside the vehicle. Already at sensor-level it is necessary to add security mea-
sures, because in-car data will possibly activate vehicle-to-vehicle applications.
Thus internal messages, such as “airbag deployed” or “emergency brake”, can
cause warning messages to be broadcasted outside the vehicle.
Security measures have so far been applied for very specific functionality and
in a few vehicle components. For example the upload of firmware updates
is protected by an access code of two or more bytes [ISO00]. Of course, a
two-byte code only provides marginal security against attackers with unlimited
time and trials. In [KCR+10] it was shown that the security code required by
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the standard can be broken in as little as three and a half days by performing
a brute force trial-and-error search. The introduction of strong cryptographic
signatures has recently been agreed between a group of manufacturers (HIS) in
Germany [ZS08].
2.1.3 Ongoing Research
Field Trials Field Operational Tests (FOTs) are programs for evaluating the
feasibility and performance of inter-vehicular communication in real-world test
beds. In FOTs, a number of vehicles, usually between 10 and 200, are equipped
with on-board systems and are operated in a specific area that is equipped with
RSUs. In all current FOTs, cryptographic security for wireless communication
is applied. For example the project simTD uses a public key infrastructure for
long-term identity as well as short-term identities, which provide pseudonymity.
These are established and operated [BSM+09] through a Public Key Infrastruc-
ture (PKI) that was established by the project consortium. The concept of
short term identities is related to the direct anonymous attestation approach,
as found in Trusted Platform Module (TPM) architectures. Due to limited
processing power, the FOTs usually fall short in the cryptographic part of pro-
tocols. For example, instead of elliptic curve cryptography, which is anticipated
for standardization, RSA-512 is used for short term certificates in simTD.
Similar FOTs exist in other countries, e.g., SCORE@F in France. These FOTs
are coordinated through the Drive C2X project, which conducts interoperability
tests towards standardization in ETSI.
In-Car Security In the scope of EVITA, it was one goal to associate in-vehicle
security systems together with external communication and corresponding safety
applications, as well as provide a base for future projects concerned with in-
vehicle security. The EU project OVERSEE focuses on secure vehicle runtime
environments [GHR+09] and the German project SEIS is going to securely im-
plement the Internet Protocol (IP) into automotive on-board network architec-
tures [GHM+10]. Recently, some new approaches to protect CAN bus secu-
rity have been proposed [CRH05, NLJ08, OYN+08, GR09, Be09, HSV11]. The
FlexRay bus, which is believed to succeed CAN, shows very similar shortcomings
in security design, as specifically eavesdropping and injecting payload are still
possible [NLPJ09]. Some approaches require adapted transceivers chips, and
some even different network media to be deployed. All of the approaches use
cryptographic security to authenticate the bus payload. We will explain these
approaches in more detail in Section 4.3. Overall, the security of in-vehicle
components has gained interest among researches and industry. This is also
illustrated by the fact that security consulting and anti-virus companies publish
survey and white papers on this topic [Lin09, MWW+11]. A good and compre-
hensive overview about current research activities related to in-vehicle security
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is given in the survey paper [KOJ11]. The SysSec report presents details on the
state of the art of security in the connected vehicle [Sys12].
Car2Car Security The outcome of FOTs will largely influence standardization
and industrial feasibility. The European Commission has issued a mandate to
the standardization bodies ETSI and CEN [Eur09b], which covers the standard-
ization of vehicular communication and its applications. In the United States,
VII and VSC (Vehicle Infrastructure Integration and Vehicle Safety Communica-
tions, funded by the US Department of Transportation, USDOT) projects have
already resulted in the IEEE WAVE standards [HL10, US 09]. The current state
of standardization and challenges in the US is presented in [LLZ+08]. A modified
form of the WAVE (IEEE 1602.11) specifications are used for FOTs in Europe.
The European Commission has given a mandate for developing Car2X standards
to the standardization bodies CEN and ETSI [Eur09b]. They are therefore likely
to be acknowledged by standardization. Apart from vehicle-to-vehicle systems,
the emergency eCall system [Eur09a] is going to be mandatory for new vehicles
within the European Union. We are going to see more and more integration of
communication hardware and software into vehicles in the coming years, which
demands for increased security awareness.
2.1.4 Current Practice
Car2X Communication Despite the fact that Car2X communication solu-
tions are not yet deployed in today’s vehicles, there exist best practices that
have been the result of many research projects and field tests [FFH+04, PBH+08,
SKL+06]. While the focus of this thesis is on-board communication, this also
plays a role in the trust-establishment for Car2X systems. Currently, a certificate-
based approach with different trust levels is envisaged.
In Car2X systems, there are mainly two types of messages called CAM and
DENM. The beacon messages are called Cooperative Awareness Messages
(CAMs). These beacons are periodically broadcasted and announce the ve-
hicle’s position, speed, and acceleration. The CAM beacon messages are used
to avoid collisions: A trajectory forecast is calculated for the surrounding ve-
hicles, and compared to the own vehicle’s trajectory, so that the driver can be
warned if a potential collision scenario arises.
The other type of messages are so-called Distributed Environment Notification
Messages (DENMs). They announce localized information such as danger warn-
ings that are generated by a sudden brake maneuver or if a crash has already
been detected. These messages are also used to broadcast road and infrastruc-
ture condition and status information from road side units such as traffic lights.
While CAM messages are always consumed at the receiver, DENM messages
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Figure 2.3: Car2X Communication examples: DENM messages are emitted and relayed
to warn other drivers (left) or to enhance traffic efficiency, for example by broadcasting
traffic light schedules (right). Pictures used with permission from BMW Forschung und
Technik.
can be relayed to other vehicles, e.g., for conveying a warning message upstream
along with cars in opposing traffic.
An important factor in wireless communication is securing the content appropri-
ately: As mentioned above, ECC is envisioned for the cryptographic signatures
in Car2X communication, due to shorter key length and signatures. A certain
feature in Car2X is that pseudonym certificates are used for signing data that is
sent: The identity of the vehicle can not be easily revealed. This preserves the
privacy of drivers and has been assessed in the EU project PRESERVE [PRE14].
Each vehicle holds a long-term identity certificate. This identity is used to au-
thenticate against a back-end PKI in order to retrieve fresh pseudonym certifi-
cates, which are then used on the road.
The current state of research in vehicular networks is described in [HL10]. The
book covers all communication layers and includes a Chapter about Car2X se-
curity approaches and emerging standards.
Communication Modeling The current development process for distributed
application over multiple ECUs is historically reasoned. When the CAN bus
was introduced, it replaced dedicated electric wires with voltage or otherwise
coded signals by a computer bus, where digitalized information is transmitted.
Thus, the data on the bus is often referred to as signals. These signals are
typically transmitted frequently in a periodic manner (typical cycle times are 10
to 100 ms), which allow closed loop controls.
During development, these signals are defined in software tools that are available
from different vendors (Vector’s suite being one of the commonly used, and
RTaW-Sim being a free alternative). The developer adds signals and their
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corresponding discretization representation. These signals are then bound to
sender ECUs and one or more receiving ECUs are selected. The resulting matrix
is referred to as the K-Matrix . It described the representation of data, and the
sender/receiver-group relation. ECUs with multiple network interfaces can be
enhanced with forwarding rules and hence become gateways within the network.
The modeled data can be exported in specific formats describing the bus com-
munication. Am XML-based format called FIBEX (Field Bus Exchange Format)
is currently becoming an industry standard. It was defined by the ASAM stan-
dardization body (Association for Standardization of Automation and Measuring
Systems).
Until now, the tools to model communication do not include means to enhance
the payload with authenticated or encrypted data. While the information about
communication groups, message frequency and size are explicitly available, they
are also not yet used for generating or defining policies for enforcing access
control on the network or detecting malicious and non-conformant data.
AUTOSAR The AUTOSAR architecture is based on a paradigm, which has
been promoted for use in vehicle networks since the mid-2000s. It comprises
an embedded operating system (AUTOSAR OS, based on OSEK, an ISO-
standardized automotive OS [ISO05]) and an abstract view on all communica-
tion, i.e., the concept of an abstract Virtual Function Bus (VFB), which replaces
explicit inter process communication and network data exchange. This model-
driven approach allows to deploy software components (SWC) on different dis-
tributed components, the ECUs at an abstract level for a “push button” compi-
lation and deployment. The operating system provides a framework for software
functions and tasks that can access hardware and libraries through a standard-
ized programming interface. Figure 2.4 shows the development paradigm, which
compiled all models into one deployment architecture.
Since the last major release, AUTOSAR 4.0, a cryptographic service library is
part of the OS specification [BFWS10]. This library provides functions to appli-
cations and OS functions for specific algorithms: MD5, SHA-1, RSA, AES and
others can be accessed via the AUTOSAR CryptoAbstractionLibrary [AUT11].
Despite the standardization of the Crypto API, there is not yet a way to se-
cure communication between AUTOSAR communication links. In particular,
if secure communication is to be implemented, the security payload, e.g., an
authentication code, would need to be added to the application layer. This is
currently done for system functions such as firmware flashing or certain diagnosis
functions.
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Figure 2.4: AUTOSAR Development Paradigm: Software Components (SWC) ex-
change information via the Virtual Function Bus (VFB). These software functions are
deployed on different ECUs. Models are described in a machine readable format and
compiled into the overall vehicle architecture for deployment. The framework’s code
is partly generated from the so-called “AUTOSAR configuration”, which comprises all
description files. Illustration from [BFWS10].
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2.2 Software Security
This second part of the current Chapter provides an overview on related work
with respect to security mechanisms for preventing and detecting attacks and
intrusions, as well as approaches to intrusion response and containment. In
order to achieve these goals, IT security research has been developing solu-
tions relying on various approaches serving different security requirements and
constraints of the dedicated application environment. The need for security
in classic computer systems has evolved from open networks and systems with
closed user groups (e.g., research-only ARPAnet) towards an open user group
(e.g., today’s internet, where code is executed within the user’s web browser)
and closed systems with applied authentication and other security solutions.
In the scope of application security, there are several known approaches for the
prevention, detection and containment of attacks:
• Software Trust Management, i.e., certification of software based on:
– Security-optimized programming techniques
– Formal verification of software of source code
– Proof-Carrying Code
– Software testing
– Digital signatures and a Public-Key Infrastructure (“code signing”)
– Reputation information
• Access Control Mechanisms:
– Sandboxing
– Policies for I/O and File Access
– Packet Filters
• Intrusion management including intrusion detection and response. These
techniques provide measures based on:
– Stateful inspection of data analyzing the plausibility, or matching to
pre-defined heuristics
– Triggering of pre-defined actions in order to contain an attack or
even disarm the attack
– Communication and information flow, based on defined rules or
learned characteristics.
• Static Information Flow Analysis of:
– Source Code
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– Binary Data
• Dynamic Information Flow Analysis of:
– Measured data, user input or network communication
– Execution of programs, using hardware or software support, such as
symbolic execution or on-the-fly binary instrumentation, or altered
computing architectures.
• Hardware Security Support:
– Secure Boot / Platform
– Secure storage of key material and execution of algorithms and
The majority of the solutions mentioned above is not applied on its own. If
applied correctly, security solutions offer a higher level of protection when they
are combined. Some of the solutions mentioned above are complemental. After
giving an overview of the available techniques, we show how they are usually
combined and how well they are suited for different scenarios.
2.2.1 Overview and Classification of approaches
Out of the multitude of different approaches to detect and address attacks and
implicit information disclosure, we present a selection of techniques with regard
to the program code’s life cycle. In Figure 2.6, we show the different security
measures and their applicability.
The techniques range from static analyses of the source code to dynamic run
time analyses on the target execution platform. While detailed and in-depth
analyses can be performed using the source code, in practice the source code
often is not available. On a given target platform, code of unknown origin shall
be executed in a timely manner. Thus, a sophisticated analysis of binary code
is not feasible. This is especially true for program code that is executed in a
browser, on a mobile phone or on the head unit of a vehicle. Security techniques
aim at establishing trust of the owner towards a piece of program code obtained
from selected or arbitrary sources.
A common technique to facilitate checks of code integrity are certificates, which
are issued by trusted instances of a PKI. It should, however, not be seen as
a single security measure, as it can only guarantee the non-modification of
program code and neither the flawlessness, nor the correct behavior of program
code.
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Certificates aren’t like some magic security elixir, where you can just
add a drop to your system and it will become secure.
C. Ellison and B. Schneier in Ten Risks of PKI: What You’re not Being Told
about Public Key Infrastructure, [ES00].
This quotation is not only true for certificates but for nearly all security measures
and techniques. System security is only as strong as the weakest point of
enforcement. Thus, it is sensible to combine different techniques at different
points in the lifetime of program code.
In the following paragraphs, we show the strengths and weaknesses of different
techniques. Many of them are widely applied, while some have not found ap-
plication due to heavy constraints.
Code Signing The widely used approach to overcome the problem of exe-
cuting code of unknown origin is a trusted third party, the certificate authority,
which authenticates program code in a process called code signing [Fle02]. The
trust towards this party is usually established using a PKI. This approach, how-
ever, does only guarantee the authenticity of origin of a certain piece of software.
If the origin is unknown or untrusted, the code may very well be malicious de-
spite the fact that it is correctly signed. Only if the certification step involves an
analysis of the software, this technique may offer a certain amount of security
towards unknown origins.
Restricted Execution Environments: Sandboxing The execution environ-
ment itself can take a number of measures with regard to unknown attacks and
unknown code. A standard method, which has been used since 1993 (4.2BSD)
on Unix operating systems (under the names of chroot and jail) and inter-
net browsers and Java interpreters (under the name of sandbox [WLAG93]).
This approach restricts the abilities of software by means of system calls, I/O
(file system and peripherals) as well as memory access. It is also referred to
as “software-based fault isolation” [WLAG93]. This principle has been taken
up for code of unknown origin by runtime environments with intermediate ob-
ject code. Java and .NET use runtime restrictions for programs loaded in an
untrusted context such as web-applets.
Proof Carrying Code Proof Carrying Code (PCC) is an approach, in which
source code is programmatically proven to conform to certain properties. These
properties can be memory related (e.g., only reads and writes from and to certain
areas) and run-time related (e.g., that the code only uses certain processing
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Figure 2.5: Partitioning for applying Proof Carrying Code: A set of proofs towards the
program is generated at programming or distribution time (1). This is typically the most
complex and expensive step. The code is distributed to the user (2). Before execution
of the code, the proofs are evaluated on the actual code (3). No cryptography needs
to be used, as changing the proof set or the program code results in failed validation.
time). It has been established by George Necula and is detailed in [Nec97]
and [NL98] as well as his thesis [Nec98].
Using PCC, the developer of program code provides a formal proof towards the
fulfillment of certain security properties. This proof is machine-readable and
can be evaluated, i.e., reconstructed, in short time. This is done on the target
platform by a so-called “theorem prover”. Figure 2.5 shows the partitioning
between producer and consumer.
This technique uses no cryptography at all. Thus, it does not rely on a trusted
third party or shared secret and is self-contained. Changes of the code or the
proof are immediately detected by the theorem prover before execution.
Code that is to be executed always has to be proven, before it can be distributed
and loaded onto a target platform. For certain properties, such as type safeness,
such a proof can be constructed automatically [Nec98]. However, for more
complicated properties, the proof itself may be complex. Also, it can not be
foreseen which particular proofs the target system may be interested in. Many
properties are not easy to prove or not provable at all, such as the halting
problem.
Model Carrying Code In [SRRS01] and [SVB+03] a framework is described,
in which code providers attach a model of the code’s behavior. This technique
is called Model Carrying Code (MCC). The model is described in a language
called BMSL, which covers security related interactions of the code. These
interactions are matched with a policy set of allowed actions at the target side.
Additionally, these policies are enforced and monitored in a restricted runtime
environment.
Security and Privacy in Automotive On-Board Networks
24 2. STATE OF THE ART
The behavioral model described in [SVB+03] is derived from “the security-
relevant operations made by the code, the arguments of these operations, and
the sequencing relationships among them”. For a concrete implementation,
this means that system calls and library calls are extracted from program code
and compiled into a behavioral model. Approaches to classify short sequences
of system calls have been successfully tested [HFS98]. Comprehensive behav-
ioral models that are matched and verified at execution time offer an additional
step of security against modification of code, without the requirements of ad-
ditional infrastructure as would be required for PKIs. The MCC approach ex-
plicitly mentions cryptographic techniques and proof-carrying code as sensible
enhancements to strengthen security.
Abstraction-Carrying Code Abstraction Carrying Code builds up on the con-
cept of Proof Carrying Code, but does not supply concrete proofs but abstract
properties that are certified by the distributor of code. These abstractions may
be validated at the target system. The approach presented in [APH08] has been
tested in a prototype implementation for the Java framework [XH03].
Code Attached Requirements Recently, a different yet somewhat related
technique popped up alongside the Android security model. For this platform,
not only classic mechanisms as code-signing and restricted execution environ-
ments are used: Programs need to supply a set required permissions. These are
attached to the code and matched with user-given policies, i.e., access must be
explicitly granted if not allowed by system-wide policies. In contrast to PCC and
MCC, the properties do not relate to abstract properties such as type-safety, but
to specific access control rules (e.g., access to location, address book and inter-
net functionality). On the one hand this approach is very useful, as it allows the
user to select which resources may be used (e.g., a weather application would
be suspicious if it accesses the microphone, as shown in [Hig10]). However, on
the other hand, the implicit usage of data can not be controlled by the user
anymore. This means that location information, which should, for example,
only be used to determine closest weather station of a user, can also be given
to any other arbitrary party on the internet, including advertising companies. A
recent study analyzed implicit information streams for Android mobile applica-
tions, finding that 20 out of 30 applications silently disclosed private data to
third parties [EGC+10].
Stack Layout A problem on lightweight microcontrollers, often used in em-
bedded systems, are stack overflows. These may not only be caused by buffer
overflows (failures in software) but also by the lack of memory—a scarce re-
source on these systems—when the stack grows too big. Additionally, such
stack overflows may go unnoticed due to the absence of a memory control unit.
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Figure 2.6: Program code and different security measures that can be taken during
programming, compilation and execution.
In [FPC09] a solution of this problem is presented by Francillon et al.: the
data stack and return addresses are separately stored in memory, which makes
overwriting the return pointer impossible. Operations that directly or indirectly
change the CPU’s program counter are restricted. They have validated their
approach based on an AVR Atmel core in software simulation and in an VHDL
hardware design and show that the approach comes at little extra cost and
complexity.
Plausibility Checks A technique, which is widely used for safety and mal-
function detection, is plausibility checking: Data are examined for validity by
means of domain-codomain characteristics (e.g. ∀t ∈ Tempext ∶ −50 < t < 60
with Tempext being external temperature sensors, measured in centigrade). Of-
ten, multiple independent data sources are used to determine plausibility using
a voting-based approach. This technique can be adopted for runtime security
checks, which need not to be limited to data plausibility based on thresholds,
but may take temporal and behavioral patterns, such as memory usage or pro-
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cessor usage patterns into account. Plausibility-based anomaly detection is an
integral part of behavior based intrusion detection systems.
Reputation Information One possible technique to address reputation is a
consensus-based mechanism, in which individual agents rate an object with re-
gard to different properties (usability, adherence to requirements, trust). This
object can be an entity, a service, or a piece of software. This mechanism de-
mands support from the infrastructure and imposes latency and communication
overhead. While this approach is viable for online-services and dependability
problems, such an approach has also been proposed for generic loosely coupled
systems [Wey08] and in the vehicle context [Ray09].
2.2.2 Techniques and Methods for Information Flow Tracking
Several domains make use of information flow tracking. While this technique
normally generates a large amount of overhead, it permits a fine-grained analysis
of data and control flow throughout the execution of inquired code. Fields of
application include (cf. [GGZ+08]):
• Debugging (bug tracking and fault avoidance)
• Security (software attack detection)
• Data validation (lineage tracing of scientific data)
In the following, we focus on the use of information flow tracking for security
purposes, i.e., to ensure privacy of data (lineage tracing) and to detect at-
tacks by means of intrusion detection systems. We give an overview of current
approaches in the academic and industrial domain.
Code Shepherding Code shepherding is a technique described in [KBA02],
in which multiple measures are taken against malicious code. The origin of
code results in a certain trust (or distrust) in code. Data are marked (tainted)
and followed throughout the execution. Additionally, sandbox like behavior is
enforced and monitored: Only previously known entry- and exit-points for shared
libraries are allowed. A technique to dynamically introduce check-points into
running code is used to validate properties and strictly enforce sandboxing. The
tool they used is called “RIO”, which operates on IA32 binaries in PE and ELF
and can thus be used on Linux and Windows platforms.
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Malware Analysis utilizing Information Flow Techniques In order to an-
alyze unknown binary code fragments, as they appear in worms and viruses,
information flow techniques have become an interesting and helpful tool. There
exist static approaches that analyze the binary as-is, and dynamic approaches
that examine the runtime behavior of such malware. This is often beneficial,
as binaries are often obfuscated by encoding, packing, and self-modifification.
In [BMKK06] an automated malware analysis system based on emulated ex-
ecution was developed and tested. Recent developments in in this field are
discussed in [ESKK08].
Dynamic Information Flow Tracking DIFT is a technique, by which in-
put data (e.g., user input, file input, network data) can be internally tagged
(tainted). This tag is carried on throughout the execution.
A sensible example for tainting are downloaded applications. At execution time,
the application’s input data are automatically tagged. When the application
operates on tainted data (i.e., data originating from input tags) data read from
those file descriptors will automatically inherit the taint, i.e. the tag is prop-
agated along the flow of information during the execution of an application.
Such propagation functions can be described within a framework, e.g. [LC06a].
A global table of tainted memory areas, often called shadow memory, is kept by
the runtime environment and evaluated when memory is accessed. For all as-
signment operations, the new taint information (typically a bit-vector of taints)
for the left-hand-operand is derived from the right hand operand’s taint infor-
mation using the inheritance or propagation function mentioned above. A tool
that follows this approach is Policy Scope [ZJS+09].
... “Information flow tracking (IFT) refers to the ability to track
how the result of a program’s execution is related, via either data
or control dependencies, to its inputs from the network, the file sys-
tem and any other external parameters such as environment vari-
ables and command line arguments. To accurately track information
flow, each piece of input should be assigned a tag, which could be
a bit (e.g., a taint bit) or a pointer to an arbitrarily complex meta-
data structure, and for each assignment operation, the tag of the
assignment operation’s left-hand side is derived from the tags at its
right-hand side according to certain tag combination rules. Differ-
ent information flow tracking applications require different types of
tag and use different tag combination rules.” ...
Lam and Chiueh in [LC06a].
Especially in mobile environments, where the necessity for access control for
applications (e.g., access on private data such as phonebook and location in-
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formation) has been recognized, a complementary solution would track how
data are used at application level. The TaintDroid framework targets exactly
this [EGC+10]. TaintDroid is a modification of the Android operating system
(Linux-based) and runtime environment (DEX, Dalvik Execution Environment,
an implementation of Java). It defines several taint sources, which contain
privacy-related data, and follows the piece of information throughout the life-
time of an application. It uses a rule-based logic to propagate taint tags in
memory and for execution. By regarding library-based code as trusted, they
manage to achieve only little overhead, an average of 14% increased execution
times. Figure 2.7 shows the propagation of tainted data in memory.
When binary code is not interpreted but directly executed, binary instrumen-
tation can be employed in order to inject taint-tracking functionality into the
execution. We discuss the existing approaches in the corresponding Chapter on
page 94.
In contrast to interpreted or binary code instrumentation, there are also source-
to-source frameworks, which translate given C code into runtime traceable C
code. The frameworks GIFT [LC06b] and DIVA [XBS06] apply this technique.
While this technique has the advantage of a limited overhead, a fundamental
disadvantage is that the source code of programs needs to be available. As
such, source-to-source information flow tracking cannot be applied to third
party binary programs.
A hardware-based approach shows that taint processing does not need to be
limited to interpreted or symbolically executed code. In [KDK09] a co-processor
is used to follow tainted data of generic programs run on the host CPU.
Information Flow Monitoring in Distributed Environments A framework
for information flow monitoring in distributed environments under the name
“Aeolus” has been proposed in [Che09]. Its security model is based on informa-
tion flow control and introduces a number of mechanisms that are applied to
code that is run at an intermediate level (e.g., Java and .NET). Similarly, a sys-
tem called “Laminar” also sets up on Java VMs and introduces labels [RPB+09].
Labels can be distinguished between security and clearance labels. The label
concept is based on information classification, such as used by military infor-
mation retrieval services. These frameworks target the confidentiality of certain
information and documents. Their approach utilized middleware functionality,
thus they do not follow indirect data flows inside the application, such as it can
be done with binary instrumentation approaches. An approach that uses lo-
cal binary instrumentation and instrumented TCP/IP connections to propagate
the tag with so-called “Flow Managers” is presented in [KKCS09]. Recently,
libdft [KPJK12] provides a toolbox for information flow tracking, which was
used to distribute tags between processes and hosts [ZPK11].
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Figure 2.7: Propagation of tainted data (blue) in memory as implemented in Taint-
Droid. Data from taint sources is marked as soon as delivered by OS services (system
calls, file system access). Libraries are regarded as trusted and thus aren’t affected by
the taint engine [EGC+10].
2.3 Dynamic Application Environments and Platform
Security
In the following, we define Open and Closed Application Environments and
categorize techniques presented above that are used to dynamically analyze
security properties by analyzing data- and information flows at runtime as well
as static methods to contain untrusted code.
2.3.1 Application Environments
Definition: An Open Application Environment is an environment in which
the user controls, which program he wants to run. There are no measures taken
to hinder the user from installing or running additional software.
Open Application Environments were the default for all personal computers until
very recently. Introduced for the sake of security, application environments for
higher level code such as Java, performed security checks (i.e., cryptographic
verification of a signature) but always concerned the user as last instance to
override security policies and allow the execution of program code even when
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an invalid or self-signed certificate was presented2. Within operating systems, it
has been a design principle since the 1960s (introduced with multics) to separate
critical code (kernel and low level drivers) from user-space programs [Gol10].
This is now taken towards a finer granularity, i.e., user-space code is differently
trusted based on origin, authenticity of signature and other methods. Thus,
there has been a major shift towards Controlled Application Environments.
Definition: A Controlled Application Environment is based on the idea that
only previously authenticated code may run on the platform. This approach
is followed for various mobile devices, of which Apple’s iPhone is the most
prominent one. It uses a closed execution environment, includes a peer-review
process for applications, as well as cryptographic signature and a closed distri-
bution platform, the so-called AppStore).
A Controlled Application Environment can be enforced with multiple techniques.
The most commonly used techniques are are:
1. Selection and Review of Software published
2. Code signing for programs, which passed the previous selection
3. Distribution Platform: Controlled form of distribution and revocation
4. Enforcement of code signatures on the target platform, using restricted
execution, such as sandboxes.
We can see that in addition to the technical measures (code signing and sand-
boxing), non-technical policies are followed in the process of publishing an ap-
plication.
Figure 2.8 shows a comparison of techniques used to achieve a secure execution
of code and how they are applied in different environments.
A combination of techniques is often applied to achieve higher level security
goals (for example the containment of privacy related data and possible attacks
out for the code). The techniques explained are often complementary, as they
cover different aspects.
Definition: A Static Environment is commonly used for embedded systems.
No additional software can be installed without changing integral parts of the
system (i.e., firmware updates, if maintenance is foreseen). Even though inter-
faces, especially for communication, are well-defined, also in embedded systems
2Which was a good idea, because the acquisition of signatures from a trusted party (PKI)
was expensive for developers - but was a bad idea on the other hand, as it educated users to
discard warnings about executing code from untrusted sources
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Figure 2.8: Classification of usability of security techniques used in different application
areas. Darker areas show more usage (and applicability), while lighter areas show limited
use or little added security. Static environments are only updatable but do not execute
mobile code, while controlled and open environments can load additional software and
code at runtime.
the trend goes towards dynamic behavior as envisaged by a variety of sensor
networks.
Reputation based security models do not apply to static environments, as these
do not allow foreign applications to be installed. The same applies to proof- and
model carrying code. In contrast, these approaches are well suited for open ap-
plication environments. In open environments, the user of potentially unknown
software may want to find out about certain behavior and/or experience from
other users, referring to a knowledge base.
2.3.2 Example for Closed Application Environments: An App
Store
To exemplify the combined use of security mechanisms, we show how security
features are combined in order to achieve platform integrity. In Figure 2.9 it is
shown how all of these measures are utilized by Apple in order to control their
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iPhone platform, a famous example for rigorous policy enforcement in 2009 and
2010. In Table 2.1 we show details on the individual steps and classify these
into technical and non-technical measures. Since its introduction in 2008, many
other such stores have copied the concept (e.g., Amazon AppStore or Windows
MarketPlace), while some deliberately do not require a review and certification
process (Google Play, a.k.a. Market).
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Figure 2.9: Enforcement of Policies and Security Measures: Apple’s AppStore as
Example. Steps 1 to 6 have to be taken before an application can be used on a user’s
device. The steps are: (1) Enrollment of Developer, (2), Software Development using
obtained Credentials, (3) Submission to Review Process, (3’) Rejection and Feedback
from Review Process, (4) Code Re-Sign with Apple Credentials, (5) Download from
Closed and Controlled Platform, (6) Sandboxed Execution in Controlled Environment
along specially secured boot process.
Step Description Classification and Measure
1. Registration as Developer Non-Technical Policy
2. Development: Keys and Certification Technical: PKI and code-signing
3. Submission for Review Process Technical: PKI and code-signing
3’. Feedback from Review Process Non-Technical Policy
4. Distribution via Platform Technical: PKI and code-signing
5. Download and Installation Technical: closed platform
(iTunes) and userbase (Apple-ID)
6. Execution on Target Device Technical: sandboxed environ-
ment, hard signature verification
and securely booted device.
Table 2.1: Classification of Individual Steps in the App-Store Example. Graphical
representation is found in Figure 2.9.
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Figure 2.10: Apple iDevice and iOS Jailbreaks: The bars show the time between the
release of the corresponding device or iOS version and the point in time when its security
was first broken. The only yet unbroken device is the Apple TV (3rd Gen.). The dates
of release and jailbreak are from the Wikipedia article “iOS jailbreaking”.
2.3.3 Attacks on iOS Security
The security concept that Apple has applied for their iDevices (iPod, iPhone,
iPad) is very stringent and ranges from a secure boot procedure up to the
software certification process described above. Many more features complement
the OS security [App12]. However, due to the fact that smartphones are widely
deployed and promised an interesting target for hackers (i.e., those who are
interested in free-to-use devices), these security measures were often broken
only short time after the introduction of a new device and/or firmware version.
We show a timeline of the evolution of this cat-and-mouse game in Figure 2.10.
While some of the bugs that were exploited were hardware-based (e.g., flaw
in baseband processor’s boot process), others were purely software based and
could be exploited at runtime.
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2.3.4 Complexity and Cost of Approaches
In addition to Figure 2.8, where we showed the different applications of security
techniques presented in this Section, we show how complexity and cost are
differently distributed between the developer, the target platform and potentially
required infrastructure. Figure 2.11 shows this distribution, in which we rated
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Figure 2.11: Depicted are the efforts necessary for different security techniques. The
effort is shown on a black (high cost/complexity) to white (does not apply / none).
We show the applicability of techniques at three places: During development, at the
execution platform, and for the infrastructure surrounding the execution platform.
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2.4 Conclusion
In today’s computer systems, security is an integral part. Despite the fact that
anti-virus programs and other intrusion detection solutions provide a “visible”
and often efficient protection, the major requirement for a good security foun-
dation is the underlying security concept. This is true for any kind of operating
system, runtime environment, and also for network infrastructure.
This paradigm is well understood in the network and computer world. While
computers and networks had not been well protected in the early days of the
internet, as demonstrated in 1988 by Robert Morris Jr. with the first internet
worm [Orm03], and similarly for personal computers that had no communication
links [And02], a good security concept is now an integral part of every major
operating system.
We see that the vehicle domain is currently changing towards opening itself
for third-party software and device integration, creating the necessity to protect
existing systems from attacks. While it is important to protect these systems,
today security is rarely taken into account during specification and testing pro-
cesses of control units and communication architecture.
Approaches exist to secure dedicated parts, such as immobilizers. However, an
overall security concept for on-board networks and vehicle control units cov-
ering the complete vehicle infrastructure, has not yet been installed. Different
domains are currently growing together in the vehicle environment, which makes
the combined application of security concepts from those domains hard, as they
rely on different techniques and measures, which are sometimes even incompat-
ible. A comprehensive solution for this problem is still missing.
Current Automotive Security The security of the in-vehicle electronic ar-
chitecture has so far mainly been maintained by isolation and secrecy of imple-
mentation details. The vehicle’s networks themselves have not been physically
accessible easily, as the car was a self-contained system with only some sensors
connecting it to the environment. A physical connection to the wires of a bus
is necessary to interact with the network’s components, i.e., the ECUs. The
principle of “isolation and obscurity” has been used for several decades in the
automotive industry, for instance for immobilizers as mentioned above. While
it seems beneficial in the first place, it can not substitute a sound security ar-
chitecture in the long run, especially when the network architecture brings more
and more remote interfaces into the car. The approach to keep implementation
details secret is a very obvious breach of Kerckhoffs’ 2nd principle “Security by
Obscurity”3. The obscurity of bus protocols and CAN identifiers for instance
3Kerckhoffs’ 2nd principle: The system must not rely on a secret, such that a lost secret will
break the system. (original: «Il faut qu’il n’exige pas le secret, et qu’il puisse sans inconve´nient
tomber entre les mains de l’ennemi»), originally dedicated to crypto systems [Ker83].
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is not given anymore today. Standard and transceiver chips are openly accessi-
ble and many CAN identifiers that still remain proprietary and confidential are
published on the internet, or can be identified by reverse engineering. Thus,
only the location of the cable (for physical access) remains secret – a secret
on which the security foundations of a vehicle are built. Even more so, many
devices that are connected to the internal network and expose, at the same
time, a user-accessible interface that can even be compromised remotely under
some circumstances.
We believe that an adaptation of the development paradigm is required to
include security by design. This change in paradigm was only recently set in
motion by the publication of security analyses on the connected vehicle.




“We can only see a short
distance ahead, but we can see
plenty there that needs to be
done.”
Alan Turing
This Chapter introduces the scenarios used throughout the thesis, defines an
attacker model, and describes the hardware and software setup that were part of
the setting in which the thesis work was performed, and to which it contributed.
3.1 Scenarios
The effectiveness of our approaches is demonstrated on three different scenar-
ios: One scenario involves Car2X communication (“Active Brake”), while the
other two are centered around the vehicle’s head unit (playing music and cus-
tomizing vehicle parameters). In the following, we explain the scenarios in detail
with regard to communication links and involved control units. We present the
individual techniques developed in this thesis on these examples.
3.1.1 Scenario I: Active Brake (Car2X)
The first scenario includes a radio link for Car2X communication. We have
explained the general nature of Car2X warning messages in Section 2.1.4, and
take up the concept of DENM warnings in this scenario. The scenario itself
involves two separate vehicles: a sending vehicle (SV) and a receiving vehicle
(RV). The sending vehicle emits the DENM warning message, which is received
by the following vehicle. This warning message indicates an emergency brake
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Table 3.1: ECU Names used in the
Active Brake Scenario. The ECU
names are prefixed with S- and R-









situation at the sending vehicle: an Emergency Stop Signal (ESS) is defined as
“a high retardation force has been applied to the vehicle” [Uni10], that is, the
brakes are engaged to decelerate by a ≥ 6m
s2
[Uni11]. The receiving vehicle may
act accordingly, for example by displaying a warning message for the driver and
by preparing for an emergency brake (e.g., to pre-charge the brakes, to engage
belt pretensioners, and close the windows). In addition, if the confidence in
the received message content is high enough, the brakes may autonomously be
engaged. Plausibility checks that confirm the validity of data are part of the
evaluation. Such plausibility checks may include the continuity of a vehicle’s
trajectory by collecting vehicle’s CAM beacons and computing a local dynamic
map as foreseen in ETSI, or by the support of additional local sensors such as
radar, if the situation allows.
We show how individual ECUs are distributed in both vehicles in Figures 3.2
and 3.3. The ECUs are interconnected with CAN and Ethernet buses, over
which information are exchanged. The communication between different units
in the Active Brake system is referred to as steps AB{r,s}{1,...,4} for the receiving
(r) and for the sending (s) vehicle and (1, ...,4) for the respective message. The
message sequence is depicted in the chart in Figure 3.2.
In Figure 3.3 we show the two vehicles, along with primary ECUs that participate
in this scenario.
In both vehicles, the Application Unit AU is used for key distribution as explained
in the following Chapter, and is thus indirectly part of the communication chain



























Figure 3.1: Active Brake: An emergency brake is performed at SV (the sending vehicle)
and received at RV (the receiving vehicle). Participating ECUs are marked yellow.
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Sending Vehicle (SV) The sending vehicle detects an emergency brake sit-
uation, in which the vehicle will decelerate with more than 6 m⋅s−2. The initial
brake request is generated by the Brake Sensor (S-BS) inside the vehicle’s pedal.
It is then transmitted (ABS1) to the Brake Controller (S-BC) and evaluated there
for plausibility. The emergency signal is then generated and distributed (ABS2)
internally (not shown) and to the Communication Unit (S-CU). The emergency
brake message is broadcasted (ABS3) as a DENM wireless message via IEEE
802.11p to surrounding vehicles, notably RV, by the communication unit.
Receiving Vehicle (RV) The following vehicle, RV, receives the message
(ABR1). The received DENM is checked with regard to its authenticity (valid
message signature) and authorization (a valid Car2X pseudonym certificate) at
the communication unit. The messages (ABR2 and ABR3) are then internally
distributed to the Brake Controller (R-BC) and the instrument cluster (R-IC).
The instrument cluster display will show a warning to the driver. A last plausi-
bility check at the brake controller is performed before the brakes are engaged
by sending a message (ABR4) to the Brake Actuators (R-BA).
In our demonstrator prototype the whole communication chain was secured and
realized as part of two BMW research vehicles, with the exception of physically
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Figure 3.2: Message Sequence Chart for Active Brake Scenario: The emergency brake
signal is given in the Sending vehicle and received and evaluated in the Receiving vehicle.
At intermediate steps, the data is checked for plausibility. We used the simTD Com-
munication Unit to transmit DENM notifications between the vehicles. The ECUs are
abbreviated according to Table 3.1.


























































































Figure 3.3: Components of both vehicles: An emergency brake is performed at SV
(sending vehicle) and broadcasted to other vehicles, including RV (receiving vehicle)
via 802.11p, i.e., Car2X communication. Internally, several ECUs participate in the
generation (SV) and evaluation (RV) of this message. The participating ECUs are
marked in the vehicle schematic.































Figure 3.4: Scenario II: Playing Music on the Head Unit. The music’s metadata is
extracted and sent to the Instrument Cluster, where it is displayed to the driver.
3.1.2 Scenario II: Playing Music
Passengers listen to digital recordings in the vehicle since the Compact Disc
has ruled out cassettes. However, nowadays digital recordings can be played in
various formats, e.g., MP3, WMA, M4A, and from various sources like CDs,
USB thumb drives, SD cards, or wirelessly from a mobile phone. These files
of different formats already provide a large attack surface that can be used to
compromise the head unit, as successfully shown with specially crafted WMA
files in [CMK+11]. Meta-information such as the artist and title are extracted
from the music files themselves. Both the parsing of the file for meta data
and the actual music decoding are done on the head unit. The metadata are
passed on to the vehicle’s instrument cluster, i.e., the display adjacent to the
speedometer, where the song title and artist are displayed to the driver. If one
of the processing software entities does not sufficiently validate the input and
programming flaws are present, an attack may use music files to inject malicious
code.
This scenario addresses playing music from an untrusted source, e.g., a file on
disk, and disseminating the information throughout the on-board network.
In Figure 3.4, the involved entities, i.e., the media source, head unit, and in-
strument cluster are displayed. The media file itself is locally read from a file
via USB, or a proprietary device interface, or wirelessly accessed via Bluetooth
or WiFi from a mobile device (MP1). It is played back locally at the head unit
(MP2) and metadata are extracted and submitted to the instrument cluster
(MP3), where they are displayed (MP4).
3.1.3 Scenario III: Driver Adaptation
Vehicles with power seats are often equipped with up to a dozen DC-motors to
adjust the seat’s position. They also offer the possibility to store the current
seat position in memory. Some vehicles combine this with the identification of a
specific key fob. In our third scenario, an application on the head unit receives


















Figure 3.5: Message Sequence Chart for Scenario II.
information about which key fob is used (i.e., its identifier) and adjusts the
seat position according to a saved profile (on disk). In reality, this step would
usually involve at least one more intermediate component, which controls the
radio communication with the key. Also, in order to authenticate the key fob
and enforce distance bounding, the communication would require more than
one message.
The key fob’s identifier is read wirelessly, e.g., via standard Radio-Frequency
Identification (RFID) (DA1). A database with stored driver preferences for this
identifier is read (DA2) on the head unit. According to these preferences, the
desired seat position is sent to the seat controller (DA3), where several servos
are triggered to arrange the seat (DA4). The setup and a sequence chart are


















Figure 3.6: Scenario III: Driver Adaptation. Seat positions are automatically adjusted
depending on the key-fob used to unlock/operate the vehicle.
3.2 Attacker Model
There are a number of motivations for attackers of modern vehicles. The number
one purpose to break into a vehicle is stealing the car itself. While this is
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Figure 3.7: Message Sequence Chart for Driver Adaptation: An identifier is retrieved
wirelessly from an electronic key (simplified with only one message). According to a
local profile the seat positions are adjusted.
definitely a realistic threat to vehicle security, our attacker model anticipates
more sophisticated attacks against the vehicle. Such attacks may originate
from the vehicle owner himself, i.e., in order to tweak and tune the vehicle’s
functionality such as:
• Changing engine controls for increased performance,
• Tampering with the vehicle’s mileage,
• Removing technical restrictions (e.g., watching TV while the car is mov-
ing),
• Unlocking features (e.g., navigation system),
• Adding functionality (e.g., compiling and running own applications, chang-
ing the navigation system).
While some actions, like changing the radio/navigation system may be benign,
others influence the vehicle safety (watching television while driving) or create
financial loss (unlocking paid functions, changing the mileage).
As the vehicle is a safety critical domain, the manufacturers usually deny liability
once the closed system is altered (e.g., an additional device is added to the ve-
hicle’s network, which may perturbate the normal operation of safety systems).
Due to the enormous demand for dynamic content and continuously enhanced
consumer experience, manufacturers are forced to allow connected and updat-
able content in close interaction with their in-vehicle infotainment systems. By
this, the vehicle exposes several interfaces, ranging from consumer-oriented USB
or Bluetooth access to back-end oriented 3G connections. This creates a large
additional attack surface in comparison with existing closed-system approaches.
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For our scenarios, we do not differentiate between internal and external attack-
ers, but assume that an attacker can have physical access to the vehicle, at
least for a short period. This means that the attacker can both read data from
internal networks and inject or replay data. The attack itself can take place
at a later stage, e.g., by using obtained or injected data or code remotely. A
non-physical attack offers similar opportunities if the attacker can freely access
network interfaces after compromising an ECU.
Definition: The attacker model is defined by the following abilities and con-
straints. An attacker can access all communication interfaces of the vehicle: it
may read data on all buses and interfaces and write data to all interfaces. The
attacker can upload certain programs or replace ECUs of the vehicle, but cannot
access data internal to HSMs that are part of the ECUs. We assume that the
combined CPU/HSM package is tamper resistant and no invasive attack, such
as micro-probing or focused ion-beam attacks (e.g., in order to zero memory
or tamper microcontroller fuses) is made. Lessons regarding these attacks have
been learned in the smart-card industry [KK99] and apply to this area similarly.
Our attacker definition covers internal attackers with unlimited time, such as the
vehicle owner, as well as external attackers who can gain short term access to
the vehicle (through social engineering, physical force or implementation flaws
at exposed interfaces, such as wireless networks).
3.3 Possible Attack Vectors
We have selected these three scenarios, as they cover most of the vehicle’s com-
mon communication patterns as well as all of our attack contexts. In the first
scenario, modifications of the Car2X payload, i.e., AB{S3,R1} itself are out of
the scope of this thesis. Nevertheless, an integration of Car2X communication
was done in the scope of the EVITA project demonstrator with an existing com-
munication unit from the simTD project. This link is secured by ECC signatures
using pseudonym certificates as foreseen for standardizations. Modifications of
radio messages can thus easily be detected by the CCU and would be discarded.
Injecting bogus payload to openly accessible interfaces poses a high risk in all
of the scenarios. A primed music file or an invalid keyfob-identifier may be used
to inject software exploits on ECUs at runtime, as shown in [CMK+11].
Once an attacker has had access to the inside of the vehicle (physically, or
by exploiting an exposed interface such as Car2X, Bluetooth, or others), the
attacker may currently replay and falsify any data that is exchanged via on-
board networks. None of the currently used networks (LIN, CAN, FlexRay,
MOST) authenticates or encrypts the payload. This is done at the application
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level and only for very specific functions, such as updating an ECU’s firmware
in diagnostic mode.
As part of the EVITA project a study about attack risks and security require-
ments was conducted [RWW+09]. It includes a catalogue of over one hun-
dred different requirements covering privacy, authenticity, and confidentiality
for different automotive applications. These were combined with the risk and
the attack potential, i.e., the likelihood of a security-related incident and the
severity of a successfully mounted attack. One of the outcomes of the study
was that most currently existing functions and communication signals can be
well protected with elementary authentication, as the attack risk is low. On
the other hand, exposed interfaces and execution platforms pose a major risk,
where stronger security functions need to be applied. This inequality of required
security levels is addressed in this thesis in Chapters 4 and 5.
Specific attacks that target network communication or exploiting applications
at runtime and how they would be applied to the three scenarios, are explained
in the following.
3.3.1 Attacks: Network Communication
Within an unauthenticated broadcast network, every node may read traffic and
send traffic under any identity. This is true for classic IP-based networks by
forging the source address, and also for vehicle networks by forging the CAN
identifier. This class of attacks is called spoofing . Within our scenario, all
communication links are affected if the payload is not secured.
Another basic kind of attacks is to inhibit or drop communication. Dropping
network frames can only be done at relaying nodes, i.e., gateways. This re-
quires the gateway itself to be compromised. In contrast, inhibiting genuine
communication can be performed on any network node connected to a broad-
cast medium, simply by provoking collisions during ongoing communication. A
modified transceiver chip would be necessary to perform such a kind of attack,
as media access is usually handled in hardware.
An often overlooked technique on authenticated or encrypted communication
are replay attacks . If the attacker is able to intercept and inject messages,
a genuine message can be replayed at a later time. Sequence numbers or
timestamps provide are countermeasures against this attack, yet require a secure
and authentic time to be distributed beforehand.
Man-in-the-middle attacks are a technically more sophisticated form of in-
trusion. The original signal is received and dropped, and a modified signal is
injected. Under certain circumstances like a compromised certification infras-
tructure, this attack even works for authenticated and encrypted communica-
tion. For IP-based networks there exist tools to redirect traffic by ARP-spoofing
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and to hijack the communication. Within the vehicle, devices for a physical
man-in-the-middle setup are being sold (variants for CAN and MOST buses
exist). They transmit wrong velocity signals to the head unit in order to enable
TV output during driving operation, despite the exclusive policy implemented
by the manufacturer.
3.3.2 Attacks: Host Based Intrusions
In order to obtain data, or to access resources such as the I/O channels of a
device, several intrusion types can lead to success. The modification of the
ECU firmware or of the bootloader in memory can make it possible to inject
malicious programs. This kind of attack requires physical access to the target
system.
The class of runtime attacks is much larger: Specially crafted input is used to
divert the control flow of applications. Once injected or reconstructed code is
executed, the attacker has gained the same access level as that of the program
that is exploited , i.e., a vulnerability is actively used to gain access. If system
resources are not specifically protected, as it would be the case for today’s multi-
user systems, an attacker can take any kind of action. This involves intrusive
attacks such as distracting the driver by influencing the vehicle behavior and
showing warning messages, but also stealthier behaviors, such as recording audio
from connected microphones or tracking the vehicle’s location.
The class of runtime attacks is of special importance as they can potentially be
performed remotely. Techniques and countermeasures used for attacks related
to overwriting data on the stack, such as the return address or function pointers,
are explained in Section 5.4.1 (p. 93).
3.4 Towards A Secure In-Car Architecture
This Section describes the in-vehicle hardware and software architecture of the
EVITA FP7 European Project. This thesis was written in parallel to work in the
EVITA project, so a number of contributions that go beyond what is described in
the thesis, were made to the architecture, protocol design and implementation.
This architecture provides a foundation for experiments and higher level solu-
tions developed within this thesis. As part of the EVITA project, an analysis
of attack scenarios and security requirements [RWW+09] with regard to typical
automotive use cases [KFL+09] has been done. The security architecture is a
combination of software and hardware elements [WWZ+10]. While the software
manages security functionality and provides automotive applications with secu-
rity services, such as authenticated or confidential communication, the hardware
part provides the trust anchor: a trusted platform for storing key material and
Ph.D. Thesis — Hendrik C. Schweppe
3.4. TOWARDS A SECURE IN-CAR ARCHITECTURE 49
using cryptographic primitives. This hardware/software co-design assures that
cryptographic keys are i) not used unauthorized, i.e., the platform needs to be
securely booted for the key to be used, and it can only be employed according to
its use-flags, and ii) will never leave the hardware in an unencrypted form, i.e.,
all cryptographic operations take place in the hardware module. Note: Despite
secure boot and key usage control, software that accesses an HSM can still be
exploited at runtime.
3.4.1 Software Security: The Framework
One of the basic building blocks that was used in order to implement and
test protocols for the automotive on-board network was the Embedded Vehic-
ular securitY (EMVY) framework provided by our research partner BMW. This
framework provides the building blocks needed for a flexible security architec-
ture. Applications use the services provided by the framework, such as “single
sign on” or the establishment of secure communication channels.
The EMVY deployment architecture is constructed in a master-client manner.
So-called master nodes , which provide services to clients, are deployed on the
on-board network and communicate with clients through a Server-Remote Pro-
cedure Call (RPC) interface. Similarly, the Clients can be reached over a Client-
RPC interface. These interface uses ASN.1 encoded request and response pack-
ets.
Using RPCs on the server allows to use lightweight implementations at ECUs
with limited processing power and memory. In particular, the client nodes were
implemented in plain C, which makes them suitable also for low-performance
nodes in the vehicle, such as low cost sensors.
In contrast to this, services that reside on master nodes are implemented in
C++. They provide more complex functionality.
The prototype implementations that are presented in this thesis have contributed
to the E-Safety Vehicle Intrusion proTected Applications (EVITA) EMVY frame-
work and were integrated in the scope of the project. More technical de-
tails on this architecture can be found in the EVITA deliverables documents
D3.2 [WWZ+10] and D3.3 [SIR+10] that can be retrieved via the project’s web-
site [EVI11]. An overview of the architecture is published in [AEKH+10]. The
EVITA software architecture EMVY is shown in Figure 3.8.
3.4.2 Communication
The EMVY communication is encapsulated in a module referred to as CCM,
the Communication Control Module. On top of socket and datagram com-
munication, it can assure node authenticity in combination with the Entity






















Figure 3.8: Overall EVITA Software Architecture: The EMVY model. A Master
node (implemented in C++) provides high-level services such as authentication, policy
decision, or key distribution, while low-end nodes (clients, using the “EMVY-remote”
C library) connect to these services via an authenticated RPC interface. The HSM is
part of the architecture and used via the EMVY application model.
Authentication Module or confidentiality of certain communication by using
cryptographic primitives of the HSM. If a secure communication channel is re-
quested, the initialization-protocols implemented inside CCM will establish the
necessary credentials, thus allowing applications to communicate without deeper
understanding of the underlying mechanisms, similar to SSL, for example.
An application requests a secure communication channel with another entity
(which may be a group) and a certain security property set. This set is a subset
of {authenticity, integrity, confidentiality, non-replay-ability},
with subsequent levels, e.g., to establish a certain trust by using keys or au-
thentication codes of a certain length. The channel is established by triggering
a key exchange, which we present in Chapter 4. After a successful key distri-
bution, the channel can be used by the application and data is automatically
wrapped with the selected security mechanisms (e.g., timestamps, encryption,
or Message Authentication Codes (MACs), and even fractions of MACs).
3.4.3 Policy Decision
One of the core modules of the framework is the policy engine. Policies are
defined in a common S,P,O format: A subject S may interact with object O
using predicate P. For example, a process (the subject) accessing files on a hard
disk (the object) would require policies to allow read or write operations (the
predicate).
In the framework, policy decisions are made on the master node and enforced
on client nodes. Thus, authentic and timely communication between nodes
Ph.D. Thesis — Hendrik C. Schweppe
3.5. HARDWARE: THE HARDWARE SECURITY MODULES 51
is crucial. Decision may have a validity timeframe, during which they can be
cached at the enforcement points (i.e., the clients).
3.5 Hardware: The Hardware Security Modules
One key aspect in the EVITA architecture is the Hardware Security Module.
It stores cryptographic key material and processes all cryptographic operations,
such that credentials that must be kept confidential at all times, will never leave
this module unencrypted and will similarly never be loaded into the application
CPU’s registers or memory. Only a handle to these cryptographic keys can be
obtained by the application during an HSM session.
3.5.1 Key Usage
The usage of individual keys can be controlled by multiple so called use-flags.
These flags provide a low level access and usage control. In particular they bind
the usage of this key to certain configurations, certain functions, or to means
of separate authentication, such as a password. These conditions must be met
in order to use a key with the HSM.
Secure Boot Flag The most prominent flag is the secure boot flag: It binds a
key to a successful boot procedure with known hash values in the ECU Config-
uration Registers (ECR). These registers work similar to a TPM’s PCR register,
i.e., measurements are taken at each stage of the boot process. Binding a key to
ECR measurements makes sure that the key is not used by a replaced firmware,
and only in the intended and correctly booted environment. The secure boot
process was successfully demonstrated on an Infineon TC1797 microcontroller
loading AUTOSAR. We require all the keys that are part of the protocols that
we introduce in Chapter 4 to be bound to a securely booted ECU.
Operation Specific Flags A key may be restricted to certain operations: It
may, for example, only be used to verify cryptographic signatures, while the
generation is forbidden. We built our key distribution mechanism around this
feature in order to allow for low-cost asymmetric usage of symmetric key mate-
rial.
3.5.2 The HSM programming interface
The programming interface of the HSM is kept as generic a possible. While
underlying algorithms may be complex and differ fundamentally, for example
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Figure 3.9: HSM Hardware Prototype Architecture: Cryptographic functions are de-
ployed in hardware (green) on the FPGA board. The software (blue), i.e., HSM firmware
control the HSM functionality and makes it available via a network API (Ethernet,
ASN.1 encoded requests). Drawing adapted from [PGW+11].
asymmetric signatures vs. message authentication codes, the programming in-
terface to this functionality is designed straight-forward. It comprises a number
of core functionalities: key generation, key import and export (using transport
encryption) and cryptographic operations (i.e., encryption and decryption in
addition to signature generation and verification).
3.5.3 Prototype Platform
The HSM is implemented as part of a Xilinx Virtex-5 Field Programmable Gate
Array (FPGA). Its cryptographic operations are realized inside the FPGA itself.
All I/O operations, the key-storage, and the actual firmware are implemented as
part of an embedded Linux (v2.6.34), which uses the Virtex440-PowerPC core
and 256MB RAM available on that platform. As a prototype, the HSM itself
is connected to the application CPU via Ethernet. An embedded SPI interface
also exists but was used only in the context of an AUTOSAR proof of concept
integration, which is not further discussed. The Ethernet/IP interface uses
standard TCP sockets in order to exchange HSM commands that are encoded
in a ASN.1 request/response packets. The architecture of the HSM prototype
platform is shown in Figure 3.9.
3.5.4 Performance
Compared with software-solutions, the HSM offers a large improvement in per-
formance: While in software only about 15 ECC-256 signature verifications are
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feasible on a typical 400 MHz CPU, we achieve between 500 and 700 verifica-
tions per second using hardware acceleration. Current traffic estimations from
the C2CC Consortium demand for at least 500 verifications per second for in-
tersection scenarios, during which every car will send beacons at a maximum
rate of 10 Hz, depending on its velocity.
Similarly, the performance for symmetric operations reaches data rates between
60 and 75 MBit/s for AES-128 in ECB and CBC mode. This is largely sufficient
for all buses that are used in the vehicle today.
In Section B.1 we have analyzed how the overhead of the prototype relates to
the actual processing time of the HSM.
3.5.5 Comparison with other Secure Hardware
The hardware security module was designed in EVITA in order to comply with
automotive requirements: Cost effectiveness, tamper protection and specific
variants were taken into account for the actual design of the prototype. As
cost is the driving factor for automotive components, three variants of the
HSM were specified. While the ‘light’ module can be produced at low cost,
due to reduced functionality and thus chip surface, the ‘full’ module offers
high-performance must be powerful enough to handle hundreds of signature
verifications per second, as pointed out in estimations [G11]. A ‘medium’ variant
provides asymmetric operations, but no ECC hardware acceleration.
A common Trusted Platform Module that is used in the PC is overly complex
and costly compared with the ‘light’ HSM that is used to secure sensors in the
vehicle. Likewise, for the specialized ‘full’ module, ECC cryptography is used,
as this is foreseen for use with Car2X communication. Elliptic curve algorithms
are not used in standard TPMs, which use RSA as asymmetric algorithm. While
RSA is used in some software-only implementations at FOTs (simTD with 512-
bit pseudonym certificates), it is not suited for wide deployment due to overhead
through certificate and key length.
In the EVITA project, the HSM approach was compared to other hardware
solutions by Wolf and Gendrullis [WG11]. In particular, the EVITA HSM is
compared to TPMs as well as commonly used smart cards (SmC) and a specific
automotive solution, the Secure Hardware Extensions (SHE) module [HIS09],
specified by the Hersteller Initiative Software (HIS) consortium. We show their
comparison in Table 3.2.
Long lifetime is an important characteristic of vehicles. While most electronic
devices are only used for a few years, vehicles have a predicted lifecycle of over
15 years. Looking back 15 years, the MD5 algorithm was considered rather
secure—today we have just seen how malware successfully uploaded malicious
code via the MS Windows Update Service using a MD5 collusion in an old, but
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still valid certificate1. These diametric requirements (fresh algorithms vs. long
vehicle lifetime) pose a real problem. In the prototype implementation of the
HSM generic point arithmetic operations were implemented, so that algorithms
may be updated to a certain extent.
Full Medium Light SHE TPM SmC
Cryptographic algorithms
ECC/RSA ∎/∎ ∎/∎ ◻/◻ ◻/◻ ◻/∎ ⊞/⊞
AES/DES ∎/⊞ ∎/⊞ ∎/◻ ∎/◻ ◻/◻ ⊞/⊞
WHIRLPOOL/SHA ∎/∎ ∎/∎ ◻/◻ ◻/◻ ◻/∎ ⊞/⊞
Hardware acceleration
ECC/RSA ∎/◻ ◻/◻ ◻/◻ ◻/◻ ◻/◻ ◻/◻
AES/DES ∎/◻ ∎/◻ ∎/◻ ∎/◻ ◻/◻ ◻/◻
WHIRLPOOL/SHA ∎/◻ ◻/◻ ◻/◻ ◻/◻ ◻/◻ ◻/◻
Security features
Secure/authenticated boot ∎/∎ ∎/∎ ⊞/⊞ ∎/◻ ◻/∎ ◻/◻
Key AC per use/bootstrap ∎/∎ ∎/∎ ∎/⊞ ◻/∎ ⊞/∎ ◻/◻
PRNG with TRNG seed ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎ ∎
Monotonic counters 32/64 bit ∎/∎ ∎/∎ ◻/◻ ◻/◻ ∎/◻ ◻/◻
Tick/UTC-synced clock ∎/∎ ∎/∎ ∎/∎ ◻/◻ ◻/◻ ◻/◻
Internal processing
Programmable/preset CPU ∎/⊞ ∎/⊞ ◻/⊞ ◻/∎ ◻/∎ ⊞/⊞
Internal V/NV (key) memory ∎/∎ ∎/∎ ⊞/⊞ ∎/∎ ∎/◻ ∎/◻
Asynchronous/parallel IF ∎/⊞ ∎/◻ ∎/◻ ∎/◻ ◻/◻ ◻/◻
Annotation: ∎ = available, ◻ = not available, ⊞ = partly or optionally available
Table 3.2: Comparison between different EVITA Hardware Security Modules, TPMs
from the PC world, the SHE module for automotive, and Smart Cards (SmC) as generic
crypto-in-chip device. Table from [WG11].
1Meant is the “Flame Spyware”, which is attributed to intelligence services that developed
the software for targeted operations.




attention, risk, money and time
that an opponent will put into
reading traffic.”
Robert Morris Sr.
In today’s automobile, communication between different units is paramount. No
vehicle would be able to ignite or drive without at least the core electronic com-
ponents (e.g., engine control and brake systems) successfully communicating
over internal networks.
As the vehicle’s systems are more easily accessible, e.g., by connecting consumer
devices via USB or bluetooth, but also with the introduction of Ethernet in cur-
rent architectures, the on-board network becomes an easier target for attackers
compared to classic vehicles without electronic networks.
For future cooperative Car2X applications, which are under standardization
right now [Eur09b], the trust in received data is highly important. In cur-
rent approaches, only the wireless link between vehicles, i.e., Car2X with IEEE
802.11p, is secured with cryptographic signatures using an adapted IEEE 1609.2
format [BSM+09]. The internal on-board network, although equally important
in order to guarantee end-to-end security, has not been secured adequately.
In this Chapter, we take up this necessity to secure the communication between
individual units of the on-board network. As contribution of this Chapter, we
introduce i) a key distribution protocol and ii) a secure transport protocol for
automotive networks. The communication protocols are designed with limita-
tions of the communication bus and performance constraints of the computing
architecture in vehicular systems in mind.
We designed the protocols and interfaces of this protocol in a way that they
integrate, on the one hand, with Hardware Security Modules (HSMs) designed
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in EVITA, and on the other hand with the software security framework EMVY
as a prototype implementation. The integration of security functionality into
software frameworks is important, as the architecture and functional design pro-
cess of a vehicle’s network is largely model driven. In a model-driven approach
as taken in AUTOSAR, the framework assures that software functions can be
flexibly deployed anywhere in the network.
As communication is a central building block for nearly all automotive functions
that span among multiple ECUs, the techniques introduced in this Chapter apply
to all of our three scenarios.
4.1 Key Distribution in Embedded Environments
One of the main building blocks for secure embedded communication is key
management . It is essential to use fresh key material that is re-distributed
periodically. If only static keys were to be used, attacks against these (never
changing) keys would break the system for the rest of its lifetime. We use static
long term keys only for the purpose of transport encryption and authenticating
data, i.e., they are never directly used to encrypt or authenticate data apart
from freshly generated session keys and will never leave the corresponding HSM
apart from the initial pairing process that is done at the manufacturer (i.e., in
a trusted environment).
The presented approach makes use of hardware security, in order to leverage
performance by symmetric cryptography, while maintaining appropriate access
control on the key material itself through the HSM as secure element.
4.1.1 Asymmetric Usage of Symmetric Keys
We use shared secrets (i.e., symmetric keys) due to constraints for cost and
embedded deployment. Deploying those keys requires a small hardware compo-
nent, the HSM at each ECU. The HSM implements accelerated cryptographic
primitives and also offers secure key storage, thereby preventing any ECU com-
promise to spread to our key infrastructure. The HSM also mediates the access
to cryptographic keys. The keys possess of additional data fields, where an
expiration date, an authentication code or so-called use-flags are maintained.
The use-flags enable the HSM to distinguish for which functionality a specific
key can or cannot be used. Typically, the HSM will enforce some usage con-
trol on the symmetric keys it stores, based on those use-flags: for instance, a
symmetric key may be tagged for sign ing (i.e., generating a MAC) at a sin-
gle HSM while the exact same key resides at several other HSMs, where it is
tagged for verify ing only. This usage control makes it possible to enforce an
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asymmetric use of key material, while the computation itself is efficiently based
on symmetric cryptography.
Definition: The key kn,g is the session key used for generating MACs at ECUn
(the sending entity) and the key kl,v is for verifying the received data (including
MACs) at ECUl (the receiving entity).
Two other use-flags are used throughout this Chapter: the flags for export and
transport . The former allows a key to be exported in encrypted form and the
latter allows it to be used to encrypt another key for export (that other key must
be exportable). A cryptographic key can under no circumstances leave the HSM
unencrypted. Of the session keys, the verification part (kx,v for ECUx) must be
marked exportable for key distribution. Additionally, a separate authentication
key is used to validate an exported and transport-encrypted key.
For every ECUn that establishes a secure channel with other ECUs, there are
a transport encryption key kn,t and an authentication key kn,a deployed at its
own HSM and the HSM of the Key Master ECU.
The EVITA project differentiates between three different types of HSMs, as
explained in Section 3.5. While full and medium HSMs support and acceler-
ate asymmetric cryptography, we focus on the use of the light HSM, which
provides a hardware based implementation of symmetric cryptography primi-
tives only. This type of module is most interesting for integration into low-cost
sensors and actuators, as symmetric cryptography is less expensive in terms of
gate count [PLSP07, Kra04]. A comprehensive and detailed specification of
the HSM, including a comparison with the HIS SHE module, can be found
in [WWZ+10] and [WG11]. While the SHE module is comparable to EVITA’s
light module in its function set, it does not feature the use-flags that are an
important building block for our key management approach. The SHE module
is envisaged for deployment in cars soon.
4.1.2 Dynamic Key Exchanges
Globally shared keys that would, if revealed, compromise the overall system
security are avoided in our solution. The distribution of keys between commu-
nication partners is done through an entity called the Key Master (KM). Every
ECU ei on the vehicle network shares two secret keys with the KM. The first key
ki,a is used to authenticate the entities against each other, while the second key
ki,t is used for transport encryption of generated keys. A KM is a logical entity,
which can be present on one or more ECUs. It is possible to have multiple KMs
(e.g., one for every domain), so that keys are only shared for a limited number of
hosts. For explaining the key distribution protocol, we simplified the deployment
with only one central KM present in the vehicle network (see Fig. 4.1). For
multiple KMs, an additional connection between the involved key masters must
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Figure 4.1: One ECU acts as Key Master node (KM). Symmetric keys are shared with
every other ECU (e1, ei shown). All keys reside in the corresponding HSM (e.g., used for
Authentication). System wide policies are evaluated at the key master (Authorization).
be established with the key distribution protocol described in Section 4.1.5. In
this setting, a distributed policy system for managing the authorization of such
domain-spanning connections is used [SIR+10].
4.1.3 Multi-Criteria Setting of Secure Communication
Our work is integrated into the security framework described in 3.4.1, which
notably provides API abstractions for (i) entity authentication, (ii) secure com-
munication (integrity, confidentiality), and (iii) access control along with policy
management. The application programmer can open a communication channel
from A to B with a given security-property-set SP and security-level SL. The
receiver B may be a group of n recipient nodes, thus creating a 1 ∶ n communi-
cation channel. The security property set contains channel attributes, of which
we now use authentic and confidential, while the security-level refers to the
selection of a particular MAC strength, as explained in Section 4.2.3. The com-
munication module initiates the key exchange and establishes a secure channel
according to those attributes. Direct and group communication are managed in
the access control framework, which interacts with the communication API as
well as with the key distribution protocol. In Figure 4.1 the architecture of Key
Management is illustrated.
4.1.4 The Protocol
In the following, we develop the protocol for secure communication that is
initiated via the Key Master node. We use the protocol in order to distribute
a session key for authentication, i.e., the key will be used for generating MACs
for further communication. The protocol also applies to the distribution of
session keys for encrypting communication, for which the use-flags need to be
set accordingly.
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Figure 4.2: Key Distribution via Key Master. Steps (6–9) are executed for all i ECUs
in the receiver group. The numbers correspond to the steps defined in 4.1.4.
In order to explain the protocol, a simplified scenario of multicast communication
is assumed: one node sends messages to a group of receivers, as it is commonly
done in today’s vehicles1.
A secure communication session s between an ECU e1 and a group gx of i ECUs
ei is established by proceeding with the following steps.
In Figure 4.2 we illustrate the protocol with a sequence diagram. All steps that
affect any cryptographic material (i.e., generation, import and export steps) are
executed inside the HSM of the corresponding ECU.
1. At e1: Local generation of a key pair ks,g and ks,v, where only ks,v is
exportable. The key has a limited time of validity (verified upon import).
2. Export of ks,v, encrypted with transport key k1,t and authenticated with
k1,a We call this the key blob b1.
3. Open an unauthenticated communication channel between e1 and KM .
4. At KM : Authorization of communication request from e1 to group gx
based on policies.
5. Import of authenticated key blob b1(= ks,v) into HSM of KM .
6. Re-export the imported key ks,v for all ECUs ei in gx with the according
transport and authentication keys ki,t and ki,a as blobs bi.
7. Open unauthenticated communication channels from KM to all ei.
1On the CAN bus data are broadcasted on the medium and received according to a device’s
acceptance filter bit-mask, similar to IP multicast.
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8. At every ei: Import of authenticated key blob bi into HSM of ei: Now
the session key ks,v (verification-only) is available at ECU ei.
9. Acknowledgements for successful import sent to KM .
10. At KM : Acknowledgement of successful distribution to initiator ECU e1.
Please note that a strict control is enforced through the HSM’s use-flags, i.e.,
they describe for which operation a key can actually be used for by the HSM.
This means that, despite the use of symmetric keys, no ECU can impersonate
the sender of a group, which is the sole entity possessing the session key with
the sign-flag. This is also the rationale for placing key generation and re-keying
at the sender’s HSM and not at the key master. Otherwise, a compromised key
master would be able to impersonate sending ECUs, as it would also possess
the generation key.
We anticipate a limited lifetime of session key material. Specifically, a session
is envisaged to last for one drive cycle or a maximum of 48 hours, after which
it is not valid for use anymore.
The session key has a limited validity. Thus, replay attacks would only re-
distribute the currently valid session key. For readability and clarity of the
protocol, we have omitted additional timestamps or serial numbers.
In Figure 4.3 you can find a detailed diagram of how the key is distributed to
the individual ECU’s HSMs in three phases. The session key itself is depicted
in blue and exists in two different variants: With and without red border, which
marks the ‘sign’ capability, i.e. ks,g. The blue key without red border may only
validate received data, i.e., it corresponds to ks,v. The first phase corresponds
to steps 1–5 in the sequence diagram. Phase 2 corresponds to steps 6–8, and
Phase 3 shows the successful distribution after steps 9 and 10.
4.1.5 Multi-Domain deployment
Central elements of a network architecture often represent so-called Single
Points of Failure (SPOF). While it is true that the Central Gateway (CGW),
which is part of most modern vehicles since the mid 2000s, already is such a
potential SPOF, we would like to emphasize the importance of the availability
of security components. If such a security component fails, it may affect the
complete system. A fallback to unsecured communication, in our case, would
open a door for DoS attacks against the central element. Algorithms for keeping
replicate information up-to-date have been developed in Distributed Systems.
However an assessment in the automotive domain is beyond the scope of this
thesis.
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Figure 4.3: Key Distribution Phases: A session key (blue) is generated at the initiating
ECU1 (phase 1). A verify-only session key (without red border) is exported to the
master node, where it is distributed to all group members, ECU{2,3} (phase 2). After
successful key distribution (phase 3), data sent from ECU1 can be authenticated at all
group members. The ECUs as shown were used for the receiving vehicle in the Active
Brake use case (Scenario I).
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Data Replication
The Key Master node and its HSM may be replicated at another ECU of the
network. This would allow for a fallback solution if the primary KM is not
available due to failure or attack. The HSM of the secondary KM must possess
the exactly same shared secret with each ECU of the on-board network. While
the security is slightly decreased due to the fact that keys are stored at a second
place (inside the secure storage of the second HSM), the overall availability of
the communication architecture is increased. As reliability of vehicular networks
is of a great concern, this solution should be carefully assessed. A detailed
investigation of this reliability problem is, however, beyond the scope of this
thesis.
Partitioned Deployment for Enhancing Domain Security
The approach of using more than one KM node may not only be employed to
increase availability through a redundant deployment. It may as well serve the
purpose of partitioning the key space for increased security. The vehicle network
consists of different domains: The drivetrain domain comprises of engine and
transmission control, while infotainment connects display and control elements.
This intrinsic design can be used to partition the shared secrets at individual
domain controllers: The KM for one domain only contains the shared secret of
ECUs of its own domain.
The security of individual domains is increased by this deployment variant. It
does not imply that communication must stay inside the domain. We can slightly
modify the key distribution protocol in order to establish domain-spanning com-
munication as explained below. This is important for a real world deployment,
as current communication groups can also span multiple domains (e.g., the
current speed signal is transmitted into nearly all networks).
Domain Spanning Key-Distribution
A requirement for KM nodes is that they are equipped with at least a medium
HSM (c.f. Table 3.2 on page 54), so that asymmetric algorithms can be per-
formed on-chip. This allows for a secure channel establishment between KM
nodes, even without previously distributed keys (i.e., using manufacturer-signed
certificates only).
The distribution protocol for establishing secure communication among different
domains of the vehicle only needs to be changed slightly. An additional phase
needs to be performed between the KM of the originating domain and the
second KM in the destination domain. This additional phase is done after the
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msc Inter-KM Key Exchange
Figure 4.4: Key Distribution in Partitioned Domain: Between steps 5 and 6 of the
MSC shown in Fig. 4.2 four additional steps are added. The two KMs of the domains
exchange their public key certificates (steps 5(1) to 5(3)) before the actual session key
is transmitted (step 5(4)).
import of the session key (step 5 in the original sequence diagram), and before
it is re-exported for the other ECUs of the group (step 6).
The establishment of a connection between two KMs of different domains is
based on the asymmetric device key, for which a manufacturer-signed certificate
exists. This certificate contains a signature of the manufacturer and is thus
accepted at the other KM when used to authenticate, as the manufacturer is
a trusted certificate authority. The manufacturer’s public key is built into any
medium HSM and in order to verify the signature of other certificates. The
session key itself is transport-encrypted using the device’s key (or a derived
key after successful authentication). The process is similar to that of an SSL
handshake, without having to agree on a cipher or a separate key, as only
transport encryption for the session key in transit is used.
The additional phase is depicted in Figure 4.4. The two domain KMs exchange
their public keys in steps 5(1) and 5(3). In 5(2) the receiving KM authorizes the
group communication request to one of its domain ECUs. The actual session key
is transferred in the last step, 5(4), before the protocol continues as originally
described in Section 4.1.4. The establishment is similar to that of SSL with
client and server-side certificates (mutual authentication), but without the need
to agree on a specific protocol or intermediate session key. We have omitted
some cryptographic details (e.g., the generation of random number on both
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sides) for better readability.
4.1.6 Initial Key Distribution
As symmetric keys are used in the approach in order to keep cost and chip
complexity low for the HSM, special attention has to be given to the transport
of key material. The initial keys that need to be known at the individual HSM
and the Key Master must be initialized in a trusted environment. This means
that no external attacker should be able to eavesdrop on communications on
the on-board network.
The initialization of the shared keys will take place at the assembly of the vehi-
cle, when also the Vehicle Identification Number (VIN) and other identifiers are
programmed into the ECUs. The assembly can be regarded a trusted environ-
ment for keying. As a unique key for every ECU is used, the risk of compromise
is very moderate, even if an employee on the assembly line would retrieve a key.
4.1.7 Maintenance and Part Replacement
Vehicles need maintenance throughout their lifetime. Although only compo-
nents experiencing wear and tear need to be exchanged, also electronic compo-
nents such as sensors or ECUs may experience failure. Exchanging an ECU at
a workshop needs special care in our case, as sensitive cryptographic material
needs to be replaced or reprogrammed.
In particular, we will look at the exchange of a sensor that must be paired with
the KM node, i.e., the shared key that comes with a new component needs to
be imported into the HSM of an existing Key Master node.
Conditions In contrast to the manufacturer’s assembly halls, a workshop can-
not be regarded a trusted environment. In addition, the cryptographic material
needs to be transferred to the workshop, yet the mechanic should not be able to
recover the (unencrypted) key. A further requirement is that network connec-
tivity should not be a prerequisite, as maintenance also needs to be practicable
at remote places and in countries with limited network infrastructure.
The approach that is presented here is divided into two scenarios, for online and
oﬄine use. In complement to replacing complete ECUs an approach for online
updates of vehicle firmware (FOTA, Firmware Over The Air) is discussed in our
paper [ISR+11].
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Figure 4.5: Key Pairing for Exchange Parts: Online Case.
Online Case
The dealership or workshop is connected to the manufacturer’s backend by
means of some secure network connectivity (e.g., a standard VPN or SSL con-
nection), as it is already the case in many countries. This way, the symmetric
key of the new component, which is also present in the manufacturer’s back-
end service, can be re-encrypted for the KM of a specific vehicle. A secure
handshake process similar to SSL with a client-certificate ensures mutual au-
thenticity to both parties. This is possible, because certificates that are signed
by a trusted authority are available at the KM and the backend. The setup is
shown in Figure 4.5.
Oﬄine Case
In contrast to the online case, the key information supplied for the new part can
not be encrypted for a specific car on-the-fly. An encrypted key is supplied with
the product on some media (e.g., CD or flash drive). This transport encryption
can be used with specific diagnosis utilities that are equipped with an HSM. An
HSM can potentially be implemented in the form of a removable smartcard. This
diagnosis equipment can establish a secure and mutually authenticated channel
to the KM node of the vehicle and receives its identity certificate (IDK). It then
reads the encrypted key that came with the replacement part, imports it and
re-exports it for the KM, where it is stored for further use. The setup is shown
in Figure 4.6.
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Figure 4.6: Key Pairing for Exchange Parts: Oﬄine Case.
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4.2 Securing CAN Bus Communication
The most commonly used communication bus in today’s vehicles is the CAN
bus that is operated at 500 kbit/s and offers 8 bytes of data payload per packet.
From a security perspective, a slice of eight bytes for the security payload does
not provide an adequate protection. On the other hand, including a larger pay-
load field or a dedicated field for security is not feasible, as the protocol could not
be changed without modification of all CAN transceivers on a bus. There exists
a backwards-compatible approach to incorporate security payload by raising the
sampling rate, which was validated in an FPGA implementation [HSV11]. How-
ever, it is not feasible to change the design of all CAN transceivers in the near
future, also given the fact that alternative buses already exist. In the following,
we show how we employ a protocol that was primarily used for vehicle diagnosis,
the CAN Transport Protocol [ISO04], in order to transmit larger payloads on
existing CAN buses.
4.2.1 Technical Background
Controller Area Network (CAN)
The CAN bus is a field bus that has been introduced in 1986. The currently
used version is CAN 2.0, released in 1991 [Rob91]. It is known to be very
resistant to electromagnetic interference and thus found a wide adaption in
vehicular on-board networks. Despite its comparatively low bandwidth (up to
1MBit/s, typically 500kbit/s and 100kbit/s or 125kbit/s depending on the total
bus length, are used) it has two interesting properties: message-based addressing
and its unique media access control scheme.
Addressing Addressing is special, because it does not rely on sender/desti-
nation pairs. Instead, a unique identifier (11bit for standard, 29bit for extended
CAN frames) is used. This identifier is used for three purposes:
• To identify the payload,
• To identify the sender (i.e., multiple sending nodes may not use the same
identifier),
• To prioritize physical bus access, i.e, media access control on OSI layer 2.
Bus access The bus access on CAN buses is priority controlled: At the be-
ginning of every data transmission, a so-called arbitration phase decides, which
station, among those who want to send, may access the bus. Due to the fact
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that this arbitration phase is collision free, the media-access-control method is
called CSMA/CA2 for “Carrier Sense Multiple Access / Collission Avoidance”.
The message priority, i.e., the CAN identifier, decides about the bus access: The
lower the identifier, the higher the priority. In fact, the bus itself implements a
‘wired AND’, where two nodes, accessing the bus at the same time with iden-
tifier bits 0 and 1, will sense a 0 due to the ’wired - AND - property’ (0∧ 1 ≡ 0
for synchronous transmission of 0 and 1 of different transceivers of the same
bus), i.e., a synchronous transmission of 0 and 1 on the same bus will lead to a
0 being transmitted. At this point in time, the node which wanted to send the
1 will stop arbitration and back off for retrying arbitration at the next frame
transmission cycle.
Security Weaknesses One of the main shortcomings of the CAN bus, from
a security perspective, is that any participant in bus communication may send
any kind of (unauthenticated) data at any priority and thereby hinder normal
network traffic. There exists no sender/destination, but a signal paradigm in
the automotive world. Data frames are addressed by service, i.e., a specific ID
is used to address the recipients of data packets and no sender identification
is used. The CAN bus was designed to be (fail-) safe against various electro-
magnetic influences, but never designed to be secure.
4.2.2 CAN Transport Protocol
We show how a transport protocol [ISO04], which has been used for other
purposes in the vehicle, in particular for diagnosis, can be employed in order
to transmit additional security payload. This transport protocol segments the
payload into chunks of 6 (for the first frame) or 7 bytes (for all consecutive
frames) and adds control information, e.g., a four-bit sequence number that is
part of the first reserved byte. Thus, a payload of n bytes is split into




packets (for n > 6). Figure 4.7 illustrates the segmentation of the payload into
multiple CAN frames.
The latency of the overall transmission increases more than linearly with the
number of packets sent, as CAN is a priority-based bus in which higher priority
frames will always take precedence over an ongoing segmented transmission,
i.e., each of the m individual frames can be delayed by higher-priority traffic.
The probability of bit-flips increases with the number of segments. According
2In fact, the CSMA postfix has never been standardized. Due to that, there also exist
CSMA/AMP for “Arbitration on Message Priority” and CSMA/BA for “Bitwise Arbitration”
and CSMA/CR for “Collision Resolution”.
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to the CAN standard [Rob91], the probability of successful transmission of one
frame is at least (1 − 4.7 ∗ 10−11). As this probability is very high, the loss
probability of a message of n segments is low. For small n ∈ [2; 20] it decreases
approximately linear. The transport protocol, as it is standardized, does not
know of retransmissions.
4.2.3 Truncation of Cryptographic Authentication Codes
Not all communications within a vehicle demand the same level of security.
Integrity and authenticity are the most demanded requirements for in-vehicle
communication. Figure 4.8 outlines an accumulation of low- and medium risk
levels, which means that many application security requirements can already be
covered with basic security measures, such as truncated MACs. This applies
as well to our selected three scenarios: In the first scenario, Active Brake,
malfunction or malicious behavior would indeed have potentially fatal effects
(leading to strong security requirements). The other two scenarios, playing
music and automatic seat adjustment, do not directly have an impact on the
vehicle behavior and thus do not have as strong security requirements.
Given the fact that basic security can already protect most applications and that
bandwidth is a scarce resource on automotive buses, we allow MAC truncation,
i.e., the use of only fractions of a calculated MAC. According to NIST and
FIPS recommendations [Dwo05] [Fed02], cryptographic authentication codes
should have a minimal length of 64 bits, when no additional measures to limit
the validation rate are taken. Within our environment, we already have several
environmental limitations, such as bus speed (low) and bus load (high), which
hinder attacks at higher speeds. We furthermore set a hard limit for verification
trials for any given key-handle to one hundred per second at the HSM. This is
the reason, why we can limit the size of authentication codes further and allow
a minimum length of 32 bits.
Given these limitations, the expectancy time of a brute force collision attack (i.e.,
random guesses) for 32-bit MACs at 100 possible tries per second corresponds to
over 35 weeks. This is a reasonable value, especially since additional measures,
such as plausibility checks involving multiple information sources are usually
employed. In Table 4.1 it is shown how different MAC lengths result in increased
expectation for success of a brute force attack given the limit of 100 verifications
per second.
A requirement for truncating MACs is that the attacker cannot control the
way in which the recipient validates the MAC, as discussed in [Mit03]. Our
session keys are bound to a specific truncation by the security-property-set that
is defined per communication channel. That is, the attacker cannot influence
the way the recipient will verify the MAC by changing the payload.
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(a) Payload segmentation for the ISO Transport Protocol on CAN
frames as defined in [ISO04].



























  	 

  	 






  	 
(b) Latency of segmented payload for ISO-TP: The MAC is segmented into n pieces.
Every packet is subject to CAN arbitration.
Figure 4.7: The CAN Transport Protocol: Payload, e.g. large cryptographic data such
as MACs are segmented into multiple individual frames on the CAN bus.
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Figure 4.8: Count (bins) of Risk Levels RL1—RL7 with regard to selected security
requirements in communication. A risk level is a combination of occurrence-probability
and impact. The count shows an aggregate of security requirements for all use cases
of the EVITA project (details in [KFL+09, RWW+09, WWZ+10]).
If an attacker would have the possibility to access the API directly, and could
choose the truncation length for verification, guessing a MAC would of course
be much simpler for reduced lengths. The underlying algorithm that is used
to construct the MAC output needs to be crafted in a way that it distributes
its output uniformly over the complete MAC-space {0,1}n. Usually, this is the
case for hash functions and encryption ciphers that are used for this purpose,
but there exist some exceptions which must be avoided, or at least carefully
assessed, as pointed out in [WFLW08], where they introduce the notion of
robustly unforgeable MACs for truncations of the output. A standard AES-
based CMAC implementation is used in our HSM implementation.
4.2.4 Implications for CAN bus communication
Clearly, the transport protocol has a strong influence on the performance of
communication (i.e., latency and bus load). In order to secure the payload,
and also to initially distribute cryptographic keys, the payload is segmented into
multiple frames. This means, on the one hand, that individual messages have
a higher latency and, on the other hand, that the overall bus load is increased.
We have evaluated the resulting latency and load with two different simulation
approaches: TTool and TrueTime on Matlab/Simulink. Our simulations are
presented in the Evaluation Chapter in section 6.2, Protocol Measurements.
The results of both simulations show an acceptable performance.
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Table 4.1: Time to Collide MAC (P=0.5). Random guesses (brute force attacks)
for different lengths of MAC at rate of 100 tries per second (intentionally limited by
design—restriction applies per key-handle). The expected number of MAC verifications
is 2n−1 for an n-bit truncation.
Other Buses
The transport protocol can also be applied to other automotive buses. The
FlexRay and the MOST bus are newer but also more expensive networks, which
offer larger payload fields that do not necessitate any segmentation of a security
payload. In contrast, the LIN bus (Local Interconnect Network) is a low cost
Master/Slave bus that is largely used to connect low-cost components, e.g.,
seat-position-servos and control panels with few buttons. Similar to CAN, it only
offers eight bytes of payload. The ISO Transport Protocol exists also for LIN to
enable diagnostic features. This makes payload segmentation available for all
components that support diagnosis. On the one hand, such small components
are rarely safety critical and do not need a high security level. On the other hand,
the devices that act as gateways are themselves part of an uplink bus (usually
CAN) and need to be secured adequately. In particular, for exposed components
such as rear-view mirrors or control buttons inside doors, data originating from
the LIN network needs to be handled with care, for instance input validation or
plausibility checks should be performed.
4.3 Related Work
The vehicle domain has for a long time been driven by functional requirements.
Security features have only been added to selected functions, such as immobi-
lizers or remote door unlocking. Recent analyses have shown that the risk of
attacks on vehicle bus systems is not anymore of theoretical nature [KCR+10].
Even supposedly well-secured functions, such as remotely unlocking the vehicle,
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have been proven faulty [FDC11].
With the integration of new wireless access technologies in order to enable ap-
plications based on Car2X and internet communication, new security threats are
posed against vehicular on-board networks. Furthermore, in order to enable cer-
tain communication-based safety functions, the trust in data from a source has
to be assured with dedicated security measures within the vehicular on-board
network. While most of research has focussed on securing external communi-
cation, the security of the on-board network has been only partly addressed,
yet.
For upcoming Car2X communication, several approaches have been discussed
in research. Most rely on asymmetric cryptography [KPB+08], but also group-
cryptography [GBW07] and timed-symmetric [HL06] mechanisms are taken into
account.
For the in-vehicle architecture, numerous authors mention the need for security
[Kun08, EB06, GFL+07]. However, rather few real-world solutions have been
proposed. A basis for security within the on-board network is the establishment
of trust relations by pre-deploying keys, such as the in-vehicle key distribution
mechanism which has been proposed in [OYN+08]. Their approach is based on
a so-called Key Predistribution System. They use an n × n generation matrix,
which is stored at a dedicated master ECU and parts (the rows) at all n ECUs.
As ours, their system uses symmetric cryptography and trusted hardware. How-
ever, we see that the practicability of their approach is largely limited by the
fact that the configuration must be static over the complete vehicle lifetime.
Despite the fact that vehicle upgrades aren’t possible without changing the com-
plete keying matrix, maintenance work such as the replacement of ECUs is very
complex. Another approach for in-vehicle security is discussed in [Be09]. The
presented security framework also relies on a master/slave partitioning. The
master node holds a shared symmetric secret with each of the ECUs, similar
to our approach. However, only mutual communication is foreseen in [Be09].
These mutual session keys are generated and stored at the master node and do
not have the notion of use-flags.
Both approaches are fitted to embedded systems, but pay not attention to
an important aspect in vehicle networks. Neither supports communication to
multiple receivers, which is the core use case within current on-board networks,
where data is sent to multiple receivers. In [GR09], this problem is addressed by
creating application groups with dedicated shared keys. This approach also relies
on a master node, the Key Distribution Center. A fundamental difference is that
asymmetric cryptography is used to distribute the symmetric group keys, and
therefore needs more expensive hardware. The approach also uses a master node
that possesses the symmetric keys and could thus interfere with communication
if compromised.
In order to secure the actual communication [CRH05] proposed the use of RC4
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in order to encrypt the bus payload. The frequent renewal of key material
is a specific requirement for using RC4, as parts of the key may be revealed
if known data fragments are encrypted more than once, as it was seen for
weaknesses in WEP. In [NLJ08] it was suggested to compute a MAC over four
consecutive CAN frames, truncate the result to 64 bits and split it among the
CRC fields of the next four frames. The approach introduces the notion of
delayed authentication. A major hindrance for real world deployment is that all
transceiver chips of the network would need to be replaced, in order to buffer
the appropriate message and to evaluate the CRC field accordingly. Changing
the transceiver chips is also necessary for the solution presented in [HSV11].
It incorporates MACs into CAN frames by using a higher physical sampling
frequency on the bus. They thereby create extra space for payload, which is
used for the MAC.
Our approach has the advantage that it covers both important topics, namely
key distribution and transport authentication. We introduce an additional delay
in the communication, as other approaches do, but in contrast to others, we do
not change the underlying CAN network. Thus, our approach can be applied to
standard components that are found in the vehicle today. Our key distribution
strategy takes group communication into account, an aspect which had often
been overlooked. We use symmetric keys in an asymmetric manner that is
enforced through the use of HSMs. Therefore, the required hardware is less
complex and cheaper, which is an important aspect in vehicle engineering.
The main publication supporting this Chapter is [SRW+11].
Ph.D. Thesis — Hendrik C. Schweppe
Chapter 5
Dynamic Platform Security
“You can’t defend. You can’t
prevent. The only thing you can
do is detect and respond.”
Bruce Schneier
In this Chapter we describe the approach we have taken to enhance the platform
security of automotive control units beyond secure communication. It differs
considerably from static approaches. While static approaches, such as a secure
boot process, or software signatures provide an important building block in sys-
tem security, they cannot guarantee resistance against the runtime exploitation
of firmware or against the compromise of any program running on a statically
secured device. We have explained the techniques of these building blocks in
Chapter 2.
In the past, we have seen a trend that static security does not prevent the
realization of successful attacks for a long time, if the target is of interest
for a hacker community. A good and recent example of this trend is shown by
Apple’s iOS devices, which immediately caught the community’s attention when
released. The devices are well protected through a sophisticated secure boot
process, jailed processes, and cryptographic application signatures as explained
in [App12]. Despite this, every version has been successfully compromised for
each of the products, sometimes only days after the release. We have shown a
timeline of this cat-and-mouse game in Figure 2.10 (page 34).
Similarly, most of the real-world vehicle hacks that were demonstrated in [CMK+11],
[KCR+10], and [RMM+10] did not rely on breaking static security measures but
on exploiting the runtime system, e.g., by overflowing variables in the music
player or otherwise breaking weak implementations, like those for bluetooth
pairing and CDMA radio modulation. They also showed attacks against classic
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measures by cracking the two-byte access code for firmware flashing. This al-
lowed them to reprogram a modified firmware to an ECU. In summary, these
examples of attacks suggest protection means beyond communication security
and purely static approaches are required.
For this sort off attacks, the dynamic platform security needs to be strength-
ened. The contribution of this Chapter is an enhancement of the overall system
security on multiple levels. We monitor the behavior of individual components
in different granularities: With classic Intrusion Detection System (IDS) the
behavior of network nodes (e.g., the frequency of messages, message content,
or valid addressing) is inspected. This is referred to as Network Based IDS
(NIDS). Furthermore the behavior of programs during execution (e.g., memory
and CPU utilization patterns) is monitored. This is referred to as Host Based
IDS (HIDS). As the vehicle is a very distributed system of systems, the indi-
vidual IDS components need to be coordinated in a distributed manner, thus
being a Distributed IDS .
In addition to the classic Intrusion Detection System approach, tracing data
usage dynamically is a promising approach in order to overcome runtime ex-
ploitation, especially for potentially untrusted code. Such untrusted code may
be third party applications (Apps), where no malicious intent is visible at first
sight. This data flow tracking concept is employed in our architecture in order to
trace program execution at a fine granularity that goes beyond monitoring CPU
or memory usage patterns. We inspect the use of individual pieces of data and
follow their propagation throughout code execution. A binary-instrumentation
based taint engine is used to locally track data flows in untrusted code.
A generic architecture for the on-board intrusion detection system that is part of
our approach is described in the first Section (5.1). The secure communication
middleware, developed in the previous Chapter, is used to securely propagate
information between the individual nodes of the system. A combination with
data flow tracking leverages the classic IDS. It follows tainted data locally,
but also among ECUs in order to monitor the information flows between local
applications and for distributed applications. We describe this approach in the
second Section (5.2). It is particularly suited for ECUs with good processing
power, as information flow tracking incurs significant overhead. A new HSM-
based approach is described in Section 5.3. It ties dynamic runtime security to
the Hardware Security Module, i.e., at a very low level, which is independent
from the actual program and operating system execution. It relies on strong
time constraints at execution and is therefore particularly suited for small ECUs
with statically scheduled jobs.
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Figure 5.1: The IDS consists of sensors, detectors, events, and actions. Sensors are
the source of detection: They send probe data to one or more detectors. Detectors
are subscribed to one or more sensors and generate events based on the evaluation of
probe data. Events trigger one or more actions, which previously registered for these
events.
5.1 Intrusion Detection and Response
Classic intrusion detection systems are based on different types of detection
mechanisms and models. They are either specification-based, matching moni-
tored data against signatures or pattern specifications, or anomaly-based, using
machine-learning techniques to classify normal behavior and detect anomalies
in the behavior of the system by monitoring communication and execution.
Similarly, misuse detection models define dedicated misuse of system functions
(e.g., a dedicated number of failed login attempts). According to [Bis04], usu-
ally a combination of two or three models is used in practice. All techniques
can be applied at different layers of processing and communication. Host-based
systems, such as traditional virus scanners, historically rely on a large signa-
ture database. Since some years, there exist approaches to detect malware by
analyzing behavioral patterns at runtime [KKB+06, Rie09, ESKK08].
In the vehicle domain, many of these mechanisms are not applicable as-is. Com-
munication patterns can be detected and classified more easily, as electric signals
are often repeated in short periods and both the format of network frames and
the data format are well-defined. However, common ECUs often do not have the
processing power to run sophisticated algorithms, so that simple classification
(such as analyzing the periodicity or outlier values of a signal) is preferred.
A fundamental difference between classic intrusion detection and automotive
systems is that patterns to detect intrusions cannot easily be updated in vehicles.
While today’s virus scanners regularly (daily or at most weekly) update their
signature and heuristics databases, such a reliable back-end connectivity is not
foreseen for all kinds of vehicles, especially in the low-cost sector.
In the scope of the security framework described in Chapter 3, we have created
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intrusion sensors that can be distributed to different ECUs of the vehicle network.
Their observations are sent to a master node, where they are evaluated. Our
approach leaves the flexibility for IDS evaluations to be either pattern-based
or behavior-based. The evaluator functions can be stateful (i.e., save a time-
window of received probe data) or stateless (i.e., only evaluate the last probe
received).
If the evaluator function suggests a possible intrusion or abnormality, a labeled
event is triggered. The label depends on the potential intrusion that was de-
tected.
At the last stage of the IDS, these events trigger actions. An action is subscribed
to one or more events, in order to react on specific conditions. The actions can
have an active influence on the configuration of the vehicle network, e.g., modify
the system-wide policies, or signal the detection to some display or log inside
the vehicle. In any case, the design of events and actions must make sure that
false positive alerts do not create an additional attack surface for Denial of
Service (DoS) attacks, and do not create confusion or distraction for the driver.
This is a sensitive topic which we take up the discussion on intrusion response in
the conclusion (Chapter 7). Fall-back rules that isolate parts of the vehicle but
guarantee a safe and drivable state of the system may provide a viable solution.
The relations between sensors, evaluators, events, and actions are visualized in
Figure 5.1.
5.1.1 Architecture: Vehicular Network and Host Based Intrusion
Detection System
Deployment The overall architecture of the Intrusion Detection System de-
veloped within the security framework is partitioned into sensors and actions,
which are deployed at different places within the vehicle. The actual evaluation
that consists of detectors and events, is done at a central place at the EMVY
master node (see 3.4.1 on page 49 for details on the architecture).
As the networks used within the vehicle are broadcast media, network-based
anomalies can be detected, but their origin cannot be identified. A deployment
of IDS sensors at all ECUs is more expensive, but would be suited to determine
the misbehaving node with a voting-like approach, as discussed in [LNJ08],
where all nodes of the system were equipped with sensors.
An example layout for sensor deployment is shown in Figure 5.2. In particular
interfaces with other buses and with the outside need to be protected. Such
interfaces include wireless links, such as Bluetooth and WiFi, but also wired
interfaces such as OBD-2 (accessible from inside the vehicle) and even those
that are possibly accessible (e.g., cables connecting electronics inside the door
or side mirrors). There exist tools to inhibit the alarm trigger and roll down
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Figure 5.2: Distributed IDS Deployment in Vehicular On-Board Networks. Shown is a
simplified network. ECUs are connected by two CAN buses (low and high speed), one
MOST bus, and a LIN bus. The Head Unit (HU), the central infotainment component,
connects external media devices via USB or Bluetooth. The red boxes show an example
deployment of the IDS sensors. IDS sensors should be placed wherever the risk for a
potential attack is increased, e.g. where external interfaces are connected. The light-
red box constitutes the IDS master, which evaluates probe data and generates events
in order to trigger actions. It is placed at the CGW, as the most connected entity of
the network.
the windows of a theft system when opening the door electronically, only by
hooking up to the wires [Jac12].
IDS Sensors
The sensors take measurements of their environment and, in a periodic manner
or on occurrence, send these data to the master node. Data may be preprocessed
within the nodes, in order to aggregate data over a certain time window, e.g.,
for one second or one minute.
The probe data that is sent to the detector functions consists of:
• A type field that identifies the kind of probe data from this sensor,
• An issuing entity identifier of the sensor, including address information,
• A timestamp,
• A data field that contains the actual probe data.
Sensors can be host and network based. Network-based sensors consider, for
example:
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- Frame-Format (packet conforming to the expected standard),
- Frame-Content (packet content is not within the expected value interval),
and
- ID-Frequency (How often are frames of a specific ID sent).
Host-based sensors that may apply to the whole platform or individual tasks,
measure for example:
- Memory-Usage (or usage patterns)
- CPU-Usage (or usage patterns)
- DIFT alerts (as explained in Sect. 5.2)
IDS Detectors and Events
The detectors are placed at the master node. They subscribe to one or more
sensors, which are distributed over the network. In addition to the probe values
from sensors, a detector has further data sources: It uses a configuration (e.g.,
a detection threshold may be set), and may also takes advantage of a database,
such as a set of signatures or patterns, or learned knowledge for clustering-based
approaches.
The policy module is a specific datasource. It stores system-wide policy rules,
which define which kind of communication or service is permitted to which
entities and on which network segment. Based on these rules, an evaluator
function can detect if a policy was overridden, e.g., by some kind of network
communication.
A detector’s evaluation function processes the received probes based on its
model: The model consists of configuration and, optionally, a database. If
the evaluator function detects anomalies, it generates an event . An event is
basically a small data structure that consists of a timestamp, the origin, and the
event type. In addition, a reference to the original probe data is contained. The
original probe data is not discarded, but saved until it is handled by an action
in the next step.
IDS Actions
The actions are the last item in the chain of the IDS components. An action
can be as simple as saving the triggered event and the corresponding probe data.
On the other hand, it can be as complex as changing system-wide policies. In
any case, changing the vehicle behavior or functionality is a delicate topic, as
it may surprise or distract the driver. Actions are subscribed to events. The
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actions can be placed either at the master node, or at any other place in the
network.
Actions include:
- Logging the event and potential probe data,
- Alerting the driver or some back-end,
- Changing system-wide policies,
- Shutting off services and ECUs
If there is, for any event, no specific action that is subscribed, the default action
is always to log and save the event.
5.2 Distributed and Dynamic Information Flow
In the vehicle, data are constantly exchanged between different units via on-
board networks. While the communication between sensors, controllers, and
actors was more or less a closed system, the integration of consumer devices
and installable applications creates a more dynamic environment. These new
features demand an access to vehicle services, which were historically isolated
from any external communication. Furthermore, vehicles will soon receive data
from other vehicles or from the infrastructure via Car2X communication. Such
data might be crafted maliciously in order to exploit protocol stack vulnerabilities
in the vehicle.
We would like to emphasize two types of attacks that can go beyond the capa-
bilities of static security measures: i) hijacking the control flow of an application
and ii) obtaining and using data in a way that infringes the driver’s privacy.
We exemplify them with the scenarios from Chapter 3. The first type of at-
tack, hijacking the control flow of an application, comprises classic exploiting
techniques, in order to execute different code. The second type consists of
applications that access potentially delicate data (such as the seat position
in scenario III, or even more so, internal microphones) and, at the same time,
have capabilities to record or transmit data (e.g., to retrieve content or updates
from the internet). This breaches the user’s privacy by secretly transferring
private data or information about behavior or location. Such a behavior has
been largely observed for applications on mobile devices, e.g., out of 30 popular
Android applications 15 would transmit additional personal data (Oct 2010)
[EGC+10]. A similar study based on automated static binary analysis of iOS
applications revealed that 195 of 1407 applications (14%) would secretly access
the device identifier (Jan 2011) [EKKV11].
Enck et al. use an approach for analyzing Android applications by tracking data
at runtime [EGC+10] that is also interesting in our context. Their approach tags
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data at the source, e.g., system calls, and follows the tagged data throughout
the execution of a program. While the approach of tagging data as tainted
was not new, this approach was the first to show that an implementation on
embedded devices is feasible. Tainting offers the advantage of knowing about
the origins of data without statically following its course of execution, which is
sometimes not easily possible, for example in binary code.
However, this concept cannot be directly adopted in the vehicle domain. It could
possibly be used for a stand-alone controller or computer, such as the vehicle’s
head unit. The conception of vehicle networks is, to a great extent, a connected
system of distributed sensors, actuator, and computation nodes. In general, the
idea of tracing data through a computation system seems appealing. We use
of this concept not only to address privacy issues, but also intrusion prevention
or detection.
The system that we propose uses the taint of data also outside of a single
execution environment, i.e., it propagates tag information between ECUs within
the vehicle network. By this, we can track the origin of data in order to avoid
unwanted leakage of private information to third parties, and can also ensure
validity of received data by matching the required route of processing with
incoming (ingress) and outgoing (egress) rules and policies.
To illustrate the overall concept, Figure 5.3 shows data generated at the brake
controller (red) and GPS receiver (green), used at the ESP/ABS unit and sent
along to the Head Unit. A warning message is generated for the Car2X inter-
face, and then to the Instrument Cluster (IC). Data is combined with location
information (green) by the Car2X unit before being sent to other vehicles.
A combination with classic access control policies allows to protect against any
unwanted leakage of private information. By tainting inbound data sources, a
taint tag in combination with a ruleset also becomes a tool to detect intrusions.
Preconditions Two preconditions have to be met in order to rely on such
distributed taint data: i) communication security and ii) static platform security
need to be assured for all nodes in the processing sequence. These conditions
are met by the secure communication protocols developed in Chapter 4 and the
EVITA Hardware Security Module described in Section 3.5, which we use as
building blocks.
To be able to combine and propagate taint information locally, a dynamic infor-
mation flow engine is used. It propagates taint tags among instructions during
processing. Unlike the approach on a single execution platform, propagating the
information to remote, intermediate processing nodes, requires the authenticity
and integrity of the taint tag.
In addition to privacy related information leakage threats, information flow con-
trol that is analyzed at the scope of single processor instructions can also be
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Figure 5.3: Data originating at the brake controller and GPS unit is enhanced by a
taint tag (Scenario I, sending vehicle). Background ©BMW.
used in order to protect against classic attacks on the execution architecture,
such as buffer- and heap overflow attacks. In such cases, the user-supplied
marking of control-flow related data is checked before a call (e.g., return or
free) is executed, thereby making it possible to spot the attack.
5.2.1 Data Flow Tracking
On-Board applications are designed in a particularly distributed and communi-
cation centric fashion. Applications are built as small function blocks following
a component based model that emphasizes the connection of inputs and out-
puts to basic or composite software modules. Those software modules are finally
mapped to different ECUs, thereby generating specific communication patterns.
Automotive middleware frameworks such as AUTOSAR are generally used to
support such architectures.
In this distributed software and hardware system, it is important to follow data
not only within, but also between individual ECUs. For example, a successful
attack via the tire-pressure monitoring system as shown in [RMM+10], in which
the sensors transmit their data wirelessly and unauthenticated, makes it evident
that superficially unrelated data can compromise parts of the vehicle. In the
case of their experiments, the speedometer display was compromised. Data
like tire pressure sensor readings are also routinely broadcasted to the in-vehicle
network and distributed to further ECUs. These data may be used as inputs
for plausibility checks within the electronic stability control module or to trigger
the “limp home” functionality (in case of a supposedly flat tire) within other
units. If the original data has been maliciously crafted, an ECU using these
data could be subject to an exploit, whereby an attacker can gain control of the
execution by diverting the CPU’s control flow. A possible overflow in a device
like the electronic stability control can result in the brake system effectively
being compromised, as it directly and individually controls brake actuators at
all wheels.
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Layered Architecture The layered approach of the architecture is shown in
Fig. 5.4: Our approach makes use of the information flow on the level of network
and inter-process communication as well as internal API calls for accessing an
ECU’s I/O. This is hedged by the middleware framework, which allows to track
in- and outgoing information. Incoming data are tainted with tags we introduce.
We verify the presence and absence of tags for outgoing data according to the
ruleset (introduced in the following Section). A major part of the system is the
taint engine, which makes binary instrumentation: It instruments all applications
and libraries at runtime and takes care of the propagation at runtime. Tags are
propagated among the ECU’s registers and memory at execution time. As
different kinds of input-sources need to be tracked, we use distinct taint tags,
an approach often called “colored taint” [EKS+10].
5.2.2 Binary Instrumentation for Taint Tracking
In order to introduce taint tags into running applications, we make use of a
technique that is called “binary instrumentation”. This technique injects cus-
tom code to binaries at run-time, i.e., one can instrument machine instructions
and system calls in order to follow the flow of data between registers or memory
regions, as well as to take precautions if data is used in a questionable manner.
One of the major advantages of binary instrumentation is that the source code
of analyzed programs does not need to be available, because the processor’s
instructions are directly instrumented at runtime. This enables monitoring pro-
grams of unknown pedigree for compliance with given rules. We make use of
Intel’s Pin [LCM+05], combined with a taint tracking engine. Pin is a generic
tool for dynamic binary instrumentation and provides the base for dynamic taint
tag analysis. Pin is available not only for x86 architectures (Windows, Linux,
Mac), but also for ARM. We have conducted the experiments on IA32 Linux.
There exist a number of prototype implementations for host-based dynamic
data flow tracking based on Pin [CLO07, KPJK12, ZJSK11]. We analyzed
these prototype implementations for feasibility to integrate with our security
framework. We use the middleware from Chapters 3 and 4 to trace data through
execution on the platform and to propagate taint tags together with network
streams within the vehicle.
5.2.3 Data Flows: Access Control
Data can be exchanged in a multitude of ways.
• By accessing shared memory,
• Via filesystem access,
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Figure 5.4: Layered architecture. Applications use libraries, which use corresponding
drivers and communication functions to exchange data. At the driver and communica-
tion layer, data that is read (1) is tagged with an appropriate label, e.g., sensorn. The
label is kept in a shadow-memory and propagated throughout execution. Dytan instru-
ments application binaries and libraries at runtime, which propagates tags in memory
(3). When data is written (2), the rules are enforced, i.e., it is analyzed whether
data only contain information from allowed sources (i.e., the tags correspond to those
expected in the rules).
• Through inter-process communication,
• By using network frames.
We do not take covert channels into account, although this is possible in princi-
ple. To limit possible data and information leaks from processing functions, we
first have to define which are the subjects in our model, i.e., at which granularity
data flows should be described as rules. Data flows exist in various granularities
(from fine to coarse): Between instruction arguments, in function and system
calls, between local programs of one ECU, and between ECUs on a network. If
control flow propagation of taint tags is taken into accounts, it would, on the
one hand, cover indirect information flows. On the other hand, by propagating
a tag of a variable inside a conditional statement to all variables changed within
the conditional code block, a taint tag is easily widely propagated, leading to
a state called ‘over tainting’. For this reason, an indirect propagation of taint
tags is often not considered.
While we cannot limit general processor instructions (e.g., moving between regis-
ters and memory), the information flow at instruction level can be monitored and
tracked. This allows to follow the information flow with a fine granularity and to
enforce control on data on the stack, e.g., to verify that the return address of a
function call has not originated from anywhere else than the function call itself.
Therefore, a large amount of potential attacks can be eliminated, in particu-
lar those based on overwriting the stack pointer, e.g., buffer-overflows [Lev96],
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format-string [scu01], and return-oriented-programming (ROP) [SPPG04] ex-
ploit techniques. A function-based propagation, if we would not have the ability
to instrument and trace individual instructions, would quickly result in over
tainting, because all outputs of a function need to be marked according to all
input tags of the function. This is due to the fact that the dependencies be-
tween inputs and outputs can only be detected with instruction level information
flow tracking. In addition it would not be possible to directly prevent exploit
techniques on the stack.
5.2.4 Taint Based Security Policy
It is not adequate to build access control rules for individual processor instruc-
tions. Likewise, access control at the network level is not adequate, as it is too
coarse (see Fig. 5.5 for an example). The adequate granularity to describe ac-
cess control based on taints is tightly linked with the communication structure
of programs and functions: The basic principle of this approach is to control
which program may communicate what kind of data with which partner. This
approach is naturally modeled by a graph. In addition to representing func-
tions as vertices v and communication between them as edges e, we also label
the edges with the kind of data carried. This allows to distinguish whether
a certain data exchange (the edge of a graph) between programs or functions
(the vertices) is allowed or not. The labels of edges model the tags allowed
for this particular communication, described by e, and consist of a set of taint
tags te ∈ T, where the set T contains all possible taint tags t in a system.
Definition: A tainted graph for information flow tracking is defined as a set
of vertices V , a set of edges E, and for each e ∈ E, a set te of tag labels. A
graph is thus a triplet GIFT = (V,E,{te}
∣E∣). Each tag set te contains [0;n]
tags, with n being the maximum number of tag sources.
A vertex v represents an entity, which communicates over one or more edges.
An entity can be a function call (in fine granularity) or an ECU (in course gran-
ularity). Data sent through these edges originate from the content of internal
variables var of an entity. We define the function T ∶ V AR → P(T) that
assigns to each variable var ∈ V AR the set of tags te belonging to edge e.
The information flow graph can be seen as a ruleset for communication. It
determines the allowed tags for each communication channel e.
A rule r consists of the association of an edge together with the allowed tags
te. Therefore, the a rule is constructed as r = (e, te), where te ⊆ T.
All vertices at the borders of the graph, i.e., those which have either no incoming
or no outgoing edge, serve a special purpose. They are the source or sink of
information. A source may be a sensor (i.e., data obtained through I/O) and a
sink may be an actuator.
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Figure 5.5: Multiple applications are located at the vehicle’s head-unit. They have
access to different services via the network. Access control must be detailed at the
level of applications, as network-based rules would not suffice to detect and prevent
malicious messages, e.g., an attempt from a compromised music player to control the
seat position. The music player is not malicious per-se, but may be turned against the
system by exploiting potential software vulnerabilities with specially crafted input files,
as shown by [CMK+11].
Example: Figure 5.6 shows an example of a tag propagation tree for the driver
adaptation comfort function. This example consists of four rules: two in order
to allow individual data flows from i) an RFID reader that receives the key fob’s
identifier and ii) a file on disk (both are local), and two rules to allow data
streams from the driver adaptation application to two different services for seat
controls, both allowed to carry data from corresponding input sources (t1 and























Figure 5.6: Propagation tree for DriverAdaptationApplication. Data is tainted at
source nodes (t1,t2). This corresponds to an I/O operation at the Head Unit. The
application issues commands to the seat control unit via the network. The combined
tags are conveyed over network communication and evaluated at the receiving side
before the actual operation is triggered. They are also propagated throughout operation,
to ensure maliciously crafted data do not change the application control flow.
Baseline rules These rules have to be defined by the manufacturer a priori ,
e.g., as expert-knowledge along with the functions that are deployed. For the
majority of vehicle functions, this is unproblematic, as communication channels
are known already at the design-phase of the on-board network and usually exist
as structured data. For the vehicle architecture, the K-matrix describes commu-
nication on the CAN bus. In the upcoming development paradigm associated
with the AUTOSAR operating system, individual data exchange between pro-
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grams and functions are modeled. One of the concepts within AUTOSAR is an
abstract communication paradigm. The VFB models communication between
programs and functions, which are later grouped into composite functions and
finally mapped onto concrete ECUs. From this deployment mode, all necessary
network and local communication are generated into the middleware configu-
ration. This facilitates the generation of the proposed ruleset, as all internal
communications of control units are already known and described explicitly.
Application specific rules For third party applications to be loaded onto the
head unit, a security ruleset also needs to be supplied along with the application.
This ruleset must be evaluated against the system’s policies, i.e., the baseline
rules. Furthermore the driver may grant certain additional capabilities, which
are restricted by the general context that is defined by the manufacturer. This
can be compared to Android’s security manifest but is more detailed. While the
granularity for Android security rules is very coarse (e.g., an application requires
network access or not – either full access or no access is granted). Our rules
include the kind of data that was used to generate specific I/O operations, such
as network requests. The example of Figure 5.6 depicts the control request,
which carries tags related to i) the key fob identifier (read via an RFID reader)
and ii) the user profile (read from disk). This allows to effectively limit access
to the vehicle functionality and leakage of personal data.
5.2.5 Example of Tag Propagation
The propagation of tags happens at every intermediate processing step. For
the purpose of controlling the origin of (possibly untrusted) data, we use the
unification of tags as a common propagation-logic, as described in the next
subsection.
The example given in listing 5.1 is a short application that reads data from two
I/O sources, a sensor (possibly memory mapped), and a file. In both cases,
the “read” call is used. It then combines the data through the application of a
function f() and, as a last step, writes data to some output handler, e.g., via
the network.
Listing 5.1: Application Code Example for Taint Tag Propagation
1 data x,y;
2 data z;
4 x = read(sensor -input);
5 y = read(file -input);
7 z = f (sensor -input , file -input);
9 write(z);
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At the end of the execution the taints for the memory regions of variables x,y,z
are: T (x) = {t1}, T (y) = {t2}, and T (z) = {t1, t2}.
While the program is executing, the taint engine instruments all calls so that
the tag is set at the read() calls and propagated at the call to function f().
Depending on the source of data, the read call results in different taints {t1}
and {t2} being set. They represent input from sensors and file input in this
example.
Memory is tagged byte-wise. This means that not all bytes of z need to carry
the same taint tag. This depends on the function f(): If, for example, x,y,z
are strings and f is a concatenation function, then z contains bytes from x and
also from y. This means that the memory for z consists of two regions from x
and y that are individually tagged with either {t1} or {t2}, for instance if z is a
structured record. If x,y,z are primitive variables, and a calculation depending
on both inputs is performed (e.g., z = x+ y), the variable z will be tainted with
both tags at the complete memory region (T (zi) = {t1, t2} for all i bytes of z).
The taint is aggregated over the complete memory region as described in the
next subsection only if data is sent via the network in one piece. This is done
primarily for limiting unnecessary network overhead that would be inevitable if
every byte would carry its own taint-set.
5.2.6 Network Marshalling
In order to follow data throughout the execution over multiple processing sta-
tions, our framework automatically adds the according tags for data contained in
network messages and signs the message with a previously exchanged, application-
specific symmetric session key. We use a low-cost symmetric message authen-
tication code (MAC) to secure the payload. This MAC, in combination with a
key distribution protocol as described in Chapter 4, makes distributed taint tags
resistant against man-in-the-middle attacks. Depending on the application’s re-
quirements, the protocol adds a sequence number or a timestamp that provide
replay protection.
A set of tags is added to the payload of a communication message. In order
to limit the message size, one-byte single taints are not sent as-is, but instead
combined and aggregated. This aggregated set is taken over all memory areas
of all message segments (i.e., individual sub-messages or variables). This means






is sent over the network. Before being sent, the tags of the data are checked
against the corresponding ruleset. The taint information is included in the
message header as depicted in Figure 5.7.
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Figure 5.7: Network data is combined with a set of tags and an application-specific
cryptographic signature. As communication is always handled by the middleware, the
application only receives the (already internally tagged) payload.
5.2.7 Multi-Level Enforcement
The enforcement in our system according to the tainted information flow graph
happens at two different layers:
First, an immediate enforcement happens at certain instructions (e.g., RET,
JMP) and system calls (execve, fork, etc.). Here, the requirement is that no
tag is present at the according arguments (e.g., the called address or, in case
of RET, the return address). If there was a tag present, this would mean that
this piece of data originated from outside the actual execution, which is prohib-
ited in the system to avoid control flow hijacking. This monitoring is directly
performed within the binary instrumentation, i.e., the taint propagation engine
that has hooked info these instruction calls.
Secondly, middleware enforcement is employed whenever functions are called
through the middleware. This includes calls to send data over a remote com-
munication channel or to save data to disk. Input data are then analyzed for
the presence and absence of tags corresponding to the according rules. For
example in Scenario III, this means that tags {t1, t2} and no other tag must be
present when the DriverAdaptationApplication sends requests to the seat
control unit (cf. Figure 5.6). In the architecture schematic drawn in Figure
5.4, (3) corresponds to outbound communication: This is where middleware
monitoring and enforcement applies.
The taint tags themselves are stored in a separate memory region referred to
as shadow memory . By instrumenting calls, it has to be assured that no
explicit write access to this memory region can be performed by compromised
applications. Thus, the integrity of taint tags is ensured.
5.3 Timing Based Hardware Security
In many automotive ECUs, typically the smaller ones, the scheduling of tasks
is nearly deterministic. For example, functions read inputs and write outputs in
a periodic and timely constrained manner. This strictly static scheduling can
be used as an orthogonal dynamic security mechanism. In the following, we
propose a solution that makes use of this feature by restricting the usage of
keys inside the HSM.
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Figure 5.8: Runtime Checks by Controlling Key Usage: The keys k1 and k2 are used
to secure communication links c1 and c2.
5.3.1 Timed Key Usage at Hardware Module
We use the Hardware Security Module as a trusted device to measure the run-
time integrity of the platform. In Figure 5.8, we show a common communication
pattern between ECUs, which takes place within a given application, e.g., Active
Brake. ECU2 receives a message c1 from ECU1 that is secured with key k1. A
function f on ECU2 subsequently evaluates the received message and sends an
output message c2 to ECU3, which is secured by k2. The key k2 is only used in
this context, i.e., a message c1 has previously been received and processed.
If the HSM on ECU2 knows the expected processing time calc of the processing
function f , which outputs c2, it may measure the time between verifying c1 using
k1 and signing c2 using k2. Let tcalc be the actual time needed for processing f .
If ∣calc − tcalc∣ < δ does not hold, then f may have been corrupted.
Figure 5.9 depicts the communication and processing of f at ECU2 and its
HSM.
In general, for every function f that uses this communication pattern, the HSM
of an ECU stores the according pair of verification and signing keys kv and ks,
the exact processing time of f , calcf , and a delta value δf .
This constitutes a ruleset r = (kv, ks, calcf , δf) for each function f using this
communication pattern.
If a rule is violated, this is reported to the original ECU or, if existent, on a
secondary secure channel to a higher level system such as a neighboring IDS
node.
5.3.2 Requirements for the HSM and Discussion
In order to enforce these rules that are based on the usage of key material,
additional information needs to be maintained inside the HSM.
• A state, i.e., when has this key been used,
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Figure 5.9: Behavior check of key usage at HSM on ECU2: key k2 must be used
exactly after tcalc has elapsed from the previous usage of k1.
• A timer, i.e., to measure the time elapsed between different commands
and key usage,
• A usage rule store.
The steps taken by the HSMs are as follows:
i) SELECT the appropriate rule according to the verification key kv.
ii) VERIFY the input and take time measurement (t0).
iii) SIGN the output and take time measurement (t1).
iv) CHECK the satisfaction of the time constraint
for the usage rule (∣calcf − (t1 − t0)∣ < δf ).
If the check fails, the signature result may be suppressed and an alarm raised.
The HSM module must have a control output to be capable of signaling the
violation of rules to the ECU, or possibly even to another external instance, e.g.,
another ECU.
Discussion
This approach focuses on small ECUs with static scheduling. It cannot be
applied to larger ECUs with dynamic and preemptive scheduling. However it is
typical that there are more smaller, single-purpose ECUs than high-performance
units in the vehicle network.
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The approach cannot reliably detect an intrusion. There may be false positives
and false negatives, depending on the particular value of δ. However, an alert
may give a strong indication that the system may have been corrupted.
Since this mechanism is orthogonal to the other security mechanisms of the
architecture, it can be very well combined with other alert signals, e.g., from
classic intrusion sensors as described in the previous Section.
In contrast to binary instrumentation for data flow analysis, this approach can
be implemented in the HSM very efficiently with few instructions. No additional
computation on the application CPU is performed. The requirements on the
HSM can be satisfied even by the smallest EVITA HSM module.
A general problem is the handling of detected intrusions. Raising an alert or
inhibiting the use of key material is not without problems in the context of
vehicular networks, as functional availability is of very high concern for passen-
ger safety. We cannot provide a solution to this higher level problem, as the
according impact is very case specific.
5.4 Related Work
5.4.1 Exploit Prevention Techniques
Many techniques to defend against exploits on personal computers have been
proposed, developed, and deployed in common computer installations during
the last years. A non-executable stack (i.e., marking memory regions as non-
executable) protects against the injection of shellcode [Pes97]. Address Space
Layout Randomization (ASLR) introduced an additional burden that protects
against the return-to-libc exploiting technique, which was again defeated by
Return Oriented Programming (ROP) [SPPG04]. A very recent technique of
aligning code during compilation protects against ROP [OBL+10], but was not
yet widely implemented. These techniques are slowly beginning to be integrated
into today’s CPU architecture, operating system memory management, and
compilers. Such protections become prevalent in the PC environment, but they
are only slowly taken up in the embedded world, e.g., ASLR was only introduced
with iOS 4.3 and with Android 4.0, both released in 2011. Similarly, it was
just introduced with the latest version of QNX, a popular operating system for
vehicle head units. However, as vehicles typically have a lifespan of over ten
years, newly introduced exploit techniques likely apply to most vehicles on the
streets.
Moving towards dynamic protection methods, runtime data flow tracking using
input data tainting has been used. In contrast to dytan [CLO07], the libdft
framework [KPJK12] is specifically designed to run at a low overhead and to
provide a generic, yet flexible toolkit for taint analysis. The sample libdft-dta
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tool, which we evaluate in Chapter 6, shows the applicability in an exploit-
prevention context.
TaintExchange was the first approach to demonstrate the feasibility of dis-
tributed taints using libdft [ZPK11]. This system instruments all system calls
used to exchange data between processes and to communicate over network
sockets. In contrast, our approach adds a ruleset, which describes the accept-
able behavior of software modules in a declarative and fine-grained manner.
5.4.2 Information Flow Control
The term information flow control originates at policies for large organizations
with different clearance levels, i.e., some people can read more documents than
others. In [Che09] such clearance labels are introduced already at the middle-
ware layer: he proposed a self-contained .NET based system that propagated
those labels among remote execution and data exchange. Another interesting
approach to limit sensitive data from leaving local applications was taken by
[CC11]. For every process, they run a copy (a shadow process), which is only
different in the detail that private data are exchanged for random data. They
compare the output of the programs (e.g., of write calls) and find whether the
result of the original and shadow process are the same (no private data used)
or differ (private data was used in calculating the results). They claim that
their approach is up to thirty times faster than taint tracking. While this is an
interesting approach to avoid data leakage in enterprises, it offers no protection
against platform attacks, which is one of our goals, and which also may lead
to privacy leakage. The dynamic analysis of information flow within programs
in order to study malware behavior has also been done with the help of em-
ulated environments, e.g., Valgrind [NS05] or QEMU [YSE+07]. While these
approaches are well suited to analyze given malware programs, it can hardly be
applied to our application domain. There also exists a tool based on the Pin
binary instrumentation tool for Windows, which allows the user to trace whether
certain input leaves a program via the network [ZJSK11].
5.4.3 Current On-Board Security
In the last two years, the automotive on-board network has come to the atten-
tion of security researchers. We have seen that a large effect (i.e., the complete
control of a vehicle) can be achieved with relatively common techniques locally
[KCR+10] and remotely [CMK+11]. Vehicles have been criticized for broadcast-
ing private data and not performing input validation [RMM+10]. Upcoming
Car2X communication demands for higher security levels and introduces hard-
ware security [PBH+08].
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Intrusion detection on automotive buses has been discussed in [LNJ08] and
[MG09]. In [LNJ08], a specification-based approach that monitors the consis-
tency of frames with the CANopen standard is used in order to exemplify the
detection of malicious activity on CAN buses. In addition to scrutinizing the
frame layout on the bus, ECU and application specific rules can be used. In the
setup they propose, detectors are deployed at every ECU in order to identify
the misbehaving nodes. In [MG09] an approach is described, where the sensors
are placed at the network and not at every ECU. The approach classifies six
different types of sensors at three levels: Packet, Network, and Application. It
classifies formality, location, compliance, correlation, frequency, and plausibility
sensors. At the packet level, formality and compliance detect malformed net-
work frames and payload. At the network level, the frequency of messages, the
correlation between frames, and the location of data (i.e., is a specific frame
allowed on a specific bus) are assessed. At the application level, the plausibility
of the payload is assessed.
Our approach using distributed dynamic information flow tracking cannot easily
be placed in Mu¨ter’s classification: Data flow tracking is not done at the network
level, but also goes beyond plausibility checks at the application layer. It can be
seen as an extension of the classification: A usage-control sensor, that would
be placed inside individual ECUs in order to enforce strict usage control on
the data used by applications. We can thereby prevent data leakage and host-
based intrusions. The other sensors of Mu¨ter’s classification can directly be
implemented as part of the distributed IDS system we presented in the first part
of this Chapter.
The main publication supporting this Chapter is [SR12].




“First get your facts; then you
can distort them at your
leisure.”
Mark Twain
In this Chapter we perform a number of experiments on prototype implementa-
tions with which we validate our approaches from Chapters 4 and 5. We have
set up different prototypes for the different security mechanisms we proposed.
For key distribution and secure communication protocols, the latency of com-
munication and the increased bus load are analyzed. The protocol performance
is shown for the CAN bus. We first measured these protocols for feasibility in
two simulation environments and then integrated them with the framework in
a stand-alone setup with three computers.
In order to show the current performance and feasibility of the dynamic dis-
tributed information flow tracking concept that was introduced in Chapter 5,
we analyze the processing times of the prototype implementation with two dif-
ferent taint engines. This prototype was integrated in the prototype mentioned
above.
An integration into two real vehicles for a demonstration of ‘Active Brake’
(Scenario I) was achieved as part of a demonstration event in November 2011,
which we describe in the last part of this Chapter.
This Chapter starts with an analysis of the current utilization of a CAN bus in
a typical upper class vehicle, in order to show that our approaches for securing
communication are feasible even with today’s bus loads.
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Std. Deviation 60 0.91%
Table 6.1: Body-CAN: frame count and payload per second, based on a random
sample of 84 seconds. The third column of the right table denotes the estimated bus
load for the values, including a protocol overhead of 47 bits per frame (standard 11-bit
addressing), and neglecting additional overhead introduced by bit-stuffing.
6.1 Analysis of a CAN bus
In order to analyze the available bandwidth for the security mechanisms that
we suggested, we have performed measurements on a typical vehicle cabin-bus,
i.e., the bus that connects convenience and infotainment ECUs inside the cabin.
This bus is often referred to as “The Body CAN” or simply “Low Speed CAN”.
It uses non-terminated wires and low-speed transceivers at 100kbit/s.
We have taken samples from a fully equipped vehicle (model year 2008). As
it is equipped with all optional features, we can assume that our measured bus
load is approximately the maximum of what is expected for periodic payload on
other vehicle’s buses as well.
We have observed traffic patterns of periodic communication on the network.
Figure 6.1 displays two time series. The first time series shows the number
of frames per second. The second graph shows the payload per second that is
transmitted. Both time series show a periodicity of around 10s, which is common
for on-board networks where a “signal paradigm” persists, i.e., digitized sensor
values that are transmitted regularly, and in short intervals.
To our surprise, we saw that the maximum channel load is only at about 22%,
leaving 78% of the channel unoccupied. This may be due to pessimistic worst-
case scheduling scenarios for realtime constraints. We looked at the specific
spread of CAN identifiers in order to obtain a clearer picture regarding the
distribution of high and low priority data. A fine-grained histogram showing the
observed distribution of CAN identifiers is shown in Figure 6.2. There is only a
small cluster of high priority frames, around ID 200 (decimal), in the histogram.
The results of this analysis show that there is indeed a reasonable amount of
bandwidth left for security enhancements. Even if all traffic would be secured by
two additional frames, i.e., the data volume would be tripled (resulting in 66%
bus load), the bus would still not be saturated. The CAN bus simulations of
the next section show that the expected signal latency is only slightly increased,
even at high bus loads.
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(a) CAN frames per second
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(b) CAN payload per second
Figure 6.1: CAN frames and payload per second (based on random sample of 84
seconds). We can see a periodicity of 0.1 Hz.
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Figure 6.2: Distribution of CAN identifiers in a 200-bin histogram. The count is
absolute with a total number of samples of 35948 in 2:32 minutes.
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6.2 Protocol Measurements
In the following, the key distribution protocol and the secure communication
protocol are evaluated for the CAN bus. For simulating the key distribution
protocol (Section 6.2.1), we used the performance specifications of the overall
system, down to clock cycles in the HSM. However, for network arbitration,
i.e., the media access on the CAN bus, a simplified priority model is used. As
key distribution is only done once for every communication group, the network
performance is not as important as for secure communication.
For the second part (Section 6.2.2), we used a different simulator to show
secure communication using the CAN transport protocol. In this part, the bus
arbitration, and especially the additional latency at different bus loads were more
important, as secure communication is anticipated for continuous use.
6.2.1 Simulating Key Exchanges with TTool
We modeled the key distribution protocol in a scenario as described in Sec-
tion 4.1.4. The according sequence chart is found in Figure 4.2 on page 59.
The setup comprises the initiator, ECU 1, a key master and the receiver ECU 2,
which are all connected to the same CAN bus and equipped with an HSM. This
setup is shown in Figure 6.3. The model includes several assumptions about
frequency and load of processors and network media. Specifically, the HSM’s
cryptographic engine is clocked at 100 MHz and requires 60 clock cycles, in-
cluding scheduler cycles, for the encryption of one AES block as well as for MAC
blocks. These are the real-world parameters for our FPGA prototype. The CAN
bus is loaded at 30% (as shown to be realistic by our experiments in 6.1) and
the arbitration for every individual packet is won with a probability of p = 0.5.
Messages transmission includes overhead on CAN (39 bits header, 25 bits trailer,
3 bits idle, bit stuffing omitted) and overhead for the segmentation (2 bytes for
the first frame, 1 for consecutive frames). Please note that in contrast to the
analysis on the current CAN bus we assume extended addressing for increased
flexibility, thus the extended overhead. The HSM keys are constructed as de-
scribed in Section 4.1 and thus carry header fields of 86 bits in addition to the
key length of 256 bits and an authentication code of 128 bits. Thus, for the
successful transmission of an HSM key structure via CAN-TP, nine frames are
sent: 9 = 1+⌈(470−48)/(7×8)⌉.1 We assume the CAN bus speed is 500kbit/s,
as this speed is commonly used for high-speed buses in vehicles.
This system has been modeled with the DIPLODOCUS UML profile [AMAB+06],
and simulated with the simulation engine of the TTool system [KAP09]. The
DIPLODOCUS profile and its simulation engine explicitly take hardware elements
1The first frame offers six bytes of payload; thus 48 bits are subtracted from the HSM key
of 470 bits. Consecutive frames offer 7 × 8 bits of usable payload.
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of the system, that is, CPUs, buses, memories, and the HSM as hardware
accelerators into account for the simulation.
A complete key distribution cycle including acknowledgements is, under the load
and speed assumptions mentioned above, performed within 9 ms on average.
While this is not adequate for on-demand establishment in hard real-time ap-
plications, it is certainly feasible to perform the key exchange at boot time for
all statically known communication groups. The current HSM implementation
allows for every ECU to participate in 64 groups, which is sufficient for the needs
of current and future applications.
Figure 6.3: TTool simulation model for Key Distribution: Two ECUs and one Key
Master node, all equipped with an HSM. All nodes are connected via a CAN bus using
the transport protocol. The key exchange is initiated by ECU 1.
6.2.2 Simulating the Secure Transport Protocol
We have also tested our design using a Matlab/Simulink simulation engine,
the TrueTIME 2.0 toolkit [CHL+03], which supports the simulation of CAN
networks. The simulation setup is shown in Figure 6.4. TrueTIME supports the
S-function concept inside Matlab/Simulink, so that our protocol simulation was
directly written and compiled in C.
For simulating the transport protocol, we use a more in-depth simulation of the
arbitration phase. The setup consists of three nodes, connected by a CAN bus
(TrueTime’s networked setup). One node generates high-priority background
noise, which will always be prioritized over our payload. We varied the bus load
introduced by this “interference node”. The node occupied the bus at random
times, using between 0% and 90% of the available slots for sending data at high
priority, so it would interfere and take precedence over regular transmissions.
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Figure 6.4: Simulink Setup for TrueTime v2.0 simulations: A CAN bus connects a
controller node, a combined sensor and actuator node and an interference node (the
networked setup). The communication is performed in a closed loop: The controller
sends step-wise commands to the servo engine (the actuator) and, independently, re-
ceives the currently sensed state from a sensor. The servo’s response function is 1000
s2s
.
The communication links were changed to segment data according to the CAN-TP
transport protocol, implemented in Matlab S-functions.
The second and third node model a controller and a sensor/actuator node. For
communication between sensor and controller we encapsulate the payload with
the secure transport protocol and varied the MAC lengths. You can see the
resulting latencies in Table 6.2.
The control system’s period of one send/receive cycle of the loop is 10 ms.
In every test run, the delays of 100 complete submissions, i.e., one second of
simulation time, were sampled.
As expected, the latency increases approximately linearly with the number of
frames sent (i.e., with the size of the security payload). What we had not
expected was that the latency did not increase significantly with the bus load.
In Figure 6.5, we show the latency results for bus loads 0% and 60% that only
diverge for security payloads larger than 128 bits. A comparison of the average
latency for both bus loads is shown in the third graph of Figure 6.5.
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(a) CAN Signal Latency at 0% Bus Load
(b) CAN Signal Latency at 60% Bus Load
(c) Comparison of Average Latency
Figure 6.5: Signal Latency for different MAC lengths at 0% and 60% bus load. The
difference in signal latency increases only for longer MACs at 60% load. The time is
given in seconds and the length in bits.
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MAC/bits 0 (SF) 32 64 128 256 512
Minimum 0.0004 0.0007 0.0011 0.0016 0.0027 0.0059
Average 0.0011 0.0018 0.0021 0.0030 0.0041 0.0073
Maximum 0.0030 0.0041 0.0043 0.0050 0.0060 0.0090
Table 6.2: Latency of secured CAN/TP packets with 16 bytes payload in seconds.
The CAN bus is charged with higher priority traffic at 60% load. The cumulated
processing time is 0.3 ms. The sampled transmissions were repeated 100 times for each
MAC length. The first column (SF) represents the latency of a single frame without
authentication code.
Discussion In combination with the results found in the analysis in Section 6.1,
it becomes clear that additional security payload can be added to signals where
needed, even on a CAN bus.
The overhead that is introduced through the transport protocol could as well
be saved, if only small fractions of 32 bits are used in combination with at most
32 bits of payload. This would, however, not be suited against replay attacks,
as no timestamp or sequence number would be included.
The first column in Table 6.2 shows the transmission latency of a single frame.
For the simulation, a processing time of 0.15 ms was assumed for the sender
and receiver side (i.e., 0.3 ms are static overhead).
6.2.3 Implementation as Part of the Framework
We implemented the key distribution protocol with the software security frame-
work. On the master side, a new module, the KMM was introduced. It receives
keying requests via the EMVY Server-RPC interface, evaluates local policies,
and performs import and export of the key according to the protocol (c.f. Sec-
tion 4.1.4). The session key is distributed to all group members via the Client-
RPC interface, where it is imported into the HSM, the key handle being saved
for the corresponding group.
As the in-vehicle prototype was, in the end, completely based on Ethernet, we
conducted measurements for key distribution latency in the Ethernet setup with
all three computers connected via a switch. We found an average latency of
over 50 ms. While not prohibitively large, as key distribution only needs to be
performed once per drive-cycle, it seemed rather high, especially given the 9
ms that resulted out of our simulations on CAN, and given the absence of any
significant delay that was expected for Ethernet. During the investigation of
the root cause for this increased latency, we found out that our HSM prototype
implementation, which was connected via TCP/IP, added a significant over-
head. We conducted a timing analysis of the HSM prototype that allowed us to
precisely measure the overhead of key generation, import, and export functions.
The results of these measurements can be found in annex B.1.
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As a result, the communication and marshalling for the prototypical HSM inter-
face distorted the measurements. A real-world deployment needs to be adapted
to different networks and buses. We thus provide no further performance re-
sults, but emphasize that even with a latency of over 50 ms, a distribution of
sessions keys per drive-cycle is reasonable.
In Annex B.2, code listings give an idea of the programming interfaces used and
exposed by the implementation.
6.3 Distributed Dynamic Information Flow Tracking
Applications in our prototype are implemented using a C-style middleware. This
middleware establishes communication links to other entities and secures the
payload accordingly (UDP/TCP/CAN-TP), as described in Section 3.4. The
information flow tracking concept for the vehicle architecture, which we in-
troduced in Section 5.2, uses this communication middleware to enable taint
tracking throughout the vehicle network.
Whenever a program reads from I/O channels that are configured as taint
sources, the corresponding data are marked. In contrast to approaches which
focus on avoiding run-time attacks (using a single binary tag per byte), we use
distinct tags in order to distinguish between different sources.
We used the dytan taint engine [CLO07], which is attached as a Pin tool
[LCM+05], i.e., applications run instrumented. Additionally to tagging I/O
data at our middleware functions, dytan possesses of an XML configuration file,
which lists network streams and files that should be regarded as additional taint
sources. Generic system calls such as read/write are instrumented accordingly.
Dytan itself is implemented in C++ and allows a large number of distinct tags
to be followed in shadow memory, held in an STL map. While this kind of imple-
mentation offers great flexibility, we have seen that it performed rather poorly,
compared to other engines, as the code injected through binary instrumentation
is implemented in C++. However, it has some distinct features (the virtually
unlimited number of tags) that were advantageous to show the interest of our
approach. We compare it to the performance oriented engine libdft [KPJK12]
in the next subsection.
We limited the number of tags to 32, in order to place them into a four byte
field to ensure a lower overhead for network propagation of the taints.
We used a standard Ubuntu Linux (v2.6.38) on an i5 processor. We compiled
all programs in 32 bit mode and without MMX and SSE instructions, as the
taint engine does not support these registers, nor 64 bit operations.
Ph.D. Thesis — Hendrik C. Schweppe
6.3. DISTRIBUTED DYNAMIC INFORMATION FLOW TRACKING 107
6.3.1 Performance
Instrumenting binaries with additional code incurs runtime penalties, as for each
original instruction, additional instructions are injected, thereby slowing down
the overall execution. As demonstrated in [KPJK12] with the libdft implemen-
tation, an optimization of tag-propagation instructions towards modern pro-
cessors, which feature multi-stage pipelines and jump-predictions, can result
in much higher performance, compared to heavier implementations. Unfortu-
nately, the original libdft implementation only allows to track binary taints, i.e.,
a “taint or no taint” tag. While this is sufficient in order to detect previously
unknown exploits that trigger buffer overflows and similar, it does not offer a
tag-space sufficient for system-wide information flow monitoring. However, in
order to show the impressive performance of their system, we also conducted
experiments using libdft and included them in our results. An alpha version
of libdft supporting 8 color taints showed exactly the same performance. This
is due to byte-wise operations, which have less execution overhead than bit-
wise operations, which require masking and shifting instructions, as detailed in
[KPJK12].
We measured the runtime of a modified version of the music player mpg123,
which we integrated with our framework in order to send the MP3 ID3 tags to
a remote display (see the example in Figure 5.5 on page 87). The runtime
includes extracting the ID3 information, the process of marshalling information
with taint tags and generating a MAC, as well as decoding the first 100 frames
of the MP3 file, corresponding to 2 seconds of music.
vanilla nullpin libdft-dta dytan
runtime in ms 37 377 1 045 18 925
factor (v) 1 10.2 28.2 511.5
factor (i) 1 2.8 50.2
Table 6.3: Runtime of example audio player application (mpg123) with different in-
strumentations.
Vanilla execution is the non-instrumented, plain execution of the code. The
column “nullpin” relates to code instrumented with Pin, but without executing
any hooks (part of libdft’s sample tools). Libdft-dta and dytan are the actual
tag-propagation engines. We show their overhead compared to vanilla execution
(v) and instrumented execution by nullpin (i).
Discussion The performance results show that binary instrumentation re-
sults in the most significant part of the execution overhead (factor 10). A
performance-oriented implementation of the tag engine itself, such as libdft,
only incurs an overhead of factor 2.8. If the instrumentation itself can be ren-
dered more efficiently, the overhead of tracking data throughout execution is
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Figure 6.6: Runtime of instrumented code in microseconds on a logarithmical scale.
Decoding of the first 100 frames of an MP3 file in i586 instructions. Unchanged code
is ‘vanilla’ runtime, nullpin the instrumentation overhead for PIN, libdft-dta and dytan
the corresponding DTA frameworks.
tolerable. While a small number of tags will not be able to construct a full-
fledged information-flow system, it can still serve the purpose to limit data
usage from certain sources (e.g., user input from media, internet or diagnosis),
especially to limit leakage of private information. These figures may seem high,
but it should be noted that other approaches to secure applications on the head
unit, such as virtualization, incur a significant overhead as well.
6.4 In-Vehicle Prototype
We have integrated the Active Brake scenario that was introduced in Sec-
tion 3.1.1 in of prototype vehicles. We have presented these vehicles during
the final EVITA public workshop and the Car2Car Communication Consortium
Forum 2011 at Erlensee, Germany.
The control units of the vehicle network were equipped with EVITA FPGA
hardware and used the communication protocols described in Chapter 4.
The brake signal of one vehicle triggered the sending of a DENM warning for
the other vehicle, as described in Scenario I on page 39. We created a com-
munication group between the brake sensor, where the pedal depression was
sensed, and the brake controller, which triggered the warning message via a
simTD communication unit. The simTD Communication Control Unit (CCU)
was complemented with an EVITA HSM to enhance the performance of cryp-
tographic operations. We show pictures of the demonstrator vehicles and the
communication unit in Annex B.6 (p. 178).
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6.4.1 The CAN-Ethernet Gateway
The bus system used in today’s vehicle is in most cases the CAN bus. In
addition to IP communication, we also wanted to show the feasibility of our
approach on current systems, and thus implemented a proof of concept for
CAN communication within the EMVY framework. Originally, an AUTOSAR
port of the EMVY framework was envisaged in the EVITA project, which should
have represented the CAN node of the demonstrator setup.
As part of the CAN setup, a CAN to Ethernet gateway was foreseen. We used
standard ISO-TP for CAN communication in order to place our application data
(e.g., addressing, RPC data, and security payload) on top of it.
Implementation The gateway was implemented using Oliver Hartkopp’s Sock-
etCAN [Har11] on a Linux machine. SocketCAN has the big advantage that
it uses POSIX sockets with additional sockopt arguments in order to estab-
lish communication with the ISO-TP transport protocol. It uses address pairs
is foreseen in the ISO-TP standard. The use of POSIX sockets facilitated the
adaptation of existing network code, which relied on TCP connections and UDP
datagram.
We were able to make use of a relay-example of the SocketCAN distribution in
order to implement this gateway. The gateway relays the raw ISO-TP payload
between CAN clients and a master node on Ethernet. This gateway was used
in order to connect both the server-RPC and the client-RPC interface, as well
as direct communication between EMVY clients. In Figure 6.7 you can see a
generic abstraction of the gateway, which is implemented in a store-and-forward
manner for datagrams of up to 4095 bytes, a fixed limitation of the ISO-TP
standard.
In order to test the gateway we added SocketCAN also to the EMVY client
framework. By doing so, the clients were able to use ISO-TP instead of IP to
access services on the EMVY Master, such as key distribution.
Discussion The gateway was foreseen to connect the AUTOSAR implemen-
tation of the client framework with the EMVY master node for the final EVITA
demonstration. Unfortunately the AUTOSAR implementation of EMVY was
never realized and AUTOSAR was demonstrated separately. Thus the gateway
was not integrated into the prototype vehicles. As we had already successfully
tested the gateway with EMVY on Linux together with SocketCAN and a PEAK
CAN adapter, we decided to include it in the implementation Chapter, in order
to show the feasibility of the implementation.
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Figure 6.7: The CAN-to-Ethernet Gateway. It can be operated in TCP and UDP-
muilticast mode. IP connections are translated to ISOTP on the CAN interface. The
payload is not modified but directly relayed.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion and Outlook
“The hardest thing is to go to
sleep at night, when there are so
many urgent things needing to
be done. A huge gap exists
between what we know is
possible with today’s machines
and what we have so far been
able to finish.”
Donald Knuth
This Chapter concludes the thesis with a comparison between the current state
of security in vehicular architectures and contributions of the thesis. Thereafter,
we critically discuss our approaches for feasibility in a real-world deployment
and give an outlook on future research and prospectives for further industrial
development of security measures.
7.1 Achievements and Conclusion
We claim that our approaches increase the level of security in vehicular on-board
networks by applying cryptography to communication, as well as leveraging run-
time security with data tainting techniques for the vehicle network and strict
policy enforcement as part of the intrusion detection system. Our prototype and
demonstrator implementations are based on a real automotive security frame-
work. We have simulated and tested these approaches for feasibility in current
on-board networks. Even on restricted networks, such as the CAN bus, our se-
cure communication approach is viable, and seems to be taken up by industrial
development [KB11]. The protocols for key distribution and secure commu-
nication have been successfully demonstrated along with Car2X applications
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inside two BMW vehicles at the Car2Car Forum in November 2011 in Erlensee,
Germany.
The contributions that were presented in this thesis can be illustrated best by
the following comparison. A frequently cited publication on embedded security,
“Security in Embedded Systems: Design Challenges” [RRKH04], names six
requirements for security in embedded systems. Based on these generic require-
ments, we compare the vehicular architecture of today with the enhancements
suggested by contributions of this thesis.
The security requirements postulated by Ravi, et al. in [RRKH04] are:
(1) Identification





Identification, Network Access, and Communication In today’s vehicles,
a secure identification (i.e., authentication) between entities inside the vehicle
is only done at few places: Identifying the driver opening the vehicle, igniting
the engine, protecting configuration parameters and saved data such as the
odometer inside ECUs, as well as a rudimentary protection of certain diagnosis
functions exist today. However, identification (1) between components of the
on-board network does not exist. Neither are network access (2) and commu-
nication (3) over internal buses secured.
With the approach we presented in Chapter 4, we have introduced an inte-
grated solution for securing communication: It comprises key distribution and
a secured transport protocol and enables the authentication and identification
(1) of nodes between each other. While the physical bus access cannot be
restricted, the data exchanged over the network for accessing vehicle services
are restricted based on using the agreed session key material, thus providing
secure network access (2). The communication itself is protected by MACs
and thereby provides secure communication (3) on the on-board buses. Ad-
ditionally a timestamp in the protocol offers protection against replay attacks
on demand. We have addressed the problem of costly solutions by using sym-
metric cryptography in an asymmetric manner: Usage controlled key material,
where the actual enforcement is embedded in the HSM based on the key’s flags.
Moreover, we have addressed 1:n group communication as used for communi-
cation in today’s vehicles. This aspect had been set aside by many previous
approaches for secure on-board communication, which aimed at 1:1 communi-
cation as used in ordinary computer networks. We also proposed a solution for
vehicle maintenance issues dealing with cryptographic key material, a real-world
aspect that is of primary concern for actual deployment, as we learned from
industrial feedback.
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Storage, Content Security and Availability In today’s vehicles, only certain
parameters of the vehicle, like the Vehicle Identification Number (VIN) are
protected in such a way that they can only be written once (burn-in). Some
functions are protected through access control measures, e.g., by a two byte
code to access the diagnosis mode of an ECU. However, codes and passwords
provide protection only to a certain extent, as for example a two byte code can
be broken by brute force (trial and error) rather easily. Additionally, data are
usually not stored encrypted, making for example the firmware prone to reverse
engineering attacks.
The HSM that was used in this thesis provides an internal key store for cryp-
tographic material. We defined a lightweight protocol (details in Annex B.2.4)
that makes use of it and that permits us to provide secure storage (4) for
arbitrary data.
Along with secure storage, our approach applies fine-grained policies and en-
forces these through dynamic information flow tracking and a network-wide
propagation. This assures that information is only used for the intended pur-
pose, i.e., we also fulfill the requirement content security (5). We presented
our approach towards fine-grained data usage control for privacy and security
aspects in Chapter 5.
The last requirement, availability (6), is certainly important for the automotive
domain. While the focus of this thesis was not on availability from a safety
perspective, we showed how, for example redundant key master servers and
intrusion response, might prevent a single point of failure from endangering
safety critical functions of the vehicle. Distributed systems have created many
solutions as far as availability, coordination, and concurrency are concerned.
These can constitute directions for future research in order to make distributed
automative system both robust and secure.
Additional Requirements: Privacy and Attack Mitigation Since the publi-
cation of [RRKH04] in 2004, two important requirements have become apparent:
the privacy of data and attack mitigation for embedded systems. Since then,
mobile phones are routinely compromised (‘rooted’ or ‘jailbroken’ in hacker jar-
gon), both locally and remotely, and applications secretly access and transmit
personal and private data.
Our dynamic information flow tracking approach provides a measure against
runtime attacks (e.g., software exploits) and the abuse of data. With our ap-
proach, we specifically embrace the execution of software of unknown pedigree
and with uncertain trust: Rule-based policies are applied for controlling the soft-
ware and the use of data also beyond the borders of the ECU where the code is
executed. We propose a rule-based policy that enhances the ‘who with whom’
with the kind and provenance of data that is exchanged, i.e., the origin of data
represented by the taint tag, secured by a MAC. This allows for a fine-grained
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enforcement that comports with model-driven development, which is prevalent
in vehicle engineering.
Discussion While our solutions to secure the onboard architecture of vehicles
were implemented and evaluated with a prototype demonstrator, a deployment
in mass production has much tighter requirements. Cost is a major factor in the
automotive world: If vehicle components cost $50 more (imagine HSM chips in
multiple ECUs), and the vehicle is sold ten million times, this already sums up
to half a billion lost profit. Customers are also not willing to pay for security
functionality, as they expect the product to be secure as-is, or do not understand
the issues at hand sufficiently.
While cost is one concern, the integration into communication stacks and the
limited processing power of current components is another. We have shown
that the communication overhead for secure communication protocols is limited.
Nonetheless, an additional latency is introduced.
Integrating cryptographic protocols with automotive operating systems is not
trivial, as many different systems exist, for example OSEK, QNX, VxWorks, or
even Windows Embedded Automotive. Low-cost components like sensors often
do not have a real operating system, but use a static communication stack
combined with a state machine. The AUTOSAR approach with a standardized
middleware addresses this problem. However, a wide deployment for low-cost
components is still a distant prospect.
The information flow tracking approach using binary instrumentation has the
big advantage that it can be used on unknown program code. On the other
hand it has a big influence on the execution performance of programs. Nat-
urally, source-to-source compilation for information tracking, as illustrated by
the frameworks GIFT [LC06b] or DIVA [XBS06], provides a much better per-
formance (between 5% and 50% overhead), but rely on the fact that the source
code needs to be available for recompilation. This is not the case for third
party development in open execution environments or application stores. Bet-
ter performance could be reached by dedicated hardware with integrated taint
tracking, or a recompilation of intermediate code, as for the Java runtime or
inside a virtualization environment.
Trusted platforms and secure on-board communication leverage the trust needed
for received Car2X communication, in particular if actions need to be taken on
received data. Still, a single successful runtime attack at the Car2X radio unit,
which evaluates internal information and triggers external alerts, is sufficient to
compromise the overall system. This is a general problem, as no end-to-end
security—from the sensor of one car to the actuator of another car—is achiev-
able without costly asymmetric cryptography and great efforts in harmonization
between manufacturers. Further hindrances for world-wide deployment can be
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different implementations, as US, European and draft standards in Asia are not
interoperable, and export restrictions for cryptography.
7.2 Outlook on Future Research and Development
We have seen that the vehicle domain has not taken security measures into
account for the overall on-board architecture. Security measures were only
applied at certain exposed interfaces, e.g., the radio signal of a key fob to unlock
a vehicle uses some distance-bounding challenge response algorithm. While a
complete protection of all on-board units and communication is not realistic
for the coming years, it is clearly one of the topics that currently see a lot of
development.
Secure On-Board Communication Currently, not even critical functionality
seems to be properly secured. Break-in tools like [Jac12] are freely sold. They
connect to network cables inside the door crack that can be grasped from the
outside, deactivate the alarm of the vehicle, and roll down its windows. This
makes the lack of secure communication in today’s vehicles blatantly obvious.
The AUTOSAR release v4.0 introduces APIs for cryptographic services as part of
the specification [BFWS10], which facilitates the use of cryptographic security
in software. What it does not supply, is yet a common secure communication
channel between units running AUTOSAR. We were pleased to see that a pro-
tocol, similar to the secure transport protocol for CAN, which we proposed,
was about to be implemented for a real product as part of an AUTOSAR stack
[KB11].
A shift towards Ethernet and IP has been made for certain parts of the on-
board architecture [Bru10, Jon10]. Further use of Ethernet in the entire on-
board network is currently researched [GHM+10]. With higher bandwidth and
larger packet size, the use of IP offers much greater room for security solutions.
While being more costly, it allows for established and well tested and proven
security solutions from classic networks, such as IPSec, to be applied. According
to [Mai12] the introduction of Ethernet for dedicated networks is planned is
anticipated for 2013, and Ethernet as the vehicle’s backbone network for 2018.
Intrusion Detection and Response Detecting misbehaving nodes and mal-
formed network packets is easier than in normal network environments, because
a vehicle is a rather static system with traffic patterns that do not change signif-
icantly during runtime, compared to networked computers. Intrusion detection
has been investigated for the on-board network [LNJ08, MG09, MA11], and
constitutes a part of this thesis and of the EVITA project [WWZ+10]. Future
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systems may use unsupervised machine learning techniques that became popular
for common IDSs. An aspect that has not been assessed adequately is intru-
sion response: What is an adequate behavior to a response, which has been
detected with a certain confidence. Can parts of the vehicle network be shut
off? Wouldn’t that open new doors for denial of service attacks? What about
notifications: A warning “you have been hacked” would certainly irritate the
driver. A publication from 2008 [HKD08a] provides a classification of possible
responses, up to haptic driver alerts. While multi-modality is used for many
vehicle functions, we are sceptic that a ‘cyber attack’ should put force on the
brake pedal or the steering wheel, as suggested. The question of how to react
sensibly and sensitively to detections is, in our eyes, still an unsolved problem
that is not easy to answer—especially for computer scientists. Research results
on HMI design and ergonomics should be considered adequately.
Dynamic Information Flow Tracking Monitoring for which purpose data is
used goes beyond simple access control. While DIFT has been used for some
time in malware analysis, its runtime usage is quite new, and has only recently
been applied to embedded and distributed systems [EGC+10, ZPK11]. This
technique is particularly interesting for the automotive world, where embedded
software is shifting from in-house development towards “application stores” in
the infotainment domain—similar to what was has been seen for smartphones
in recent years. Renault will open their R-Link AppStore to developers this year,
which is scheduled for November [Lut11]. While a strict review process, as en-
forced by Apple (see Sect. 2.3.2), provides a certain level of security, it can never
provide full assurance. Applications can still slip through the review’s monitor-
ing [Sli12], and software faults in applications can lead to runtime attacks as
shown in Section 2.3.3.
A DIFT approach similar to ours can be applied to unknown applications, and
thereby prevent attacks on the driver’s privacy such as [Sli12]. The major
problem to solve is performance, because binary instrumentation shows a sig-
nificant overhead, even when small-footprint taint engines are used. A solution
to this problem may be a combined approach, in which trusted functions and
well validated code is exempt from such fine granular runtime monitoring. We
are currently working on a feasibility analysis of an approach that combines
purely middleware-based tracking (that has little to no overhead) with binary
instrumentation in a vehicle-wide environment.
In the long run, malware may adapt itself to such techniques. Intrusion detec-
tion systems can always be circumvented by some means. For instance we see
viruses and worms today that can detect whether they are executed in a virtual
environment. This is also true for dynamic runtime analyses. Egele et al. em-
phasize this in their survey on dynamic malware analysis techniques [ESKK08]:
“If information flow techniques become prevalent in analysis tools, it can
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be expected that malware authors will come up with mechanisms that try to
circumvent such systems”.
Hardware Security One of the main building blocks within the EVITA project
was the Hardware Security Module. It has not only been used to secure on-board
communication, but was also integrated with a simTD communication unit, in
which it improved the communication stack with hardware accelerated ECC
operations1. As a follow up of the FPGA prototype, the PRESERVE EU project
[PRE14] will develop an ASIC based on the results of EVITA. A prototype to
prepare the final Application-Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC) is envisaged to
be used in the final phase of the French FOT SCORE@F in 2013.
The SHE hardware security module features an approach similar to the EVITA
HSM. A comparison is given in [WG11]. It also provides secure boot and
hardware acceleration for symmetric cryptographic algorithms. Its specification
was agreed between a number of OEMs and automotive suppliers, the HIS
consortium. The EVITA partners Infineon and Fujitsu have announced plans
to start the production of ASIC chips for automotive HSMs by 2014 [SS11].
Infineon also envisages an integration with their TriCore line of automotive
microcontrollers like the TC1797 used in EVITA.
Car2X Communication For most people ‘talking cars’ and autonomous vehi-
cles are still a vision much in the future. While we will certainly not have Car2X
communication in the next two years, there already exist preliminary standards
from IEEE and ETSI. Even interoperability and conformance tests for early
products have been conducted under an official mandate of the European Com-
munity [Eur09b].
We are certain that Car2X communication is going to be part of tomorrow’s
vehicles. The communication link will be secured by cryptographic signatures,
and an on-board HSM is going to be required by the standard: For reasons of
security, e.g., key and certificate storage, and also for reasons of performance
because pure software solutions cannot handle the number of verifications per
second that is anticipated.
A growing awareness for attacks on the on-board network [CMK+11, KCR+10]
are strong indicators that security will play an important role in the design of
future inter-vehicular interfaces and in on-board networks.
1In fact, simTD’s RSA certificates were not used, but ECC pseudonym certificates were
used to sign data that was exchanged between the two demonstrator vehicles.
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Re´sume´
L’informatique embarque´e est maintenant devenue partie inte´grante de l’architecture
re´seau des ve´hicules. Elle s’appuie sur l’interconnexion de microcontroleurs appele´s
ECUs par divers bus. On commence maintenant a` connecter ces ECUs au monde
exte´rieur, comme le montrent les syste`mes de navigation, de divertissement, ou de
communication mobile, et les fonctionnalite´ Car2X. Des analyses re´centes ont montre´
de graves vulne´rabilite´s des ECUs et protocoles employe´s qui permettent a` un attaquant
de prendre le controˆle du ve´hicule.
Comme les syste`mes critiques du ve´hicule ne peuvent plus eˆtre comple`tement isole´s,
nous proposons une nouvelle approche pour se´curiser l’informatique embarque´e combi-
nant des me´canismes a` diffe´rents niveaux de la pile protocolaire comme des environ-
nements d’exe´cution. Nous de´crivons nos protocoles se´curise´s qui s’appuient sur une
cryptographie efficace et inte´gre´e au paradigme de communication dominant dans l’au-
tomobile et sur des modules de se´curite´ mate´riels fournissant un stockage se´curise´ et
un noyau de confiance. Nous de´crivons aussi comment surveiller les flux d’information
distribue´s dans le ve´hicule pour assurer une exe´cution conforme a` la politique de se´curite´
des communications. L’instrumentation binaire du code, ne´cessaire pour l’industrialisa-
tion, est utilise´e pour re´aliser cette surveillance durant l’exe´cution (par data tainting)
et entre ECUs (dans l’intergiciel).
Nous e´valuons la faisabilite´ de nos me´canismes pour se´curiser la communication sur le
bus CAN aujourd’hui omnipre´sent dans les ve´hicules. Une preuve de concept montre
aussi la faisabilite´ d’inte´grer des me´canismes de se´curite´ dans des ve´hicules re´els.
A.1 Introduction
Cette annexe donnera au lecteur un re´capitulatif sur les contributions de cette
the`se. Nous allons discuter des approches qui ont e´te´ utilise´es pour re´soudre les
de´fis actuels en matie`re de se´curite´ des ve´hicules automobiles sur les re´seaux de
bord.
Nous commenc¸ons par introduire le domaine d’application et les objectifs de
cette the`se ainsi que ses contributions en vue de re´soudre les proble`mes actuels
dans le domaine de la communication automobile inte´gre´e, dans laquelle les
ve´hicules sont devenus “des ordinateurs sur roues.” [RH05].
A.1.1 Electronique embarque´e
Durant les dernie`res de´cennies, les ve´hicules ont e´te´ e´quipe´s d’un nombre crois-
sant de commandes e´lectroniques. Sans e´lectronique, les ve´hicules d’aujourd’hui
ne seraient plus en mesure de se conformer aux normes d’e´missions actuelles et
de satisfaire les attentes du conducteur en termes de confort et de divertisse-
ment. Cette e´lectronique est devenue un e´le´ment essentiel de l’architecture de
l’automobile. Elle s’organise sous forme d’un re´seau interne de microcontroleurs,
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appele´s Electronic Control Units (ECUs), boˆıtiers de controˆle e´lectroniques , ou
plus simplement calculateurs en franc¸ais. Un ECU peut, par exemple, faire partie
d’un syste`me de divertissement ou d’une interface homme-machine interagis-
sant avec le conducteur, ou comple´ter des syste`mes techniques et me´caniques.
Chaque ECU est connecte´ a` un bus, de meˆme qu’a` un certain nombre de cap-
teurs et d’actionneurs qu’il commande. Typiquement, les mesures des capteurs
sont utilise´es en boucle ferme´e pour commander des actionneurs. Nous donnons
un aperc¸u sur la fac¸on dont l’e´lectronique des ve´hicules et les re´seaux embarque´s
sont de´veloppe´s dans le chapitre 2.
A.1.2 Motivation
En plus du capteur et du controˆle des boucles qui font partie inte´grante des
ve´hicules d’aujourd’hui, l’automobile est devenue une entite´ avec diverses inter-
faces internes et externes. Le ve´hicule se connecte par exemple a` Internet pour
diffe´rents services en ligne. Il permet de diffuser des contenus multime´dias dans
toutes sortes de formats et en provenance de toutes sortes de re´seaux physiques
ou de supports connecte´s.
Aujourd’hui, il existe un e´cart important entre ce qu’il est possible de re´aliser en
termes de communication inter-ve´hiculaire et la confiance ne´cessaire vis-a`-vis
des donne´es rec¸ues, notamment du fait de vulne´rabilite´s potentielles dans les
re´seaux ve´hiculaires. Les fonctionnalite´s logicielles implante´es s’appuient notam-
ment sur les informations envoye´es par d’autres ve´hicules. Ceci peut directement
influer sur le comportement du ve´hicule, par exemple, dans une situation de frei-
nage d’urgence. Bien que l’information peut eˆtre certifie´e et se´curise´e comme
provenant d’un ve´hicule donne´ par une signature cryptographique et un certifi-
cat de cle´ publique, ceci ne peut suffire a` donner l’assurance que l’information
est authentique et n’a pas e´te´ modifie´e entre la ge´ne´ration et la ve´rification de
la signature. En particulier, nul n’est en mesure de garantir l’exactitude des
donne´es transmises, notamment parce qu’un ECU ayant traite´ ces donne´es
dans le ve´hicule expe´diteur peut avoir e´te´ compromis et pourrait ge´ne´rer de
fausses donne´es qui seraient avant que les donne´es e´tait cryptographique signe´.
Des Logiciels Te´le´chargables De plus en plus de plates-formes d’exe´cution,
surtout dans le monde du mobile, permettent au proprie´taire d’installer des appli-
cations personnalise´es. Dans les premiers temps des smartphones, par exemple,
aucune se´curite´ n’e´tait inte´gre´e a` la plate-forme de Palm ou au syste`me d’ex-
ploitation Windows Mobile. Avec un nombre croissant de menaces telles que les
virus et les worms ciblant les plates-formes embarque´es, la se´curite´ joue main-
tenant un roˆle majeur pour le code exe´cutable d’un programme te´le´chargeable.
Nous assistons a` un mouvement similaire dans le monde de l’automobile, ou` une
personnalisation apre`s-vente des fonctions e´lectroniques est maintenant dispo-
nible pour les clients. Cette personnalisation va de l’installation d’applications
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me´te´orologiques sur l’ordinateur de bord aux applications mobiles sur les smart-
phones connecte´s acce´dant auz fonctions du ve´hicule. Renault a par exemple
pre´vu le lancement en Novembre 2012 du magasin d’applications en ligne R-link,
base´ sur Android App [Lut11].
Contrairement aux syste`mes informatiques communs, les syste`mes automobiles
sont tre`s critiques en terme de se´curite´ et ont donc besoin d’une protection
ade´quate en matie`re de se´curite´, surtout avec l’apparition d’une multitude de
nouvelles surfaces d’attaque. D’autre part, la plate-forme du ve´hicule est un
environnement inte´gre´ : les contraintes de couˆts, de latence et de fonctionnalite´
ont e´te´ jusqu’a` pre´sent les principales pre´occupations. Le couˆt, par exemple, est
la principale raison pour laquelle la cryptographie asyme´trique ne peut pas eˆtre
de´ploye´ sur des unite´s de controˆle typiques ou sur des capteurs e´lectroniques.
A.1.3 Description du Proble`me
Dans ce syste`me forme´ de plusieurs sous-syste`mes, l’e´change de donne´es entre
les domaines diminue les possibilite´s de segmentation des re´seaux. Dans les
ve´hicules de la prochaine ge´ne´ration, les applications te´le´charge´es peuvent se
connecter au re´seau embarque´ pour acce´der aux informations et fonctions de la
voiture.
Contextes d’Attaque
Nous nous attendons a` de nouvelles menaces a` l’e´gard des syste`mes automobiles
du ve´hicule par le biais de trois nouvelles interfaces tre`s expose´es. Les contextes
d’attaque sont plus larges que des vecteurs d’attaque particuliers. En plus des
interfaces existantes, telles que le connecteur OBD-II ou les interfaces sans fil
mentionne´s au de´but de ce chapitre, ces trois nouveaux contextes d’attaque
cre´ent une situation comple`tement nouvelle dans le ve´hicule. Plus pre´cise´ment,
ces contextes sont :
1. Canaux de communication ve´hicule a` ve´hicule ou ve´hicule a` infrastructure,
utilise´s pour la suˆrete´ et les fonctions de confort.
2. Appareils portables des passagers ayant acce`s a` des interfaces bien de´finies.
3. Plate-forme d’exe´cution a` l’inte´rieur du ve´hicule qui peut exe´cuter du code
e´tranger, par exemple suite a` l’achat par l’utilisateur d’applications [Lut11,
MTV09, GEN09] et sur demande pour les services ITS [Kom10].
La figure A.1 illustre dans quelles parties du ve´hicule ces interfaces plus ou
moins ouvertement accessibles sont situe´es. En particulier l’exe´cution de code
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d’origine inconnue et non se´curise´ pose un proble`me qui ne peut eˆtre re´solu
par une technique de protection unique. Dans la section 2.2, nous pre´sentons
diffe´rentes techniques, et les classons par rapport a` la complexite´ et a` la se´curite´.
Nous de´crivons aussi comment certaines d’entre ells peuvent eˆtre combine´es.
Sce´nario Pour le moment les trois contextes d’attaque sont peu connecte´.
Bien que les applications a` l’inte´rieur du ve´hicule aient de´ja` maintenant plusieurs
sources de donne´es distribue´es et fournissent leurs donne´es a` d’autres nœuds
dans le re´seau du ve´hicule, elles ne ne´cessitent pas l’acce`s en ligne. A` l’avenir,
ces sources puits de donne´es seront encore plus distribue´es, c’est-a`-dire que les
applications auront acce`s a` des services en ligne sur des serveurs back-end, des
services ITS ou des services Internet. Les frontie`res entre ces services diminuent
et des applications de seconde monte (after-market) sont inte´gre´es aux services
internes du ve´hicule. Ainsi, les trois contextes d’attaque grandiront ensemble,
posant des menaces potentielles a` tous les domaines re´seau internes.
Proble´matique Dans le sce´nario, les acteurs sont fortement interconnecte´s et
peuvent meˆme changer de roˆle. Plusieurs domaines sont mis en oeuvre, dont
certains sont tre`s limite´s (le ve´hicule sur le re´seau de bord) et certains sont
accessibles au public (services Internet), mais ils ne suivent pas une architecture
ou des mesures de se´curite´ communes. A` l’heure actuelle, certaines mesures de
se´curite´ ne sont base´es que sur l’isolation (par exemple, la se´paration physique
des re´seaux du ve´hicule). D’autres sont base´es sur des mesures cryptographiques
et de certification (authentification pour les serveurs Internet) ou des politiques
de se´curite´ (re`gles de firewall). Le sce´nario ne peut donc pas facilement eˆtre
e´value´ dans son ensemble avec les techniques de se´curite´ classiques, telles que
la cryptographie, les politiques de controˆle d’acce`s ou les TPM. En raison du
couˆt et des exigences fonctionnelles, on ne peut applique des techniques de
se´curite´ quelconques sans justification.
Les composants e´lectroniques d’un ve´hicule constituent naturellement un sys-
te`me distribue´. Par conse´quent, la se´curite´ doit eˆtre conside´re´e dans son en-
semble, et non isole´ment pour un ECU en particulier. Comme les flux d’infor-
mation existent e´galement dans diffe´rents domaines, une solution de se´curite´
doit eˆtre conc¸ue de fac¸on conforme aux exigences de se´curite´, aux sce´narios, et
aux applications inter-domaines.
A.1.4 Re´capitulatif et Plan de la The`se
L’objectif global de cette the`se est de re´duire le risque d’attaques provenant
des trois contextes d’attaque et de leur combinaison. Un proble`me central non
re´solu des re´seaux embarque´s d’aujourd’hui est de maintenir et d’attester de
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Figure A.1: Nouveaux contextes d’attaque des ve´hicules connecte´s : Car2X, les appa-
reils mobiles et les applications te´le´chargeables sont les principales interfaces expose´es.
Interfaces de diagnostic et interfaces sans fil (par exemple, capteurs de pression sans
fil) sont e´galement sans protection spe´ciale. Le sche´ma du ve´hicule affiche´ en arrie`re
plan est proprie´te´ de BMW.
l’authenticite´ et de l’inte´grite´ du re´seau interne du ve´hicule entre les composants.
Celui-ci est beaucoup plus expose´ qu’il y a quelques anne´es.
Alors que les trois contextes d’attaque semblent, a` premie`re vue, orthogonaux,
une combinaison de techniques peut nous permettre d’atteindre l’objectif visant
a` pre´venir et a` limiter l’impact des attaques et garantir la confidentialite´ du
syste`me. Le troisie`me contexte d’attaque exige explicitement la protection de la
vie prive´e et la se´curite´ de l’exe´cution. Par exemple, un code e´tranger pourrait
eˆtre charge´ sur un microcontroˆleurs du ve´hicule et acce´der a` des informations
personnelles, telles que les informations de paiement ou aux services de naviga-
tion et a` l’historique du ve´hicule. Aujourd’hui, nous voyons de´ja` des exemples
de vol de donne´es ciblant les appareils mobiles : les applications peuvent en-
voyer secre`tement des donne´es de localisation pour les entreprises de publicite´,
ou prendre en charge le pe´riphe´rique lui-meˆme en vue de commettre des paie-
ments ou des appels frauduleux. Ce type d’infraction peut aussi se reproduire
pour les plates-formes ve´hiculaires, qui actuellement s’ouvrent aux meˆmes types
d’applications.
Nous avons contribue´ a` la conception et aux re´alisations du projet europe´en
EVITA du 7e`me programme cadre. Nous de´crivons l’environnement du proto-
type d’EVITA qui a e´te´ utilise´ dans le cadre du travail de cette the`se dans
le chapitre 3. En particulier, la plate-forme logicielle et le module de se´curite´
mate´riel sont des e´le´ments importants pour nos implantations. Comme nous ci-
blons spe´cifiquement le contexte ve´hicule, nous soulignons certaines contraintes
spe´cifiques et les conditions pre´alables pour la communication de l’automobile
et de plates-formes d’exe´cution.
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Communications Une approche classique de la question de la validite´ des
donne´es rec¸ues est la cryptographie. Dans le ve´hicule, il n’y a actuellement au-
cune technique possible pour re´soudre ce proble`me : les ECUs n’offrent pas
de puissance de traitement suffisante pour des ope´rations cryptographiques
supple´mentaires et les bus de communication ne permettent pas de de´finir des
protocoles comportant des messages significativement plus longs, une exigence
pour introduire des signatures nume´riques ou des codes d’authentification. Une
contrainte supple´mentaire est pose´ par des exigences de temps re´el pour cer-
taines applications automobiles.
Plate-forme Alors que les me´canismes cryptographiques peuvent assurer la
fraˆıcheur, l’authenticite´ et l’inte´grite´ des donne´es, le re´cepteur doit avoir la cer-
titude que la plate-forme de l’expe´diteur est dans un e´tat de confiance et non
compromise. Cela signifie que l’environnement d’exe´cution et le logiciel qui a
ge´ne´re´ les donne´es rec¸ues n’ont pas e´te´ modifie´s par un tiers. Dans les syste`mes
informatiques personnels, cette question est aborde´e par une technique appele´e
attestation a` distance, dans laquel un module mate´riel se´curise´ comme une puce
TPM mesure l’inte´grite´ du logiciel. Bien que certains proble`mes, par exemple
en ce qui concerne la vie prive´e ou la fraˆıcheur d’attestation peuvent surve-
nir [CGL+11], nous conside´rons que l’approche d’attestation de se´curite´ de la
plateforme est viable pour un ve´hicule. Pour des raisons techniques et pour des
raisons de couˆt (par exemple, la ne´cessite´ d’utiliser le chiffrement syme´trique),
une attestation a` distance des composants dans le ve´hicule pour se´curiser la com-
munication avec d’autres ve´hicules (communication Car2X) est hors de question.
Pour la communication externe Car2X, les approches employe´es s’appuient soit
uniquement sur la cryptographie sous diverses formes (asyme´trique [GFL+07],
de groupe [GBW07], temporise´e [HL06]), soit sur des informations de re´putation
dynamique [Ray09] comme indicateur supple´mentaire.
Contributions de la The`se
Nous avons de´veloppe´ des techniques et des protocoles pour les re´seaux ve´hicu-
laires embarque´s qui peuvent assurer l’authenticite´ et la fraˆıcheur des donne´es
(se´curite´), ainsi que la protection effective des donne´es (se´curite´ et confidentia-
lite´) au sein du re´seau du ve´hicule et a` l’inte´rieur des ECUs.
1. Spe´cification et Conception
• Un protocole embarque´ pour la distribution des cle´s cryptographiques.
• Un syste`me de de´tection d’intrusion (IDS) distribue´e pour les re´seaux
et plates-formes d’exe´cution ve´hiculaires, base´s sur le suivi des flux
d’information dynamique (DIFT).
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• Une approche base´e sur des re`gles de DIFT pour de´crire les flux
d’information autorise´s.
2. Simulation et Evaluation
• L’e´valuation de la latence et de taux d’erreur du protocole de trans-
port se´curise´ sur des noeuds CAN simule´s.
• La performance globale de la distribution des cle´s sur un bus CAN
simule´ et sur un prototype Ethernet.
• L’e´valuation du prototype de l’approche de suivi de flux d’information
distribue´.
3. Implantation du Prototype
• Distribution des cle´s, inte´gre´e avec le module HSM et l’intergiciel
EMVY.
• Communication se´curise´e pour les bus CAN et Ethernet, inte´gre´e
avec le HSM et l’intergiciel EMVY.
• Une passerelle CAN–Ethernet.
• Un syste`me de de´tection d’intrusion pour le ve´hicule, inte´gre´ a` l’in-
tergiciel EMVY.
• Un syste`me DIFT distribue´, base´ sur des moteurs de marquage de
donne´es locaux utilisant l’instrumentation de code compile´ et la pro-
pagation de marques par des liens de communication se´curise´s.
A.1.5 Organisation de la The`se
Cette the`se est divise´e en sept chapitres. Dans ce re´sume´ en franc¸ais nous allons
donner un bref aperc¸u du contenu de chaque chapitre. Le lecteur se reportera
a` la version anglaise pour plus de de´tails.
Suite a` l’introduction, le chapitre 2, Etat de l’Art , donne un re´sume´ complet
des pratiques industrielles actuelles et des approches de recherche a` la fois dans
le domaine des ve´hicules et d’autres environnements informatiques embarque´s
tels que les te´le´phones mobiles ou des ordinateurs. Dans le chapitre 3, Envi-
ronnement , nous pre´sentons les sce´narios que nous avons choisis pour illustrer
les approches de´veloppe´es dans cette the`se. Nous de´crivons un mode`le d’atta-
quant, l’environnement d’expe´rimentation des ve´hicules, et le projet europe´en
FP7 EVITA, dans lequel la plupart des travaux de cette the`se ont e´te´ re´alise´s.
Cette the`se se poursuit avec les deux chapitres principaux : dans le chapitre 4,
Communication Se´curise´e, un protocole de distribution de cle´s dans les envi-
ronnements automobiles ainsi qu’un protocole pour e´tablir une communication
se´curise´e sur le bus CAN sont pre´sente´s. Par la suite, le chapitre 5, Securite´ des
Ph.D. Thesis — Hendrik C. Schweppe
A.1. INTRODUCTION 127
Plateformes Dynamique, e´value la se´curite´ globale dynamique de la plate-forme
automobile : une approche qui est base´e sur le suivi de flux d’information dyna-
mique pour se´curiser l’exe´cution. Ces techniques permettent e´galement d’assu-
rer la protection de la vie prive´e du conducteur et des passagers. En outre, un
syste`me de de´tection d’intrusion classique inte´gre´ dans le cadre de la se´curite´
routie`re est pre´sente´. Finalement, une autre approche qui est a` meˆme de garantir
des performances de faible ECUs est introduite.
Dans le chapitre 6, Prototypes et leur E´valuation, nous pre´sentons des simu-
lations et des mesures de la mise en œuvre de ces techniques et discutons les
de´cisions de conception et les de´tails du prototype.
La the`se se conclut par la pre´sentation de conclusions et perspectives dans le
chapitre 7. Nous discutons de la faisabilite´ de nos approches, de l’applicabilite´
des techniques et de leurs avantages et inconve´nients respectifs. Nous donnons
e´galement un aperc¸u des travaux futurs sur les sujets aborde´s dans la the`se, ainsi
que des perspectives en matie`re de recherche et de de´veloppement industriel.
Dans l’annexe B, nous fournissons des Mesures supple´mentaires et de´tails de
mise en œuvre. Dans l’annexe C.1 (page 181) les Sigles et acronymes qui sont
utilise´s dans la the`se sont de´veloppe´s et explique´s. La version e´lectronique du
document permet de naviguer sur cette page en cliquant sur une abre´viation.
A la fin de la the`se, des listes de Figures, Inscriptions et Tableaux sont fournies.
Une liste des publications effectue´es lors des travaux de cette the`se est donne´e
par la suite. Une bibliographie qui donne la liste des re´fe´rences aux travaux cite´s
comple`te enfin cette the`se.
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A.2 E´tat de l’Art
Nous donnons dans cette section un aperc¸u de l’e´tat de l’art de la se´curite´ re´seau
et logicielle des syste`mes embarque´s ve´hiculaires. Nous montrons e´galement
les de´veloppements en cours et a` venir dans les me´canismes de se´curite´ pour
ve´hicules et de l’e´lectronique embarque´e et des re´seaux.
A.2.1 Les Syste`mes Ve´hiculaires Actuels
Les ve´hicules ont longtemps e´te´ un domaine purement me´canique. Cet e´tat de
fait a radicalement change´ ces dernie`res de´cennies. A` compter de la gestion
e´lectronique du moteur dans les anne´es 70, les ve´hicules ont e´volue´ vers une
plateforme informatique multi-connecte´e. Dans le meˆme temps, les syste`mes de
se´curite´ routie`re autrefois me´caniques ont e´volue´ vers des e´quipements e´lectro-
niques (ESP, ABS) qui ont e´te´ introduits avec succe`s. Des syste`mes de commu-
nication ve´hicule-a`-ve´hicule embarque´s sont en train d’eˆtre de´ploye´s et consti-
tuent un premier pas vers la conduite autonome. Le de´ploiement commercial
d’un syste`me conduisant de manie`re autonome est encore irre´aliste dans les
anne´es qui viennent, mais les de´fis re´cents de la DARPA pour la conduite auto-
nome ont remarquablement montre´ sa faisabilite´. Entre 2010 et 2012, des tests
sur route ont e´te´ re´alise´s a` grande e´chelle avec plusieurs centaines de ve´hicules.
Ceux-ci ont conduit a` la de´livrance d’une autorisation officielle pour l’usage
routier des ve´hicules autonomes dans deux e´tats des E´tats-Unis en 2012.
E´lectronique Embarque´e Capteurs et appareils de controˆle sont devenus de
plus en plus complexes ces dernie`res anne´es. Ceci est e´galement duˆ au fait que
la redondance joue un roˆle important pour la re´duction des risques en ce qui
concerne la se´curite´ routie`re. Un exemple concerne le placement des capteurs
redondants utilise´s pour le freinage e´lectronique (‘brake-by-wire’) : il n’y a pas un
seul capteur a` la pe´dale, mais un ensemble de plusieurs capteurs redondants, qui
mesurent diffe´rentes grandeurs physiques. L’un des capteurs est utilise´ pour la
mesure de l’inclinaison de la pe´dale de frein et un autre pour de´tecter la pression
applique´e a` la pe´dale. Ces capteurs sont ge´ne´ralement inte´gre´s dans un boˆıtier de
capteurs connecte´ aux bus du ve´hicule. Un exemple d’implantation d’un capteur
de pe´dale de frein e´lectronique est de´crit dans [ISS02] a` partir de 2002. Nous
l’avons sche´matiquement illustre´ a` la figure 2.2 page 12. Alors que la pe´dale
d’acce´le´rateur est e´lectronique dans la plupart des ve´hicules vendus aujourd’hui,
les syste`mes de freinage e´lectronique sans solutions de secours me´canique ne
re´pondent pas encore aux exigences le´gales dans tous les marche´s. Une faille dans
le logiciel de l’unite´ de freinage a e´te´ la cause d’un rappel important de ve´hicules
par Toyota en 2010 [Wil10]. En Octobre 2012, Nissan a annonce´ mettre en place
un syste`me de direction e´lectronique (direction-by-wire) dans la production de
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Figure A.2: Exemples de communication Car2X : Messages DENM sont e´mis et trans-
mis a` avertir les autres conducteurs (a` gauche) ou pour ame´liorer l’efficacite´ du trafic,
par exemple les horaires de diffusion des feux de circulation (a` droite). Photos utilise´es
avec l’autorisation de BMW Forschung und Technik GmbH.
se´rie pour les ve´hicules Infiniti dans moins d’un an [Nis12]. Leur syste`me utilise
une configuration redondante de trois calculateurs et un syste`me de sauvegarde
me´canique pour controˆler e´lectroniquement le syste`me de direction du ve´hicule,
et donner une re´troaction au volant de manie`re se´lective. La colonne de direction
me´canique peut remplacer des signaux e´lectroniques a` l’aide d’un embrayage,
qui de´couple le volant des roues motrices en mode de fonctionnement normal.
Depuis 2005, un tel syste`me d’urgence redondant ne serait meˆme pas ne´cessaire
selon une re´vision du re`glement de la ECE qui englobe notamment le pilotage
e´lectronique (‘steer-by-wire’) [Uni05].
VANETS : La communication ve´hicule-a`-ve´hicule Malgre´ le fait que la
communication Car2X n’est pas encore de´ploye´e dans les ve´hicules d’aujour-
d’hui, les re´sultats pre´liminaires de nombreux projets de recherche et de tests
sur le terrain commencent a` eˆtre disponibles [FFH+04, PBH+08, SKL+06]. L’ob-
jectif de cette the`se est la communication a` bord, mais celle-ci joue e´galement
un roˆle tre`s important dans la confiance mise en place de syste`mes Car2X. Ac-
tuellement, une approche base´e sur des certificats avec diffe´rents niveaux de
confiance est envisage´e pour repre´senter la se´curite´ vis-`-vis des communications
internes au ve´hicule.
Dans les syste`mes Car2X, il existe principalement deux types de messages. Les
messages appele´s balises Cooperative Awareness Messages (CAMs) sont dif-
fuse´s re´gulie`rement pour annoncer la position du ve´hicule, sa vitesse et son
acce´le´ration. Le deuxie`me type de messages est constitue´ des messages Distri-
buted Environment Notification Messages (DENMs), qui servent pour avertir
d’un danger et des conditions routie`res. Alors qu’un CAMs n’est pas relaye´,
les messages DENM peuvent eˆtre transmis par des noeuds. Ceci est utile, par
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exemple, pour transmettre un message d’alerte en amont le long d’une route
avec des voitures circulant en sens inverse.
En revanche, les messages des balises Cooperative Awareness Messages (CAMs)
sont utilise´s pour e´viter les collisions : une pre´vision de trajectoire est calcule´e
pour les ve´hicules environnants, et par rapport a` la trajectoire propre du ve´hicule,
de sorte que le conducteur peut eˆtre averti en conse´quence.
Par contre, les DENM sont envoye´s, par exemple, dans les situations d’urgence :
si un accident a de´ja` e´te´ de´tecte´, ou si un freinage d’urgence est effectue´e. Le
relayage de ce type de message permet de s’assurer non seulement que les
ve´hicules dans le voisinage, mais aussi la circulation en amont recevront cette
information. Ces messages sont e´galement utilise´s pour diffuser l’information
routie`re, tels que les fre´quences des feux de circulation.
Un facteur important dans la communication sans fil est la se´curisation ap-
proprie´e du contenu : comme mentionne´ ci-dessus, la cryptographie a` courbes
elliptiques (ECC) est pre´vue pour des signatures cryptographiques Car2X de
communication, en raison de la longueur plus courte des cle´s et des signa-
tures. Des certificats de pseudonymes sont utilise´s pour signer les donne´es en-
voye´es : l’identite´ du ve´hicule ne peut pas eˆtre facilement re´ve´le´e. Cela permet
de pre´server la vie prive´e des conducteurs et a e´te´ e´value´ dans le projet eu-
rope´en de´die´ PRESERVE [PRE14]. Chaque ve´hicule est titulaire d’un certificat
d’identite´ a` long terme. Cette identite´ est utilise´e pour l’authentification par une
infrastructure de cle´ publique (PKI) centralise´e afin de re´cupe´rer des certificats
de pseudonyme frais, qui sont ensuite utilise´s sur la route.
L’e´tat actuel de la recherche dans les re´seaux ve´hiculaires est de´crit dans [HL10].
Le livre couvre toutes les couches de communication et comprend un chapitre
sur les approches securite´ dans le Car2X et les nouvelles normes.
Dans un futur proche, des services de se´curite´ routie`re et des applications se-
ront de´ploye´es dans les ve´hicules ainsi que dans l’infrastructure routie`re. Cette
possibilite´ est a` l’e´tude dans le Consortium Car2Car et l’organisme de standar-
disation ETSI.
Afin de fournir une base fiable pour la communication inter-ve´hicules, se´curiser
les communications a` bord des ve´hicules est crucial.
Dans les premie`res ge´ne´rations de Car2X, les ve´hicules utiliseront les informa-
tions fournies par les RSUs et sont conscient des autres ve´hicules dans le voisi-
nage, ce qui leur permet d’avertir le conducteur des dangers a` venir toˆt et de
manie`re ade´quate. Alors que les solutions de se´curite´ ge´ne´ralement proprie´taires
ont ge´ne´ralement e´te´ applique´e pour les fonctions du ve´hicule classiques, tels
que les odome`tres nume´riques et le controˆle d’acce`s physique (par exemple,
porte-cle´s pour ouvrir les portes a` l’aide de communication radio sans fil), inter-
ve´hicule de communication doit s’appuyer sur des normes bien de´finies qui ont
d’eˆtre reconnu et respecte´ par tous les fabricants et fournisseurs.
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Ces nouvelles applications offrent de nouvelles surfaces d’attaque, qui peuvent
meˆme eˆtre exploite´es a` distance et peuvent entraˆıner des conse´quences graves.
Sans mesure de se´curite´ supple´mentaire, de fausses alertes peuvent eˆtre cre´e´es
et des attaquants peuvent exploiter des applications de se´curite´ en leur faveur,
mettant ainsi en danger la se´curite´ des conducteurs. Nous de´crivons dans ce
manuscrit des exemples d’attaques re´ussies pour illustrer le besoin de se´curite´.
Se´curite´ des VANETs Apre`s que les premie`rs syste`mes coope´ratifs de com-
munication de ve´hicule a` ve´hicule ont e´te´ teste´s avec succe`s au de´but des
anne´es 2000 [FFH+04], le besoin de se´curite´ est devenu e´vident, car des attaques
re´ussies sur les fonctions de se´curite´ peuvent non seulement perturber le syste`me,
mais aussi conduire a` des accidents mortels. Le projet SeVeCOM [SeV08] a
e´value´ ce besoin de se´curite´ et a mene´ plusieurs expe´riences en 2006. Il s’est
ave´re´ que les certificats, qui sont ne´cessaires pour pour authentifier les ve´hicules
a` distance, peuvent causer une surcharge importante en communications, ce qui
a entraˆıne´ le choix d’algorithmes cryptographiques a` base de courbes elliptiques
(ECC). Leurs cle´s et la longueur de leurs signatures sont courts, mais offrent le
meˆme niveau de se´curite´ que RSA avec des cle´s plus longues [LBH+06]. Des op-
timisations de l’utilisation des canaux, par exemple en omettant intelligemment
et autant que possible des certificats [Pap09] ont e´te´ de´veloppe´s dans ce projet.
Le re´seau d’excellence en syste`mes informatiques de se´curite´, SysSec, a publie´
un rapport sur l’e´tat de l’art de la se´curite´ dans les ve´hicules connecte´s [Sys12].
Il couvre le Car2X ainsi que la se´curite´ interne des ve´hicules.
Syste`mes Coope´ratifs Routiers Expe´rimentaux Les tests ope´rationnels de
syste`mes coope´ratifs (Field Operational Tests (FOTs)s) sont des programmes
qui permettent d’e´valuer la faisabilite´ et les performances des communications
inter-ve´hiculaires par des bancs d’essais re´alistes. Dans ces FOTs, un certain
nombre de ve´hicules, en ge´ne´ral entre 10 et 200, sont e´quipe´s de syste`mes
embarque´s et sont exploite´s dans une zone spe´cifique qui est e´quipe´e avec des
RSUss. La se´curite´ cryptographique pour la communication sans fil est applique´e
dans tous les FOTss actuels. Par exemple, le projet simTD utilise une infra-
structure a` cle´ publique a` long terme ainsi que des identite´s de courte dure´e,
ou pseudonymes. Celles-ci sont e´tablies et exploite´es [BSM+09] a` travers une
acPKI qui a e´te´ mise en place par le consortium du projet. Le concept d’identite´
a` court terme est lie´ a` la proce´dure d’attestation anonyme directe, que l’on
trouve dans les architectures de TPM. En raison de la puissance de traitement
limite´e, les FOTs survolent ge´ne´ralement l’implantation de la partie cryptogra-
phique des protocoles mis en Uˆuvre. Par exemple, au lieu de cryptographie a`
courbe elliptique, qui est pre´vu pour la normalisation, RSA-512 est utilise´ pour
les certificats a` court terme dans simTD.
Des tests similaires existent dans d’autres pays, comme par exemple SCORE@F
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en France. Ces FOTs sont coordonne´s par le projet routier C2X, qui effectue
des tests d’interope´rabilite´ dans le cadre de la normalisation de l’ETSI.
Le re´sultat des FOTss va largement influencer la normalisation et la faisabilite´
industrielle. Aux E´tats-Unis, les projets VII et VSC ont de´ja` abouti a` la norme
IEEE WAVE [HL10, US 09]. L’e´tat actuel de la normalisation et des de´fis pour
les E´tats-Unis est pre´sente´ dans [LLZ+08]. La Commission europe´enne a donne´
un mandat de normalisation a` l’ETSI et au CEN [Eur09b], qui couvre la normali-
sation des communications et applications automobiles. Une forme modifie´e des
spe´cifications WAVE (IEEE 1602.11) est utilise´e pour les FOTss en Europe. En
dehors des syste`mes ve´hicule-a`-ve´hicule, le syste`me d’urgence eCall [Eur09a] va
eˆtre obligatoire pour les ve´hicules neufs dans l’Union europe´enne. Nous allons
voir de plus en plus l’inte´gration de mate´riels et logiciels de communication dans
les ve´hicules dans les prochaines anne´es, ce qui exige une sensibilisation accrue
a` la se´curite´.
Se´curite´ des re´seaux embarque´s La ne´cessite´ de la protection des donne´es a`
l’inte´rieur des ve´hicules est mentionne´e dans plusieurs publications et projets de
recherche [Kun08, EB06, GFL+07]. Ne´anmoins, aucun de ces projets n’a e´tudie´
les solutions possibles pour la se´curite´ dans une plate-forme automobile et leurs
implications. Le projet europe´en EVITA vise exactement cet objectif d’assurer la
se´curite´ et la confiance a` l’inte´rieur du ve´hicule. Il est de´ja` ne´cessaire d’ajouter
des mesures de se´curite´ au niveau des capteurs, parce que dans les donne´es en
provenance de la voiture de donne´es peuvent activer des applications impliquant
la communication ve´hicule-a`-ve´hicule. Ainsi, des messages internes, tels que le
de´ploient les airbags ou le freinage d’urgence, peuvent entraˆıner la diffusion de
messages d’avertissement a` l’exte´rieur du ve´hicule.
Des mesures de se´curite´ ont jusqu’a` pre´sent e´te´ applique´es pour des fonction-
nalite´s tre`s spe´cifiques et dans un peu de composants du ve´hicule. Par exemple,
le te´le´chargement des mises a` jour du micrologiciel des calculateurs embarque´s
est prote´ge´ par un code d’acce`s de deux ou plusieurs octets. Bien suˆr, un code
a` deux octets ne fournit qu’une se´curite´ marginale contre des attaquants avec
un temps et un nombre d’essais illimite´s. [KCR+10] a de´montre´ que le code de
se´curite´ requis par la norme peut eˆtre trouve´ en seulement trois jours et demi
en effectuant une attaque par force brute (essais et erreurs). L’introduction de
signatures cryptographiques fortes a d’ailleurs e´te´ re´cemment de´cide´e par le
groupe de fabricants HIS en Allemagne [ZS08].
Dans le cadre du projet EVITA, le but e´tait d’associer des syste`mes de se´curite´
pour les re´seaux intra-ve´hiculaires avec la communication externe et les ap-
plications de se´curite´ correspondantes, ainsi que de fournir une base pour de
futurs projets concerne´s par la se´curite´ dans le ve´hicule. Le projet europe´en
OVERSEE met l’accent sur les environnements d’exe´cution se´curise´s dans les
ve´hicules [GHR+09] et le projet SEIS allemand va mettre en œuvre la se´curite´ du
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protocole Internet (IP) dans les architectures de re´seau de bord de l’industrie au-
tomobile [GHM+10]. Re´cemment, quelques nouvelles approches pour prote´ger la
se´curite´ routie`re CAN ont e´te´ propose´es [CRH05, NLJ08, OYN+08, GR09, Be09,
HSV11]. Le bus FlexRay, qui est cense´ succe´der a` CAN, pre´sente des lacunes de
conception tre`s similaires en ce qui concerne la se´curite´, et notamment l’e´coute
et l’injection de charge utile sont encore possibles [NLPJ09]. Certaines approches
ne´cessitent de de´ployer des circuits e´lectroniques d’e´mission-re´ception adapte´s
et diffe´rentes technologies re´seau. Toutes ces me´thodes utilisent la se´curite´ cryp-
tographique pour authentifier la charge utile du bus. Nous allons expliquer ces
approches plus en de´tail dans la section 4.3. Dans l’ensemble, la se´curite´ des
composants embarque´s dans les ve´hicules a pris de l’inte´reˆt pour les chercheurs
comme pour l’industrie. Le fait que les socie´te´s de conseil de se´curite´ et anti-
virus publient enqueˆtes et livres blancs sur ce sujet [Lin09, MWW+11] illustrent
e´galement cet inte´reˆt croissant. Une bonne vue d’ensemble sur les activite´s de
recherche actuelles en matie`re de se´curite´ dans les ve´hicules est donne´e dans
l’e´tat de l’art publie´ dans [KOJ11]. Le rapport SysSec de´taille aussi l’e´tat de
l’art de la se´curite´ dans le ve´hicule connecte´ [Sys12].
Paradigmes de Communication Interne Actuels Le processus de de´ve-
loppement utilise´ a` l’heure actuelle pour les applications re´parties sur plusieurs
ECUss s’explique par l’historique des technologies employe´es. Lorsque le bus
CAN a e´te´ introduit, il a remplace´ des fils e´lectriques sous tension de´die´s ou des
signaux code´s par un bus informatique, ou` l’information nume´rise´e est trans-
mise. Ainsi, les donne´es sur le bus sont souvent appele´es signaux . Ces signaux
sont ge´ne´ralement transmis d’une manie`re pe´riodique (avec des cycles typiques
de 10 a` 100 ms), ce qui permet des controˆles en boucle ferme´e.
Au cours du de´veloppement, ces signaux sont de´finis dans les outils logiciels
qui sont disponibles a` partir de diffe´rents fournisseurs (la suite Vector est l’un
des plus couramment utilise´s, RTaW-Sim en e´tant une alternative libre). Le
de´veloppeur ajoute des signaux et leur repre´sentation discre´tise´e correspondante.
Ces signaux sont ensuite associe´s a` un calculateur e´metteur et un ou plusieurs
calculateurs re´cepteurs sont se´lectionne´es. La matrice re´sultante est appele´e
K-Matrix . Elle de´crit la repre´sentation des donne´es, et la relation e´metteur /
groupe de re´cepteurs. Les ECUss avec plusieurs interfaces re´seau peuvent assurer
la propagation de trames et constituent alors des passerelles au sein du re´seau.
Les donne´es mode´lise´es peuvent eˆtre exporte´es dans des formats spe´cifiques
de´crivant le bus de communication. Un format base´ sur XML appele´ FIBEX
(Format Field Exchange Bus) est en train de devenir un standard industriel. Il a
e´te´ de´fini par l’organisme de normalisation ASAM (Association de normalisation
des syste`mes automatiques et de mesure).
Jusqu’a` pre´sent, les mode`les et les outils de de´veloppement ne comprennent pas
les moyens d’accroˆıtre la charge utile des donne´es authentifie´es et chiffre´es. Bien
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Figure A.3: AUTOSAR de´veloppement de paradigme : les composants logiciels (SWC)
d’e´changer des informations via le bus de fonction virtuelle (VFB). Ces fonctions logi-
cielles sont de´ploye´es sur des calculateurs diffe´rents. Les mode`les sont de´crites dans un
format lisible par une machine et compile´es dans l’architecture globale du ve´hicule
pour le de´ploiement. Le cadre d’exe´cution est partiellement ge´ne´re´ a` partir de la
“configuration d’AUTOSAR”, qui comprend tous les fichiers de description. Illustra-
tion de [BFWS10].
que les informations concernant la composition des groupes de communication,
la fre´quence des messages qui leurs sont destine´s et leur taille sont explicite-
ment disponibles, elles ne sont pas encore utilise´es pour ge´ne´rer ou de´finir des
politiques de controˆle d’acce`s au re´seau ou pour de´tecter des donne´es d’origine
malveillante et non conformes.
Un Nouveau Paradigme : AUTOSAR L’architecture AUTOSAR est base´e
sur un paradigme qui a e´te´ promu pour une utilisation dans les re´seaux de
ve´hicules depuis le milieu des anne´es 2000. Il se compose d’un syste`me d’exploi-
tation embarque´ (le syste`me AUTOSAR, base´ sur OSEK, un syste`me d’exploi-
tation automobile normalise´ ISO [ISO05]) et d’une vue abstraite sur toutes
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les communications, c’est-a`-dire, le concept abstrait d’un bus de fonctions
virtuel (VFB), qui remplace la communication explicite entre processus et le
re´seau d’e´change de donne´es. Cette approche d’inge´nierie des mode`les per-
met de de´crire le placement des composants logiciels (SWC) sur les diffe´rents
calculateurs distribue´s a` un niveau abstrait de compilation et de de´ploiement
“presse-bouton”. Le syste`me d’exploitation fournit un cadre pour les fonctions
du logiciel et des taˆches qui peuvent acce´der a` du mate´riel et des bibliothe`ques
a` travers une interface de programmation standardise´e. La figure A.3 montre le
paradigme de de´veloppement, avec une compilation de tous les mode`les dans
une architecture de de´ploiement.
Depuis sa dernie`re version majeure, AUTOSAR 4.0 dispose d’une bibliothe`que de
services cryptographiques qui fait partie de sa spe´cification [BFWS10]. Cette bi-
bliothe`que fournit des fonctions pour les applications et des fonctions du syste`me
d’exploitation en ce qui concerne des algorithmes spe´cifiques : MD5, SHA-1,
RSA, AES et d’autres peuvent eˆtre accessibles via la bibliothe`que CryptoAbs-
tractionLibrary [AUT11].
Malgre´ la standardisation de l’API Crypto, il n’existe pas encore de moyen de
se´curiser les communications entre des liens de communication AUTOSAR. En
particulier, si une communication se´curise´e doit eˆtre mise en œuvre, la charge
utile de se´curite´ devrait eˆtre ajoute´e a` la couche application. C’est ce qui se fait
actuellement pour les fonctions syste`me telles que la mise a` jour du firmware
ou certaines fonctions de diagnostic.
A.2.2 Techniques pour Se´curiser l’Exe´cution de Logiciels
Suivi dynamique de la circulation de l’information La technique DIFT per-
met de s’assurer que les donne´es en entre´e (par exemple, les donne´es entre´es
par l’utilisateur du re´seau, le fichier d’entre´e,) peuvent eˆtre e´tiquete´es en interne
(contamine´). Cette balise est effectue´ tout au long de l’exe´cution. Ces balises
peuvent repre´senter une donne´e en entre´e d’origine inconnue ou non fiable. Les
applications te´le´charge´es peuvent aussi utilement eˆtre marque´es. Au moment
de l’exe´cution, les donne´es en entre´e de l’application sont automatiquement
marque´es. Lorsque l’application traite des donne´es marque´es, les donne´es lues
a` partir de ces descripteurs de fichiers he´ritent automatiquement du marquage,
c’est a` dire que la balise se propage le long de la chaˆıne suivant laquelle circule
l’information au cours de l’exe´cution d’une application. Ces fonctions de propa-
gation peuvent eˆtre de´crites dans un cadre logiciel comme par exemple [LC06a].
Un tableau global de zones de me´moire marque´es, souvent appele´e me´moire sha-
dow, est conserve´ par l’environnement d’exe´cution et e´value´ lorsque la me´moire
est acce´de´e. Pour toutes les ope´rations d’affectation, la nouvelle information de
marquage (ge´ne´ralement un vecteur de bits) pour l’ope´rande gauche est de´rive´
des informations de marquage de l’ope´rande de droite a` l’aide de la fonction
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d’he´ritage ou de propagation mentionne´e ci-dessus. Policy Scope [ZJS+09] est
par exemple un outil qui suit cette approche.
... “Le suivi de la circulation de l’information (IFT pour Informa-
tion Flow Tracking) se re´fe`re a` la possibilite´ de suivre la fac¸on
dont le re´sultat de l’exe´cution d’un programme est marque´, par
l’interme´diaire soit des donne´es ou des de´pendances de controˆle, a`
ses entre´es a` partir du re´seau, du syste`me de fichiers et des autres
parame`tres externes tels que les variables d’environnement et les ar-
guments de ligne de commande. Pour suivre avec pre´cision les flux
d’information, chaque donne´e en entre´e doit eˆtre marque´e par une
e´tiquette, qui peut eˆtre un bit (par exemple, un bit ‘taint’ ou mar-
quage) ou un pointeur vers une me´ta-structure de donne´es arbitrai-
rement complexe, et pour chaque ope´ration d’affectation, l’e´tiquette
de la partie gauche de l’ope´ration est de´rive´e de celle de sa partie
droite selon des re`gles de combinaison des marquages. Diffe´rentes
applications de suivi des flux d’information exigent diffe´rents types
de marquages et d’utiliser diffe´rentes re`gles de combinaisons de ba-
lises de marquage” ...
Lam and Chiueh in [LC06a].
Une solution comple´mentaire serait de suivre comment les donne´es sont utilise´es
au niveau applicatif, tout spe´cialement dans les environnements mobiles ou` la
ne´cessite´ d’un controˆle d’acce`s pour les applications (par exemple, l’acce`s a` des
donne´es prive´es telles que l’annuaire et des informations de localisation) a e´te´
reconnue. Le syste`me TaintDroid vise exactement cette application [EGC+10].
TaintDroid est une extension du syste`me d’exploitation Android (lui-meˆme base´
sur Linux) et de son environnement d’exe´cution (DEX ou Dalvik Execution En-
vironment, une implantatation de Java). Il de´finit plusieurs sources de marquage
(taint), qui contiennent des donne´es relatives a` la vie prive´e, et suit l’information
tout au long de la dure´e de vie d’une application. Il utilise des re`gles logiques
pour propager des balises de marquage dans la me´moire et lors de l’exe´cution.
En conside´rant le code provenant de bibliothe`ques comme de confiance, Taint-
Droid parvient a` obtenir un faible surcouˆt d’exe´cution, en moyenne de 14% plus
e´leve´. La figure A.4 montre la propagation de donne´es de marquage dans la
me´moire.
Lorsque le code binaire n’est pas interpre´te´ mais directement exe´cute´, l’instru-
mentation binaire peut eˆtre utilise´e pour injecter des fonctionnalite´s de mar-
quage a` l’exe´cution. Nous discutons des approches existantes dans le chapitre
correspondant sur la page 94.
Contrairement a` l’instrumentation du code interpre´te´ ou binaire, il existe aussi
des outils de traduction source-a`-source, qui produisent du code C trac¸able. Les
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Figure A.4: Propagation des donne´es marque´es (bleu) dans la me´moire telle que trans-
pose´e dans TaintDroid. Les donne´es provenant de sources de marquage sont marque´
daes que fournies par les services du syste`me d’exploitation (appels syste`mes, acce`s au
syste`me de fichier). Les bibliothe`ques sont conside´re´es comme dignes de confiance et
ne sont donc pas marque´es par le moteur d’IFT [EGC+10].
cadres logiciels GIFT [LC06b] et DIVA [XBS06] appliquent cette technique. Bien
que cette technique a l’avantage d’un surcouˆt limite´, son inconve´nient majeur
est que le code source des programmes doit eˆtre disponible. En tant que tel,
le suivi de flux d’information source-a`-source ne peut pas eˆtre applique´ a` des
programmes binaires proprie´taires.
Une approche base´e sur le mate´riel montre que le traitement des marques
n’a pas besoin d’eˆtre limite´ a` un code interpre´te´ ou exe´cute´ symboliquement.
Dans [KDK09] un co-processeur permet de suivre les donne´es marque´es de pro-
grammes ge´ne´riques s’exe´cutant sur le processeur hoˆte.
Surveillance de la circulation des informations dans les environnements
distribue´s Un cadre logiciel pour la surveillance de flux d’informations dans
les environnements distribue´s sous le nom de Aeolus a e´te´ propose´ dans [Che09].
Son mode`le de se´curite´ est base´ sur le controˆle de flux d’informations et introduit
un certain nombre de me´canismes qui sont applique´es au code qui est exe´cute´
a` un niveau interme´diaire (par exemple, Java et .NET). De meˆme, un syste`me
appele´ Laminar met e´galement en place sur les machines virtuelles Java et y
introduit des e´tiquettes [RPB+09]. Ces e´tiquettes concernet soit la se´curite´ soit
des autorisations. Le concept d’e´tiquette est base´ sur la classification des infor-
mations, telles que celles utilise´es par les services militaires de recherche d’infor-
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mation. Ces cadres visent la confidentialite´ de certains renseignements et docu-
ments. Leur approche utilise des fonctionnalite´s d’intergiciels, et ils ne suivent
donc pas les flux de donne´es indirects a` l’inte´rieur de l’application, comme cela
peut eˆtre fait avec les approches d’instrumentation binaire. Une approche qui
utilise une instrumentation binaire locale avec des connexions TCP/IP instru-
mente´es pour propager l’e´tiquette avecdes “gestionnaires de circulation” (Flow
Managers) est pre´sente´e dans [KKCS09]. Plus re´cemment, libdft [KPJK12]
fournit une boˆıte a` outils pour le suivi des flux d’information, qui a e´te´ utilise´e
pour distribuer des e´tiquettes entre des processus et entre des noeuds [ZPK11].
A.2.3 Conclusion
La se´curite´ fait partie inte´grante des syste`mes informatiques d’aujourd’hui. Mal-
gre´ le fait que les programmes antivirus et autres solutions de de´tection d’intru-
sion fournissent une protection “visible” et souvent efficace, l’exigence principale
de se´curite´ est la de´finition de principes architecturaux solides. Cela est vrai pour
n’importe quel type de syste`me d’exploitation, d’environnement d’exe´cution, ou
d’infrastructure re´seau.
Ordinateurs et re´seaux n’e´taient pas bien prote´ge´s dans les premiers jours de
l’Internet, comme l’a de´montre´ en 1988 Robert Morris Jr. avec son ver [Orm03],
ou [And02] pour les ordinateurs personnels qui n’avaient pas de liens de com-
munication. Ce paradigme est maintenant bien compris et la se´curite´ partie
inte´grante de tous les principaux syste`mes d’exploitation.
Nous assistons a` l’ouverture du domaine ve´hiculaire a` l’inte´gration de logiciels et
appareils ou dispositifs tiers, cre´ant la ne´cessite´ de prote´ger les syste`mes contre
des attaques nouvelles. Bien qu’il soit important de prote´ger ces syste`mes,
la se´curite´ est aujourd’hui rarement prise en compte dans les processus de
spe´cification et de test des calculateurs embarque´s et de l’architecture de com-
munication.
Des approches existent pour se´curiser des e´le´ments spe´cifiques, tels que les dis-
positifs d’immobilisation de ve´hicules. Toutefois, un concept global de se´curite´
pour les re´seaux embarque´s et les unite´s de controˆle des ve´hicules couvrant l’in-
frastructure ve´hiculaire comple`te n’a pas encore e´te´ de´ploye´. Plusieurs domaines
prennent actuellement de l’importance dans l’environnement du ve´hicule, ce qui
rend l’application combine´e des concepts de se´curite´ difficile, car ils reposent sur
des techniques diffe´rentes et des mesures qui sont parfois incompatibles. Une
solution globale a` ce proble`me est toujours manquante.
Etat de la Se´curite´ des Re´seaux Embarque´s La se´curite´ de l’e´lectronique
dans l’architecture des ve´hicules a jusqu’ici principalement e´te´ maintenue par
l’isolement physique et le secret de mise en œuvre. Le re´seau d’un ve´hicule
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n’est pas facilement accessible car il constitue fondamentalement un syste`me
autonome avec des capteurs qui le connectent au monde exte´rieur. La connexion
physique aux cables d’un bus est ne´cessaire pour interagir avec les composants
du re´seau, c’est a` dire les calculateurs. Le principe de “l’isolement et l’obscurite´”
a e´te´ utilise´ depuis plusieurs de´cennies dans l’industrie automobile, par exemple
pour les dispositifs d’immobilisation tels que mentionne´s ci-dessus et ont fait
long feu. Bien qu’ils semblent be´ne´fiques a` premie`re vue, ils ne peuvent pas
remplacer une architecture de se´curite´ correcte sur le long terme. L’approche
mise en œuvre pour garder les de´tails secrets constitue une violation e´vidente
du 2e`me principe de Kerckhoffs d’absence de se´curite´ par l’obscurite´ 1.
L’obscurite´ de la conception des protocoles pour le bus CAN et de leurs identi-
fiants, par exemple, n’existe plus aujourd’hui. Les circuits e´lectroniques d’e´mission-
re´ception sont librement accessibles et de nombreux identifiants CAN, encore
aujourd’hui confidentiels pour les industriels, sont largement publie´s sur l’Inter-
net, ou peuvent eˆtre identifie´s par inge´nierie inverse. Ainsi, seul l’emplacement
du caˆble (donc l’acce`s physique) reste secret, un secret sur lequel repose toute
la se´curite´ d’un ve´hicule. Plus encore, de nombreux appareils qui sont connecte´s
au re´seau interne exposent, dans le meˆme temps, une interface accessible par
l’utilisateur qui peut meˆme eˆtre compromise a` distance dans certaines circons-
tances.
Nous pensons qu’une adaptation du mode`le de de´veloppement est ne´cessaire
et doit inclure la se´curite´ de`s la conception. Ce changement de paradigme a
e´te´ re´cemment mis en branle dans l’industrie par la publication d’analyses de
se´curite´ sur les ve´hicules connecte´s.
12e`me principe de Kerckhoffs : le syste`me ne doit pas reposer sur un secret, tel qu’un secret
perdu brisera le syste`me. («Il faut qu’il n’exige pas le secret, et qu’il puisse sans inconve´nient
tomber entre les mains de l’ennemi»), [Ker83].
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A.3 L’Environnement et les Composants
Mode`le d’Attaquant De nombreuses motivations existent pour les attaquants
des ve´hicules modernes. La premie`re consiste a` s’introduire dans un ve´hicule
pour le voler. Bien que ce soit certainement une menace re´aliste pour la se´curite´
du ve´hicule, notre mode`le pre´voit des attaques plus sophistique´es contre le
ve´hicule. De telles attaques peuvent provenir du proprie´taire du ve´hicule lui-
meˆme, notamment dans le but d’ajuster et re´gler la fonctionnalite´ du ve´hicule,
tels que :
• Modification des parame`tres du moteur pour des performances accrues,
• Falsification du kilome´trage du ve´hicule,
• Suppression de restrictions techniques (par exemple, regarder la te´le´vision
pendant que la voiture est en mouvement),
• De´blocage de fonctionnalite´s et logiciels (par exemple, syste`me de navi-
gation),
• Ajout de fonctionnalite´s (par exemple, la compilation et l’exe´cution d’app-
lications propres, en changeant le syste`me de navigation).
Bien que certaines mesures, comme la modification du syste`me d’autoradio
ou de navigation peuvent eˆtre mineures, d’autres influent sur la se´curite´ des
ve´hicules (regarder la te´le´vision pendant la conduite) ou ge´ne`rent une perte
financie`re ou des fraudes (de´verrouillage des fonctions re´mune´re´es, changement
du kilome´trage).
Comme un ve´hicule est un syste`me sensible aux modifications, les fabricants re-
jettent habituellement toute responsabilite´ en cas d’alte´ration du syste`me ferme´
mis au point par l’industriel (par exemple, un dispositif supple´mentaire est ajoute´
au re´seau du ve´hicule, ce qui peut perturber le fonctionnement des syste`mes de
se´curite´ routie`re). En raison de l’e´norme demande de contenus dynamiques et
les attentes toujours croissantes des conducteurs, les fabricants sont oblige´s
d’autoriser des contenus en ligne modifiables en e´troite interaction avec leurs
syste`mes embarque´s de divertissement. Le ve´hicule expose plusieurs interfaces,
allant de l’appairage des e´quipements USB ou Bluetooth, en passant par l’acce`s
a` des serveurs back-end, jusqu’a` des connexions mobiles 3G ou LTE. Cela cre´e
une surface d’attaque supple´mentaire par rapport a` l’existant, qui fonctionne en
circuit ferme´.
Pour nos sce´narios, nous ne diffe´rencions pas entre les attaquants internes et ex-
ternes, mais supposons que l’attaquant peut avoir un acce`s physique au ve´hicule,
au moins pour une courte pe´riode. Cela signifie que l’attaquant peut lire des
donne´es a` partir de re´seaux internes et injecter ou relire les donne´es. L’attaque
elle-meˆme peut avoir lieu a` un stade ulte´rieur, par exemple, en utilisant les
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donne´es obtenues ou injecte´es, ou par un code a` distance. Une attaque a` dis-
tance offre des possibilite´s comparables si l’attaquant peut acce´der librement
aux interfaces re´seau, apre`s avoir compromis un calculateur (ECU) avec suce`s.
Definition: Le mode`le d’attaquant est de´fini par les capacite´s et contraintes
suivantes. Un attaquant peut acce´der a` toutes les interfaces de communication
du ve´hicule : il peut lire les donne´es sur les bus et sur les interfaces, et aussi
injecter des donne´es. L’attaquant peut te´le´charger ou remplacer certains pro-
grammes des ECUss du ve´hicule, mais ne peut pas acce´der aux donne´es internes
du HSMs qui fait partie de l’ECU. Nous supposons que le processeur combine´
avec le HSM est inviolable et aucune attaque invasive, tels que micro-sondage ou
des attaques physiques (par exemple, dans le but de mettre un ze´ro la me´moire
ou de modifier les fusibles du microcontroˆleur) ne sont re´alise´s. Des lec¸ons au
sujet de ces attaques ont e´te´ tire´es dans l’industrie de la carte a` puce [KK99]
et s’appliquent a` ce domaine de fac¸on similaire.
Notre de´finition couvre les attaquants internes avec un temps illimite´, comme
le proprie´taire du ve´hicule, ainsi que les attaquants externes qui peuvent gagner
un acce`s a` court terme au ve´hicule (graˆce a` l’inge´nierie sociale, la force physique
ou des de´fauts de mise en œuvre au niveau des interfaces expose´es, telles que
les re´seaux sans fil).
A.3.1 Module de Protection Mate´riel
Un aspect cle´ de l’architecture EVITA est le module de protection (ou de
se´curite´) mate´riel, le Hardware Security Module. Il stocke les mate´riels crypto-
graphiques comme les cle´s et traite toutes les ope´rations cryptographiques, telles
que les informations d’identification qui doivent toujours eˆtre garde´es confiden-
tielles, ne sortira jamais de ce module en clair et meˆme ne sont jamais charge´es
dans les registres du CPU ou de la me´moire d’application. Seules quelques-unes
de ces cle´s cryptographiques peuvent eˆtre obtenues par l’application durant une
session de HSM.
A.3.1.1 Usage des cle´s
L’utilisation des cle´s est commande´e par des indicateurs ou drapeaux d’usage
(use-flags). Ces indicateurs fournissent un acce`s de bas niveau et le controˆle de
l’utilisation cryptographique. En particulier, ils lient l’utilisation de cette cle´ pour
certaines configurations a` certaines fonctions, notamment a` une authentification
distincte telle qu’un mot de passe. Ces conditions doivent eˆtre remplies pour
pouvoir utiliser une cle´ avec le HSM.
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Indicateur d’Amorc¸age Se´curise´ L’indicateur le plus important est le dra-
peau d’amorc¸age (boot) se´curise´ : il lie une cle´ au succe`s d’une proce´dure de
de´marrage du syste`me, connu par les valeurs de hachage pre´sentes dans les
registres de configuration des ECU (ECR). Ces registres travaillent comme le
registre PCR d’un TPM, a` savoir que des mesures sont prises a` chaque e´tape du
processus de de´marrage. La liaison d’une cle´ de mesure ECR permet de s’assurer
que la cle´ n’est pas utilise´e par un firmware remplace´, et seulement dans l’envi-
ronnement pre´vu et correctement initialise´. Le processus de de´marrage se´curise´ a
e´te´ de´montre´ sur un microcontroˆleur Infineon TC1797 avec le syste`me d’exploi-
tation AUTOSAR. Les cle´s qui font partie des protocoles que nous pre´sentons
dans le chapitre 4 sont lie´es a` un amorc¸age securise´.
Indicateurs de fonctionnement spe´cifiques Une cle´ peut eˆtre limite´e a` cer-
taines ope´rations : elle peut, par exemple, eˆtre utilise´e pour ve´rifier les signatures
cryptographiques, alors que l’utilisation de cette cle´ pour la ge´ne´ration des signa-
tures n’est pas possible. Nous avons construit notre me´canisme de distribution
de cle´s autour de cette fonction afin de permettre a` faible couˆt en termes de
performances d’utiliser de manie`re asyme´trique des cle´s syme´triques.
A.3.1.2 Interface de programmation du HSM
L’interface de programmation du HSM est particulie`rement simple et ge´ne´rique
tandis que les algorithmes peuvent eˆtre complexes et fondamentalement diffe´rents
comme par exemple les signatures asyme´triques par rapport aux codes d’authen-
tification de messages. L’interface de programmation de cette fonctionnalite´ est
conc¸ue pour eˆtre flexible et ge´ne´rique. Elle comprend un certain nombre de
fonctionnalite´s essentielles : ge´ne´ration de cle´, importation et exportation de
cle´s (en utilisant le chiffrement de transport) et d’ope´rations cryptographiques
(par exemple le chiffrement et le de´chiffrement, en plus de la ge´ne´ration d’une
signature et de sa ve´rification).
A.3.1.3 Plate-forme d’experimentation HSM
Le HSM est mis en œuvre dans le cadre d’un FPGA Xilinx Virtex-5 FPGA.
Les ope´rations cryptographiques sont re´alise´es a` l’inte´rieur du FPGA. Toutes les
ope´rations d’E/S, le stockage des cle´s, et le micrologiciel sont mis en œuvre dans
le cadre d’un Linux embarque´ (v2.6.34), qui utilise la base Virtex440-PowerPC
et 256 Mo de RAM disponibles sur cette plate-forme. En tant que prototype,
le HSM est lui-meˆme relie´ a` l’unite´ centrale via Ethernet. Une interface SPI
inte´gre´e existe aussi mais n’a e´te´ utilise´e que dans le cadre d’une preuve de
concept de l’inte´gration d’AUTOSAR. L’interface Ethernet/IP utilise les sockets
standards de TCP afin d’e´changer des commandes HSM qui sont code´es dans
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Figure A.5: HSM Prototype d’architecture mate´rielle : les fonctions cryptographiques
sont de´ploye´es dans le mate´riel (vert) sur la carte FPGA. Le logiciel (en bleu), c’est a`
dire le controˆle de la fonctionnalite´ du HSM et sa disponibilite´ via une API de re´seau
(Ethernet, ASN.1). Dessin adapte´ de [PGW+11].
des paquets de requeˆtes / re´ponses ASN.1 L’architecture de la plate-forme
prototype du HSM est de´crite a` la figure A.5.
A.3.2 Vers une Architecture Embarque´e plus Se´curise´e
Ce paragraphe traite de la proble´matique du mate´riel a` bord des ve´hicules et
de l’architecture des logiciels du projet europe´en FP7 EVITA. Cette the`se a e´te´
e´crite en paralle`le au travail re´alise´ dans le cadre du projet EVITA. Un certain
nombre de contributions qui vont au-dela` de ce qui est de´crit dans la the`se,
ont e´te´ apporte´es a` la conception du protocole de l’architecture et a` sa mise en
œuvre.
L’architecture fournit une base pour des expe´riences sur les solutions de haut ni-
veau de´veloppe´es dans cette the`se. Dans le cadre du projet EVITA, une analyse
a e´te´ re´alise´e sur les sce´narios d’attaque et les exigences de se´curite´ [RWW+09]
concernant des cas d’utilisation typiques du monde de l’automobile connecte´e
[KFL+09]. L’architecture de se´curite´ est une combinaison d’e´le´ments mate´riels et
logiciels [WWZ+10]. Le logiciel ge`re l’interface entre la se´curite´ et le fonctionne-
ment des applications dans l’automobile, comme la communication authentifie´e
ou confidentielle. La partie mate´rielle fournit une base a` la confiance : une plate-
forme fiable pour le stockage de cle´ et des primitives cryptographiques. Cette
co-conception mate´rielle / logicielle assure que les cle´s cryptographiques ne sont
pas utilise´es sans autorisation, a` savoir, la plate-forme doit eˆtre correctement
amorce´e pour utiliser les cle´s, et seulement en fonction de leurs parame`tres
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d’usage. De plus les cle´s ne peuvent quitter le mate´riel dans une forme non
chiffre´e, c’est a` dire que toutes les ope´rations cryptographiques ont lieu dans
le module mate´riel. Remarque : La protection d’un HSM ne peut pas assu-
rer l’inte´grite´ des logiciels dans leur exe´cution. Ceci signifie que les attaques a`
l’exe´cution posent toujours un proble`me.
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A.3.3 Sce´narios
A.3.3.1 Sce´nario I : freinage actif (Car2X)
Un premier sce´nario concerne la communication Car2X. Nous avons de´crit la na-
ture ge´ne´rale des messages d’avertissement Car2X dans la section A.2.1, et nous
employons dans ce sce´nario le concept de notification d’avertissement DENM
comme exemple. Le sce´nario lui-meˆme est base´ sur deux ve´hicules distincts :
un ve´hicule e´metteur (SV) et un ve´hicule re´cepteur (RV). Le ve´hicule e´metteur
envoie le message d’avertissement DENM, qui est rec¸u par le ve´hicule re´cepteur.
Ce message d’avertissement correspond a` une situation de freinage d’urgence
par le ve´hicule e´metteur : un ESS est de´fini comme “une force de ralentis-
sement a e´te´ applique´e au ve´hicule” [Uni10], les freins sont actionne´s pour
ralentir par a ≥ 6m
s2
[Uni11]. Le ve´hicule re´cepteur peut agir en conse´quence,
par exemple en affichant un message d’avertissement pour le conducteur et en
se pre´parant a` un freinage d’urgence (par exemple, en pre´-chargeant les freins,
en actionnant la ceinture de se´curite´, et en fermant les feneˆtres). En outre, si la
confiance dans le contenu du message rec¸u est suffisamment e´leve´e, les freins
peuvent eˆtre actionne´s de manie`re autonome. Les controˆles de plausibilite´ qui
confirment la validite´ des donne´es font partie de l’e´valuation. Ces controˆles de
plausibilite´ peuvent s’appuyer sur le calcul d’une trajectoire d’un ve´hicule en re-
cueillant ses balises CAM ou sur le calcul d’une carte locale dynamique, comme
pre´vu par la spe´cification de l’ETSI, ou avec le soutien des autres capteurs locaux
tels que le radar, si la situation le permet.
Une vue abstraite du sce´nario est illustre´e a` la figure A.6, ou` les deux ve´hicules
implique´s et leurs ECUs sont montre´s.
Une vue de´taille´e et la se´quence de messages e´change´s se trouve a` la page 42,
a` la figure 3.3.
Dans les deux ve´hicules, le protocole de distribution de cle´s fait indirectement



























Figure A.6: Un freinage d’urgence est e´mis par SV (le ve´hicule e´metteur) et rec¸u par
RV (ve´hicule re´cepteur). Les ECUss participants sont marque´s en jaune.
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Figure A.7: Sce´nario II : E´coute de la musique sur l’unite´ principale. Les me´tadonne´es de
la musique sont extraites et envoye´es au panneau d’instruments, ou` elles sont affiche´es
pour le conducteur.
A.3.3.2 Sce´nario II : Diffusion Audio
Les passagers e´coutent des enregistrements nume´riques dans le ve´hicule depuis
que le disque compact a remplace´ les cassettes. Cependant, les enregistrements
nume´riques peuvent eˆtre lus de nos jours dans diffe´rents formats, par exemple
MP3, WMA, M4A, et a` partir de diverses sources comme les CD, cle´s USB,
cartes SD ou sans fil depuis un te´le´phone mobile. Ces fichiers de diffe´rents
formats offrent de´ja` une grande surface d’attaque qui peut eˆtre utilise´e pour
compromettre l’unite´ de divertissement, comme de´montre´ avec succe`s a` l’aide
de fichiers WMA spe´cialement conc¸us a` cet effet [CMK+11]. Des me´tadonne´es
comme le nom l’artiste ou le titre sont directement extraites des fichiers mu-
sicaux. L’analyse du fichier de me´tadonne´es et de la musique ainsi que leur
de´codage sont effectue´s sur l’unite´ principale. Les me´tadonne´es sont transmises
au tableau de bord du ve´hicule, c’est a` dire, l’e´cran place´ a` coˆte´ de l’indicateur
de vitesse, ou` le titre de la chanson et l’artiste sont affiche´s au conducteur.
Ce sce´nario porte sur la lecture de musique a` partir d’une source non fiable, par
exemple, un fichier sur un disque, et la diffusion d’informations dans le re´seau de
bord. Une repre´sentation du sce´nario est donne´e a` la figure A.7. Le diagramme
des se´quences de message se trouve sur la page 3.5 a` la figure3.5.
A.3.3.3 Sce´nario III : Adaptation au conducteur
Les ve´hicules haut de gamme sont souvent e´quipe´s de jusqu’a` une douzaine
de moteurs a` courant continu pour ajuster la position du sie`ge. Ils offrent
e´galement la possibilite´ de conserver diffe´rentes positions du sie`ge en me´moire.
Certains ve´hicules combinent cette fonction avec l’identification d’un porte-cle´s
spe´cifique. Dans notre troisie`me sce´nario, une application sur l’unite´ principale
rec¸oit des informations depuis le porte-cle´s (par exemple, son identifiant) et
ajuste la position du sie`ge en fonction d’un profil enregistre´ (sur le disque).
En re´alite´, cette e´tape devrait normalement impliquer au moins un composant
interme´diaire, qui controˆle la communication radio avec la cle´. En outre, afin
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d’authentifier la cle´ a` te´le´commande, la communication ne´cessiterait plusieurs
messages.
Un identifiant dans le porte-cle´ est lu sans fil, par exemple, via le standard RFID
(DA1). Une base de donne´es avec les pre´fe´rences enregistre´es pour le conducteur
(pour cet identifiant) est lue (DA2) sur l’unite´ principale. Selon ces pre´fe´rences,
la position assise souhaite´e est envoye´e au controˆleur de sie`ge (DA3), ou` plu-
sieurs servomoteurs sont de´clenche´s pour arranger le sie`ge (DA4). Le sce´nario
est repre´sente´ a` la figure A.8. Un diagramme de se´quence est pre´sente´ a´ la


















Figure A.8: Scenario III : Les sie`ges sont automatiquement ajuste´s en fonction de la
cle´ utilise´ pour de´verrouiller/de´marrer le ve´hicule.
Security and Privacy in Automotive On-Board Networks
148 A. RE´SUME´ E´TENDU — FRANC¸AIS
A.4 Se´curite´ des Communications
En termes d’assurance vis-a`-vis du fonctionnement des automobiles, la commu-
nication entre les diffe´rentes unite´s est primordiale. Aucun ve´hicule ne serait plus
en mesure aujourd’hui de de´marrer ou de rouler sans qu’au moins quelques com-
posants e´lectroniques de base (par exemple, le controˆle moteur et les syste`mes
de freinage) communiquent par les re´seaux (des bus) internes.
Comme les syste`mes du ve´hicule sont plus facilement accessibles, par exemple,
en connectant les appareils grand public via USB ou Bluetooth, mais aussi avec
la mise en place d’Ethernet dans les architectures actuelles, le re´seau de bord
devient une cible de choix pour les attaquants.
Pour de futures applications Car2X coope´ratives, qui sont en cours de norma-
lisation en ce moment [Eur09b], la confiance dans les donne´es rec¸ues est tre`s
importante. Dans les approches actuelles, seule la liaison sans fil entre ve´hicules,
par exemple ı.e., Car2X avec la norme IEEE 802.11p, est de´finie comme se´curise´e
par des signatures cryptographiques. L’inte´rieur du re´seau de bord, tout aussi
important afin de garantir la se´curite´ de bout en bout, n’a pas e´te´ spe´cifie´.
Dans ce chapitre, nous abordons cette ne´cessite´ de se´curiser la communication
entre les diffe´rentes unite´s du re´seau de bord. Nous de´crivons i) un protocole
de distribution de cle´ et ii) un protocole de transport se´curise´ pour le re´seau
embarque´. Les protocoles de communication sont conc¸us en gardant a` l’esprit les
limitations dues aux contraintes des bus et aux performances de communication
de l’architecture informatique.
Nous avons conc¸u les protocoles et les interfaces de ce protocole de fac¸on a` ce
qu’ils s’inte`grent d’une part avec les Hardware Security Modules (HSMs) conc¸u
dans le projet EVITA, et d’autre part avec le cadre de la se´curite´ des logiciels
comme un prototype. L’inte´gration des fonctionnalite´s de se´curite´ dans un cadre
logiciel est importante comme l’architecture et la conception fonctionnelle du
re´seau d’un ve´hicule est en grande partie dirige´e par les mode`les. Dans une
approche pilote´e par les mode`les comme c’est le cas dans AUTOSAR, le cadre
assure que les fonctions du logiciel peuvent eˆtre de´ploye´es n’importe ou` dans le
re´seau.
Comme la communication est un e´le´ment central pour presque toutes les fonc-
tions automobile qui s’e´tendent entre plusieurs ECUss, les techniques pre´sente´es
dans ce chapitre s’appliquent a` l’ensemble de nos trois sce´narios.
A.4.1 Distribution de Cle´s dans le Syste`me Embarque´
L’un des principaux e´le´ments de communication inte´gre´ se´curise´ est la ges-
tion des cle´s . Il est essentiel d’utiliser des ce´s fraˆıches qui sont redistribue´es
pe´riodiquement. Si seules des cle´s statiques devaient eˆtre utilise´es, les attaques
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contre ces cle´s (jamais modifie´es) permettrait de de´finitivement casser la se´curite´
du syste`me. Nous utilisons des cle´s statiques uniquement dans le but d’assurer
le chiffrement des transports et l’authentification de cle´s, c’est a` dire qu’elles
ne sont jamais directement utilise´ pour chiffrer ou authentifier des donne´es en
dehors des cle´s de session fraˆıchement ge´ne´re´es et ne quitteront jamais le HSM
en dehors du processus d’appariement initial qui se de´roule a` l’usine, dans un
environnement de confiance.
La me´thode pre´sente´e utilise la se´curite´ mate´rielle en vue d’ame´liorer les perfor-
mances par l’utilisation de la cryptographie syme´trique, tout en maintenant un
controˆle d’acce`s sur la cle´ elle-meˆme.
A.4.1.1 Utilisation asyme´trique de cle´s syme´triques
Nous utilisons des secrets partage´s (les cle´s syme´triques) en raison de contraintes
de couˆt et de de´ploiement inte´gre´ automobile. Le de´ploiement de ces cle´s
ne´cessite un dispositif ou module mate´riel de se´curite´, le HSM, associe´ a` chaque
ECU. Le HSM met en œuvre des primitives cryptographiques acce´le´re´es et as-
sure e´galement le stockage se´curise´ des cle´s, empeˆchant ainsi qu’une attaque
logicielle re´ussie ne compromette notre infrastructure de cle´s. L’utilisation du
HSM assure aussi la me´diation de l’acce`s aux cle´s cryptographiques. Les cle´s
posse`dent des champs de donne´es supple´mentaires, notamment une date d’ex-
piration, un code d’authentification et des paramt`res d’usage (use-flags). Ces
parame`tres d’usage permettent de distinguer le HSM pour lequel la fonctionna-
lite´ d’une cle´ spe´cifique peut ou ne peut pas eˆtre utilise´e. En re`gle ge´ne´rale, le
HSM fera respecter certains usages sur les cle´s syme´triques qu’il stocke, sur la
base de ces parame`tres : par exemple, une cle´ syme´trique peut eˆtre e´tiquete´e
pour la signature (par exemple, la ge´ne´ration d’un MAC) pour un HSM alors
que cette meˆme cle´ re´side dans plusieurs autres modules de se´curite´ mate´rielle,
ou` elle est e´tiquete´e seulement pour la ve´rification de la signature (en re´alite´
l’authentification du message). Ce controˆle de l’utilisation permet d’assurer une
utilisation asyme´trique des cle´s, tandis que le calcul lui-meˆme est efficace sur la
base de la cryptographie syme´trique.
Definition: La cle´ kn,g est la cle´ de session utilise´e pour ge´ne´rer un Message
Authentication Code (MAC) a` ECUn (l’entite´ e´mettrice) et la cle´ kl,v pour
la ve´rification des donne´es rec¸ues (y compris la ve´rification du MAC) a` ECUl
(l’entite´ de re´ception).
Deux autres indicateurs sont utilise´s dans ce chapitre : les indicateurs d’exportation
et de transport . Le premier permet a` une cle´ d’eˆtre exporte´e sous forme chiffre´e
et le second permet a` une cle´ d’eˆtre utilise´e pour chiffrer une autre cle´ pour
l’exportation (cette autre cle´ doit eˆtre exportable). Une cle´ cryptographique ne
peut en aucun cas quitter le HSM en clair. Pour les cle´s de session, la partie
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ve´rification (kx,v for ECUx) doit eˆtre marque´e exportable pour la distribution
des cle´s. En outre, une cle´ d’authentification distincte est utilise´e pour valider
une cle´ exporte´e et le transport chiffre´.
Pour chaque ECUn qui e´tablit un canal se´curise´ avec d’autres ECUss, il y a une
cle´ de chiffrement pour son transport kn, t, et une cle´ d’authentification kn, a,
de´ploye´es sur son propre HSM et sur le HSM du gestionnaire centralise´ des cle´s
ou nœud maˆıtre (Key Master KM).
A.4.1.2 Distribution dynamique des cle´s
Partager globalement des cle´s compromettrait la se´curite´ globale du syste`me
et est e´vite´ dans notre solution. La re´partition des cle´s entre les partenaires de
communication se fait a` travers une entite´ appele´e KM. Chaque ECU ei sur le
re´seau interne du ve´hicules partage deux cle´s secre`tes avec le KM. La premie`re
cle´ ki,a est utilise´ pour authentifier l’ECU au regard des autres calculateurs,
tandis que la seconde cle´ ki,t est utilise´ pour le chiffrement de transport des cle´s
ge´ne´re´es. Un nœud maˆıtre (KM) est une entite´ logique qui peut eˆtre pre´sente sur
un ou plusieurs calculateurs. Il est possible d’avoir plusieurs KMs (par exemple,
un pour chaque domaine), de sorte que les cle´s ne sont partage´s que par un
nombre limite´ de fonctionnalite´s. Pour expliquer le protocole de distribution
de cle´s, nous avons simplifie´ le de´ploiement avec seulement un gestionnaire
centralise´ ou nœud maˆıtre (KM pour Key Master) pre´sent dans le re´seau du
ve´hicule (voir figure A.9.). Pour plusieurs KMs, une liaison supple´mentaire entre
les maˆıtres implique´s doit eˆtre e´tablie avec le protocole de distribution de cle´
de´crit dans la section 4.1.5. Dans ce cadre, un syste`me distribue´ pour la politique
gestion d’autorisation de connexions des diffe´rents domaines du ve´hicule est
utilise´ [SIR+10].
La figure A.9 repre´sente l’architecture de gestion des cle´s. Les de´tails des phases
de distribution sont expose´es dans la figure A.10.
A.4.2 Communication Securise´e sur le Bus CAN
Le bus de communication le plus couramment utilise´ dans les ve´hicules d’au-
jourd’hui est le bus CAN qui est exploite´ a` 500 kbit / s et dispose de 8 octets de
donne´es de charge utile (payload) par paquet. Du point de vue de la se´curite´,
une tranche de huit octets pour la charge utile de se´curite´ ne fournit pas une
protection ade´quate. D’un autre coˆte´, des donne´es plus grandes ou un champ
de´die´ a` la se´curite´ n’est pas possible, car le protocole ne peut pas eˆtre change´
sans modification de tous les e´metteurs-re´cepteurs CAN sur un bus. Il existe une
approche re´tro-compatible permettant d’incorporer une charge utile de se´curite´
en augmentant le taux d’e´chantillonnage, qui a e´te´ valide´e dans un FPGA mis
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Un ECU agit en tant que nœud maˆıtre, c’est a` dire gestionnaire de cle´s (KM pour Key
Master). Les cle´s syme´triques sont partage´s avec tous les autres ECUs (repre´sente´ par
e1, ei). Toutes les cle´s se trouvent dans le HSM correspondant (par exemple, utilise´
pour l’authentification). Les politiques d’acce`s a` l’ensemble du syste`me sont e´value´es
par le nœud maˆıtre (Autorisation).
en œuvre par [HSV11]. Toutefois, il n’est pas possible de changer la concep-
tion de tous les e´metteurs-re´cepteurs CAN dans un avenir proche, compte-tenu
e´galement du fait que des bus alternatifs existent de´ja`. Dans ce qui suit, nous
montrons comment nous utilisons un protocole qui a e´te´ principalement utilise´
pour le diagnostic du ve´hicule, le protocole de transport ISO-TP [ISO04], afin
de transmettre de plus grandes charges utiles sur les bus CAN existants.
Nous ge´ne´rons des MACs afin d’authentifier les donne´es transmises. Nous pou-
vons ajuster la longueur du code d’authentification afin de tenir compte de la
latence et de la charge du bus. Les de´tails concernant ce protocole peuvent eˆtre
trouve´s a` partir de la page 67.
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Les phases du me´canisme de distribution de cle´s : une cle´ de session ECU1 (en bleu)
est ge´ne´re´e a` l’initialisation (phase 1). Une cle´ de session ECU{2,3}, permettant uni-
quement la ve´rification (sans marge rouge) est exporte´e vers le nœud maˆıtre, ou` elle est
distribue´e a` tous les membres du groupe, (phase 2). Apre`s la distribution re´ussie des
cle´s (phase 3), les donne´es envoye´es a` partir de ECU1 peuvent eˆtre authentifie´es par
tous les membres du groupe. L’ECU de´crit a e´te´ utilise´ pour le ve´hicule de re´ception
dans le cas d’utilisation de freinage actif (sce´nario I)
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A.5 Se´curite´ Dynamique des Plate-formes
Dans ce chapitre, nous de´crivons l’approche que nous avons suivi pour ame´liorer
la se´curite´ de la plate-forme de calculateurs embarque´es d’une automobile au-
dela` de la seule communication se´curise´e. Elle diffe`re conside´rablement des ap-
proches statiques. Alors que le cas statique se suffit d’un processus d’amorc¸age
(bootstrap) se´curise´ et de signatures de logiciels, ces e´le´ments ne peuvent garan-
tir une re´sistance contre l’exploitation de vulne´rabilite´s du logiciel s’exe´cutant
sur un calculateur. Nous avons explique´ les techniques de ces blocs de construc-
tion dans le chapitre 2.
De nombreuses attaques re´elles effectue´es sur des ve´hicules du commerce ont
e´te´ de´montre´s dans [CMK+11], [KCR+10], et [RMM+10]. La plupart ne se sont
pas appuye´es sur des failles des mesures de se´curite´ statiques mais sur l’exploi-
tation de vulne´rabilite´s du syste`me d’exe´cution, par exemple, le de´bordement
de variables dans un autoradio ou des failles de l’appairage Bluetooth et de la
modulation radio CDMA. Ces travaux ont e´galement montre´ la possibilite´ d’at-
taques contre des mesures de protection classiques comme le de´chiffrement du
code d’acce`s a` deux octets pour la mise a` jour de micrologiciels. Cette attaque
a permis de reprogrammer un ECU avec un micrologiciel modifie´. En re´sume´,
ces exemples d’attaques sugge`rent que des moyens de protection au-dela` de la
se´curite´ des communications et des approches purement statiques sont requis.
Nous avons employe´ une architecture ge´ne´rique pour re´aliser un syste`me em-
barque´ de de´tection d’intrusion et qui est de´crit dans la premie`re section du
chapitre (5.1) qui se trouve sur la page 77.
Une combinaison de m’ecanismes de suivi et de surveillance des flux de donne´es
sous-tend le concept de notre IDS. Ce me´canisme s’appuie sur le marquage des
donne´es au niveau local a` l’inte´rieur d’un ECUs, mais aussi par la propagation de
ce marquage entre plusieurs ECUss afin de controˆler les flux d’informations entre
les applications locales et les applications distribue´es. Ce me´canisme ne´cessite
des ECUs avec une capacite´ de traitement assez importante. Nous proposons
un deuxie`me me´canisme, simplifie´ pour des ECUss moins puissants, mais avec
des risques de faux ne´gatifs ou de faux positifs plus significatifs.
A.5.1 Protection de la Confidentialite´ et de la Se´curite´ par le
Suivi de Flux d’Information
Dans le ve´hicule, les donne´es sont e´change´es en permanence entre les diffe´rentes
unite´s via les re´seaux embarque´s. Alors que la communication entre les capteurs,
les controˆleurs et les actuateurs constitue plus ou moins un syste`me ferme´,
l’inte´gration d’appareils grand public comme les te´le´phones mobiles et notam-
ment les smartphones et la possibilite´ de te´le´charger de nouvelles applications
cre´e un environnement plus dynamique. Ces nouvelles fonctionnalite´s exigent
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un acce`s aux services des ve´hicules, qui ont e´te´ historiquement isole´s de toute
communication externe. En outre, les ve´hicules pourront bientoˆt recevoir des
donne´es provenant d’autres ve´hicules ou de l’infrastructure routie`re via la com-
munication Car2X. Ces donne´es peuvent eˆtre forge´es de toute pie`ces a` des
fins malveillantes telles qu’exploiter les vulne´rabilite´s des piles de protocoles du
ve´hicule.
Nous tenons a` souligner deux types d’attaques qui peuvent aller au-dela` des ca-
pacite´s de mesures de se´curite´ statique : i) le de´tournement du flux de controˆle
d’une requeˆte protocolaire et ii) l’obtention et l’utilisation de donne´es person-
nelles pouvant porter atteinte a` la vie prive´e du conducteur.
Conditions pre´alables Deux conditions pre´alables doivent eˆtre remplies afin
de s’appuyer sur ces donne´es marque´es distribue´es : i) leur transmission doit
eˆtre se´curise´e et ii) la se´curite´ statique de la plate-forme doit eˆtre assure´e pour
tous les nœuds dans la se´quence de traitement. Ces conditions sont remplies
par l’utilisation des protocoles de communication se´curise´s de´veloppe´s dans le
chapitre A.4 et du Hardware Security Module d’EVITA de´crit dans la section
A.3.1, que nous utilisons comme des blocs de construction.
Pour eˆtre en mesure de combiner et de propager les informations de marquage
sur place, un moteur de marquage dynamique de l’information est utilise´. Il pro-
page des balises ou e´tiquettes de marquage dans les instructions en cours de
traitement. Contrairement a` une plate-forme d’exe´cution unique les nœuds in-
terme´diaires de traitement doivent s’assurer de l’authenticite´ et de l’inte´grite´ des
e´tiquette de marquage transmises en propageant l’information aux calculateurs
distants.
En plus des menaces sur la vie prive´e lie´es a` la fuite d’informations, le controˆle
de flux d’information qui est analyse´e au niveau d’instructions processeur uniques
peut e´galement servir a` prote´ger l’exe´cution contre l’exploitation de vulne´rabilite´s
telles que les attaques par de´bordement de tampons (buffers) et du tas (heap).
Dans de tels cas, le marquage de controˆle des flux de donne´es est ve´rifie´e avant
un appel (par exemple, les appels return ou free), ce qui permet de repe´rer
l’attaque.
A.5.1.1 Suivi dynamique de flux d’information
Les programmes et applications ve´hiculaires sont organise´s autour de la com-
munication. Ils sont construits en petits blocs fonctionnels suivant un mode`le de
composants qui de´finit le raccordement des entre´es et sorties des modules logi-
ciels de base ou composite. Ces modules logiciels sont finalement place´s sur des
calculateurs diffe´rents, ge´ne´rant ainsi des modes de communication spe´cifiques.
Des intergiciels tels qu’AUTOSAR pour l’automobile sont ge´ne´ralement utilise´s
pour de´ployer de telles architectures.
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Dans un tel syste`me distribue´, qui associe logiciels et mate´riels, il est important
de suivre la circulation des donne´es non seulement a` l’inte´rieur, mais aussi entre
les calculateurs. Par exemple, une attaque re´ussie par le biais du syste`me de sur-
veillance de la pression des pneus comme indique´ dans [RMM+10], dans lequel
les capteurs transmettent leurs donne´es sans authentification par un re´seau sans
fil, il est e´vident que des donne´es apparemment inoffensives peuvent compro-
mettre des parties du ve´hicule, comme par exemple l’affichage de l’indicateur de
vitesse. Des donne´es comme la valeur d’un capteur de pression des pneus sont
e´galement couramment diffuse´es sur le re´seau de bord du ve´hicule et distribue´es
a` des calculateurs spe´cifiques. Ces donne´es peuvent eˆtre utilise´es par des fonc-
tions de controˆles de plausibilite´ dans le module de controˆle e´lectronique de la
stabilite´ du ve´hicule ou pour de´clencher la fonctionnalite´ “limp home” (dans
le cas d’un pneu a` plat) dans d’autres unite´s. Si les donne´es d’origine ont e´te´
construites de manie`re malveillante, un calculateur utilisant ces donne´es pour-
raient faire l’objet d’un exploit par lequel un attaquant peut prendre le controˆle
de son exe´cution en de´tournant le flot de controˆle normal de l’unite´ centrale.
Un de´bordement possible dans un dispositif comme le controˆle e´lectronique de
stabilite´ peut se traduire par une de´faillance du syste`me de freinage, car ce
calculateur controˆle directement et individuellement les actionneurs de frein de
chaque roue.
Une architecture multi-couches L’approche multi-couches de notre archi-
tecture est repre´sente´e sur la figure A.11 : Notre approche s’appuie sur la sur-
veillance de la circulation de l’information provenant du re´seau et des processus
internes. Celle-ci est introduite au niveau de l’intergiciel qui ge`re les e´changes
d’information. Les donne´es entrantes sont e´tiquete´es par un marquage que
nous introduisons. Nous ve´rifions la pre´sence et l’absence d’e´tiquettes pour les
donne´es sortantes en fonction d’un ensemble de re`gles de´finissant la politique
de se´curite´. Une partie importante de ce syste`me est le moteur de marquage
base´ sur l’instrumentation binaire : toutes les applications et les bibliothe`ques
sont instrumente´es a` l’exe´cution. Le marquage se propage a` l’exe´cution parmi
les registres et la me´moire de l’ECU. Comme les diffe´rents types de sources de
donne´es en entre´e doivent eˆtre surveille´es, nous utilisons des marques distinctes,
une approche souvent appele´e “ marquage‘ de couleur” [EKS+10].
A.5.1.2 Instrumentation binaire pour le suivi des balises de marquage
Afin d’introduire des marqueurs dans les applications en cours d’exe´cution, nous
utilisons une technique appele´e “instrumentation binaire”. Cette technique in-
jecte du code personnalise´ pour les binaires au moment de l’exe´cution, c’est a`
dire que l’on peut instrumenter les instructions machine et les appels syste`me
afin de suivre le flux de donne´es entre les registres ou les zones de la me´moire,
ainsi que prendre des pre´cautions si les donne´es sont utilise´es d’une manie`re
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Figure A.11: L’architecture multi-couche. Les applications utilisent les bibliothe`ques
base´es sur des pilotes et fonctions de communication de la plate-forme pour e´changer
des donne´es. Lorsqu’elles arrivent dans la couche du pilote et de la bibliothe`que de
communication, les donne´es qui sont lues (1) sont e´tiquete´es avec un marquage ap-
proprie´, par exemple sensorn. L’e´tiquette de marquage est maintenue dans une me´moire
fantoˆme (shadow) et propage´ tout au long de l’exe´cution. Dytan instrumente les binaires
applicatifs et les bibliothe`ques a` l’exe´cution, et propage le marquage dans la me´moire
(3). Lorsque les donne´es sont e´crites (2), les re`gles de la politique de se´curite´ sont ap-
plique´es, c’est a` dire que l’on analyse si les donne´es ne contiennent que des informations
provenant de sources autorise´es, a` savoir que les e´tiquettes de marquage correspondent
a` celles attendues dans les re`gles.
douteuse. L’un des principaux avantages de l’instrumentation binaire est que le
code source des programmes analyse´s n’a pas besoin d’eˆtre disponible. Cela per-
met de s’assurer que des programmes d’origine inconnue respectent des re`gles
e´tablies. Nous utilisons l’outil Pin d’Intel [LCM+05], combine´ a` un moteur de
marquage. Pin est un outil ge´ne´rique pour l’instrumentation binaire dynamique
et fournit la base pour l’analyse dynamique de marquage. Pin est disponible
pour les architectures x86 (Windows, Linux, Mac) et aussi pour ARM. Nous
avons mene´ des expe´riences sur IA32 Linux.
Il existe un certain nombre d’implantations de prototypes pour le suivi dyna-
mique de flux de donne´es base´es sur Pin [CLO07, KPJK12, ZJSK11]. Nous
avons analyse´ la faisabilite´ d’appliquer ces implantations prototypes dans notre
cadre de se´curite´. Nous de´crivons l’implantation re´alise´e pour tracer des donne´es
lors de l’exe´cution sur la plate-forme et pour propager les marqueurs avec la com-
munication entre les calculateurs embarque´s dans la voiture aux chapitres 3 et
4.
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A.6 Conclusion et Perspectives
Nous affirmons que nos approches augmentent le niveau de se´curite´ des re´seaux
ve´hiculaires embarque´s en appliquant la cryptographie pour la communication,
l’utilisation de techniques de marquage pour le re´seau du ve´hicule, ainsi que
l’application stricte de re`gles dans le cadre du syste`me de de´tection d’intrusion.
Notre prototype de de´monstration et nos implantation sont base´es sur un cadre
de se´curite´ automobile re´el. Nous avons simule´ et teste´ la faisabilite´ de ces
approches sur des re´seaux embarque´s actuels. Meˆme sur des re´seaux restreints,
tels que le bus CAN, notre approche de communication se´curise´e est viable et
semble avoir e´te´ prise en compte par le de´veloppement industriel [KB11]. Les
protocoles de distribution de cle´s et de communication se´curise´e ont e´te´ mis en
œuvre avec succe`s pour des applications Car2X a` l’inte´rieur de deux ve´hicules
BMW au Forum Car2Car de Novembre 2011 a` Erlensee, en Allemagne.
Les contributions qui ont e´te´ pre´sente´s dans cette the`se peuvent eˆtre mieux
illustre´es par la comparaison suivante. Une publication fre´quemment cite´ sur
la se´curite´ embarque´, “se´curite´ dans les syste`mes embarque´s : les de´fis de
conception” [RRKH04], nomme six exigences en matie`re de se´curite´ pour les
syste`mes embarque´s. Sur la base de ces exigences ge´ne´riques, nous comparons
l’architecture des ve´hicules d’aujourd’hui, avec les ame´liorations sugge´re´es par
les contributions de cette the`se. La comparaison de´taille´ se trouve au Chapitre
7, a` partir de la page 111.
Ces exigences sont :
• L’identification/authentification, l’acce`s au re´seau, et la se´curite´ de la
communication,
• Le stockage, la se´curite´ des contenus et la disponibilite´ des syste`mes
• Exigences supple´mentaires : La protection de la vie prive´e et la de´tection
et limitation des attaques
Discussion sur la faisabilite´ de l’approche propose´e Nos solutions pour
se´curiser l’architecture a` bord de ve´hicules ont e´te´ mises en œuvre et e´value´es
sur un prototype de de´monstration. Un de´ploiement en production a cependant
des exigences beaucoup plus strictes. Le couˆt est un facteur important dans
le monde de l’automobile : si les composants du ve´hicule couˆtent $50 de plus
(imaginez un HSMs dans plusieurs ECUss), et que le ve´hicule est vendu a` dix
millions d’exemplaires, le manque a` gagner se monte de´ja` a` un demi-milliard de
dollars. Les clients ne sont e´galement pas preˆts a` payer pour des fonctionnalite´s
de se´curite´, car ils s’attendent a` ce que le produit soit de´ja` se´curise´ tel quel.
Si le couˆt est une pre´occupation, l’inte´gration dans les mode`les de communi-
cation et la puissance limite´e de traitement des composants actuels en sont
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d’autres aussi importantes. Nous avons montre´ que la surcharge de communi-
cation pour les protocoles de communication se´curise´s est limite´e. Ne´anmoins,
une latence supple´mentaire est introduite.
L’inte´gration des protocoles cryptographiques avec les syste`mes d’exploitation
automobile n’est pas un facteur anodin non plus, car de nombreux syste`mes
diffe´rents existent, comme par exemple OSEK, QNX, VxWorks, ou meˆme Win-
dows Embedded Automotive. Les composants de faible couˆt tels que les capteurs
n’ont souvent pas a` proprement parler un ve´ritable syste`me d’exploitation et uti-
lisent un mode`le de communication statique combine´e avec une machine d’e´tat.
L’approche d’AUTOSAR avec un intergiciel standard re´pond a` ce proble`me. Ce-
pendant, un de´ploiement a` grande e´chelle et a` faible couˆt des composants est
encore une perspective lointaine.
Le suivi des flux d’information en utilisant une instrumentation du code compile´
a le grand avantage de pouvoir eˆtre applique´ sur des composants logiciels au
code source duquel on n’a pas acce`s. Cette approche a cependant une grande
influence sur la performance de l’exe´cution des programmes. Naturellement, la
compilation source-a`-source pour le suivi des informations, comme l’illustrent
les syste`mes GIFT [LC06b] ou DIVA [XBS06], fournit une bien meilleure per-
formance (entre 5% et 50% de surcouˆt), mais elle repose sur la disponibilite´ du
code source et sa recompilation. Ce n’est pas le cas pour le de´veloppement de
composants logiciels par des tiers dans des environnements d’exe´cution ouverts
ou dans le cas des magasins d’applications en ligne. Une meilleure performance
pourrait eˆtre atteinte par l’utilisation d’un mate´riel de´die´ au suivi de marquages
de se´curite´, ou par une recompilation du code interme´diaire, comme pour l’en-
vironnement d’exe´cution Java ou un environnement de virtualisation.
Meˆme si des me´canismes logiciels et mate´riels permettent d’accroˆıtre la se´curite´
du re´seau embarque´, toute attaque re´ussie sur l’unite´ Car2X, qui e´value l’infor-
mation interne et de´clenche des alertes externes, rend vulne´rable et compromet
potentiellement l’ensemble du syste`me de communication inter-ve´hiculaire. Il
s’agit d’un proble`me ge´ne´ral, aucune se´curite´ de bout-a`-bout – a` partir du cap-
teur d’une voiture a` l’actionneur d’une autre voiture – n’e´tant re´alisable sans
l’utilisation de la couˆteuse cryptographie asyme´trique et de grands efforts d’har-
monisation entre les fabricants. Les diffe´rentes imple´mentations de me´canismes
de se´curite´ a` l’e´tude peuvent aussi constituer un obstacle supple´mentaires pour
un de´ploiement mondial : par exemple, les spe´cifications ame´ricaines, europe´enes
et asiatiques ne sont pas interope´rables et entraˆınent par ailleurs des restrictions
a` l’exportation du fait de l’utilisation de cryptographie.
A.6.1 Perspectives en recherche et de´veloppements futurs
Nous avons vu que le domaine du ve´hicule automobile n’a pas pris en compte la
ne´cessaire mise en oeuvre de mesures de se´curite´ pour l’ensemble de l’architec-
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ture embarque´e. Certaines mesures de se´curite´ ont e´te´ applique´es uniquement
a` des interfaces expose´es, comme par exemple le signal radio d’un porte-cle´s
pour de´verrouiller le ve´hicule qui commencent a` inte´grer des algorithmes de
de´fi/re´ponse a` distance borne´e. Bien qu’une protection comple`te de toutes les
unite´s embarque´es et de la communication n’est pas re´aliste pour les anne´es a`
venir, la se´curite´ constitue indubitablement un sujet de recherche actif.
Se´curite´ de la communication embarque´e Actuellement, meˆme des fonc-
tionnalite´s essentielles d’une automobile ne sont pas correctement se´curise´es.
Des outils pour le vol de voiture comme [Jac12] sont en vente libre. Ils se
connectent a` des caˆbles du re´seau interne (qui peuvent eˆtre atteint depuis
l’exte´rieur du ve´hicule, par exemple a` travers l’espace entre la portie`re et la
carrosserie), de´sactivent l’alarme du ve´hicule, et ouvrent les feneˆtres. Cela rend
aujourd’hui flagrant le manque de se´curite´ dans les communications dans le
ve´hicule.
La version v4.0 de l’API d’AUTOSAR introduit des services cryptographiques
dans sa spe´cification [BFWS10], ce qui facilite l’utilisation de me´canismes cryp-
tographique dans le logiciel. Mais cette spe´cification ne de´finit aucun canal de
communication se´curise´ entre diffe´rentes unite´s fonctionnant sous AUTOSAR.
Nous avons e´te´ agre´ablement surpris de constater qu’un protocole inspire´ du
protocole de transport se´curise´ pour CAN que nous avons propose´ e´tait sur le
point d’eˆtre mis en œuvre pour un produit industriel sous AUTOSAR [KB11].
L’e´volution des re´seaux embarque´s vers Ethernet et IP est de´ja` en cours en
ce qui concerne certaines parties de l’architecture embarque´e [Bru10, Jon10].
L’utilisation d’Ethernet pour l’ensemble du re´seau de bord est actuellement a`
l’e´tude [GHM+10]. Avec une bande passante et une taille de paquet supe´rieures,
l’utilisation du protocole IP offre beaucoup des possibilite´s pour la se´curite´. Tout
en e´tant plus couˆteux, il permet d’e´tablir et d’appliquer des solutions de se´curite´
e´prouve´es dans les re´seaux informatiques, comme le protocole IPsec.
De´tection et re´action aux intrusions La de´tection des nœuds qui se conduisent
anormalement et des paquets malforme´s est plus facile que dans les environne-
ments re´seaux normaux, parce qu’un ve´hicule est un syste`me plutoˆt statique avec
des mode`les de trafic qui ne changent pas de manie`re significative au cours de
l’exe´cution, par rapport aux re´seaux d’ordinateurs. La de´tection d’intrusion a e´te´
e´tudie´e pour le re´seau embarque´ d’une automobile dans [LNJ08, MG09, MA11],
et constitue une partie de cette the`se et du projet EVITA [WWZ+10]. Les tech-
niques d’apprentissage sans surveillance qui sont devenues populaires pour les
syste`mes IDS pourront probablement eˆtre utilise´es dans le futur. La re´ponse a`
l’intrusion constitue un aspect du proble`me qui n’a pas e´te´ e´value´ de manie`re suf-
fisante dans le cadre automobile : quel est le comportement ade´quat en re´ponse
a` la e´te´ de´tection d’une menace avec un degre´ donne´ de confiance ? Est-ce
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que certains composants du ve´hicule peuvent eˆtres e´teints ou de´sactive´s ? Ne
risque-t-on pas de cre´er de nouvelles possibilite´s d’attaque par de´ni de service ?
La notification d’une intrusion par un avertissement “vous avez e´te´ pirate´” est-
elle acceptable ou risque-t-elle de se re´ve´ler geˆnante voire dangereuse pour le
conducteur ? Une publication de 2008 [HKD08a] fournit une classification des
re´ponses possibles a` des notifications d’alertes haptiques. Alors que la multi-
modalite´ est utilise´e pour de nombreuses fonctions du ve´hicule, nous sommes
sceptiques concernant son utilisation dans le cadre d’une attaque informatique,
qui consisterait par exemple a` ‘’influencer la force sur la pe´dale de frein ou le
volant”, comme la publication le de´crit. La question de savoir comment re´agir
intelligemment a` une de´tection d’intrusion est, a` nos yeux, encore un proble`me
non re´solu et difficile — surtout lorsque seuls des informaticiens se penchent sur
le proble`me. La conception d’interfaces homme-machine HMI et sur l’ergonomie
doivent eˆtre conside´re´s dans la solution de ce proble`me.
Suivi dynamique de flux d’information La surveillance de l’usage des donne´es
de´passe le simple controˆle d’acce`s. Si le suivi dynamique de flux d’information
(ou DIFT) a e´te´ utilise´ depuis un certain temps dans l’analyse de logiciels mal-
veillants, son utilisation pendant l’exe´cution d’un logiciel est assez nouvelle,
et il n’a que re´cemment e´te´ applique´ aux syste`mes embarque´s et distribue´s
[EGC+10, ZPK11]. Cette technique est particulie`rement inte´ressante pour le
monde de l’automobile, ou` le logiciel embarque´ est en train d’e´voluer d’un
de´veloppement en interne vers la mise en place de “boutiques d’applications
en ligne” pour le domaine de divertissement — d’une manie`re e´quivalente a` ce
qui s’est de´roule´ pour les smartphones ces dernie`res anne´es. L’ouverture aux
de´veloppeurs de l’AppStore R-Link de Renault est pre´vue pour Novembre 2012
[Lut11]. Meˆme si un processus d’examen rigoureux, comme celui impose´ par
Apple (voir section 2.3.2), offre un certain niveau de se´curite´, il ne peut jamais
fournir une assurance comple`te. Des applications malveillantes peuvent se glis-
ser au travers des mailles du filet [Sli12], et des de´fauts dans les applications
logicielles peuvent entraˆıner des vulne´rabilite´s exploitables a` l’exe´cution, comme
indique´ dans la section 2.3.3.
Une approche DIFT similaire a` la noˆtre peut eˆtre applique´ a` des applications
inconnues, et ainsi pre´venir les atteintes a` la vie prive´e du conducteur comme
[Sli12]. Le principal proble`me a` re´soudre est la performance, car l’instrumen-
tation binaire implique un surcouˆt important a` l’exe´cution, meˆme lorsque des
moteurs de marquage a` faible empreinte sont utilise´s. Une solution a` ce proble`me
pourrait eˆtre une approche combine´e, dans laquelle les fonctions de confiance
du code soientt valide´es et exempte´es de ce suivi d’exe´cution de fine granularite´.
Nous travaillons actuellement sur une analyse de la faisabilite´ d’une approche
qui combine un suivi base´ purement sur l’utilisation d’un intergiciel (qui imlique
peu ou pas de surcouˆt) avec une instrumentation binaire pour l’environnement
du reste du ve´hicule.
Ph.D. Thesis — Hendrik C. Schweppe
A.6. CONCLUSION ET PERSPECTIVES 161
A` long terme, les logiciels malveillants peuvent s’adapter a` ces techniques. Les
syste`mes de de´tection d’intrusion peuvent toujours eˆtre contourne´ par divers
moyens. Par exemple, nous voyons les virus et les vers informatiques d’au-
jourd’hui de´tecter s’ils sont exe´cute´s dans un environnement virtuel. Cela est
e´galement vrai pour les analyses dynamiques d’exe´cution. Egele et al. [ESKK08]
mettent l’accent sur ce point dans leur enqueˆte sur les techniques d’analyse
dynamique de logiciels malveillants : “Si les techniques de suivi de flux d’in-
formation deviennent pre´dominantes dans les outils d’analyse, on peut s’at-
tendre a` ce que les auteurs de logiciels malveillants trouvent des me´canismes
qui essayent de contourner ces syste`mes”.
Se´curite´ mate´rielle L’usage d’un module mate´riel de se´curite´ (ou HSM) est
l’un des principaux e´le´ments techniques du projet EVITA. Ce module a non seule-
ment e´te´ utilise´ pour se´curiser les communications a` bord, mais il a e´galement
e´te´ inte´gre´ a` une unite´ de communication C2X simTD, dans laquelle il a assure´
l’acce´le´ration mate´rielle des ope´rations cryptographiques a` base d’algorithmes
ECC utilise´es pour prote´ger les communications interve´hiculaires 2. Une suite au
prototype FPGA est en cours d’e´laboration par le projet europe´en PRESERVE
[PRE14] qui devrait de´boucher sur un composant ASIC sur la base des re´sultats
d’EVITA. Un prototype est pre´vu pour eˆtre utilise´ dans la phase finale du FOT
franc¸ais SCORE@F en 2013.
Le module mate´riel de se´curite´ SHE propose une approche similaire a` celle du
HSM d’EVITA. Une comparaison est donne´e dans [WG11]. Ce module fournit
e´galement un amorc¸age (boot) se´curise´ et l’acce´le´ration mate´rielle des algo-
rithmes de chiffrement syme´triques. Son cahier des charges a e´te´ convenu entre
un certain nombre de constructeurs et e´quipementiers automobiles, le consor-
tium HIS. Infineon et Fujitsu, qui faisaient partie du partenariat d’EVITA, ont
annonce´ qu’ils comptaient commencer la production de puces ASIC HSM pour
l’automobile d’ici a` 2014 [SS11]. Infineon pre´voit e´galement une inte´gration de
ces modules avec leur ligne TriCore de microcontroˆleurs automobiles comme le
TC1797 utilise´ dans EVITA.
Communication Car2X Pour la plupart des gens, “les voitures qui parlent”
et se conduisent de manie`re autonome sont encore une vision extreˆmement
futuriste. Bien que la communication Car2X va se de´velopper dans les anne´es
qui viennent, il existe de´ja` des normes pre´liminaires de l’IEEE et l’ETSI. Des
tests d’interope´rabilite´ et de conformite´ ont meˆme de´ja` e´te´ de´finis et mene´s sur
des prototypes en vertu d’un mandat officiel de la Communaute´ Europe´enne
[Eur09b].
2En fait, les certificats RSA simTD n’ont pas e´te´ utilise´s, mais des certificats de pseudonyme
ECC ont e´te´ utilise´s pour signer les donne´es qui ont e´te´ e´change´s entre les deux ve´hicules de
de´monstration.
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Nous sommes certains que la communication Car2X va faire partie du paysage
des ve´hicules automobiles de demain. La se´curite´ des communications sera as-
sure´e par des signatures cryptographiques. Un module de se´curite´ mate´riel de
bord sera selon toute vraisemblance requis par la norme pour assurer la se´curite´,
par exemple, des cle´s et du stockage des certificats ainsi que pour des raisons
de performances, car les solutions purement logicielles ne peuvent pas soutenir
la cadence des ve´rifications pre´vues. La prise de conscience croissante des at-
taques sur le re´seau embarque´ [CMK+11, KCR+10] est un indicateur fort que
la se´curite´ jouera un roˆle important dans la conception des futures interfaces
inter-ve´hiculaires ainsi que dans les re´seaux embarque´s automobiles.




B.1 HSM Performance Measurements
B.1.1 Performance Figures
A detailed performance analysis of the EVITA HSM that was used in the scope
of this thesis has been published in [WG11]. The ECC signature generation
and verification averages around 500 per second. This is important for the
verification of Car2X Communication, especially in congested environments and
at intersections, where a large amount of vehicles broadcast CAM frames at
a high rate (up to 10 Hz per vehicle). This performance is adequate even for
these dense scenarios, as predicted in [LLZ+08] and [G11].
B.1.2 Overhead of Prototype Implementation
The HSM prototype was implemented on a Virtex-5 FPGA board. The on-
board PowerPC CPU was used to install an embedded Linux, which contains
the firmware. This firmware uses standard TCP sockets on a dedicated ethernet
interface to retrieve ASN.1 encapsulated HSM requests. While this allows agile
development, the performance of this prototype was influenced by network and
marshalling operations, i.e., the encapsulation of requests to a large extent.
To understand how the real processing time is distributed between network,
ASN.1 coding and the actual HSM operations, we have instrumented the HSM
firmware’s source code with time measurement functionality. In Figure B.2 we
show how the processing time is broken up between these tasks. Not surpris-
ingly, for commands which involve I/O operations at the firmware level (e.g.,
import/export), the overhead is marginal (under 10%), while it is close to 80%
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for key generation and cryptographic operations. This is the result of the slow
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Figure B.1: Performance per-byte for generating a standard AES-128 based CMAC
in the HSM. The time is given in [ms]. The input is padded to 32 bytes and varied
between 10 and 2000 bytes.
The overhead of generating a MAC sinks with the amount of data that is
hashed. In particular, all payload is padded to 32 bytes, resulting in poor per-
byte performance for smaller payloads. The per-byte performance is shown in
Figure B.1.
Out of all HSM operations, the import and export operations are most time
intensive, due to I/O. Both import and export operation take around 15ms.
This value can very likely be improved for key distribution, e.g., by holding
temporary keys in volatile memory and never saving them to NVRAM.
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Figure B.2: Breakdown of the prototype processing time into network, ASN.1, and
actual cryptographic HSM operations. The large difference is due to necessary I/O
operations for import/export commands.
HSM function net t asn1 t hsm t/key t/key (hsm)
create random key 243 1005 289 0.7685 0.14
export key 256 2729 30879 16.932 15.44
import key 255 1265 31297 16.409 15.65
create MAC 1801 4971 597 3.68 0.30
verify MAC 895 2404 291 0.22 0.018
Table B.1: Absolute and relative times of processing at the HSM prototype. The times
are given in milliseconds. For the absolute time, a sample series of 2000 keys (or bytes
for MAC) was used.
HSM function net (%) asn1 (%) hsm (%)
create random key 15.84 65.42 18.81
export key 0.76 8.06 91.19
import key 0.78 3.86 95.37
create MAC 24.45 67.46 8.1
verify MAC 24.94 66.97 8.12
Table B.2: Relative percentages of individual HSM operations broken up into network,
ASN.1, marshalling and actual processing time (cf. Fig. B.2).
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B.2 Key Distribution Implementation
In the following, we give code examples or key distribution and secure commu-
nication implementations within the framework. We start with application code
and present a simple example for sending and receiving data. We then show
code excerpts from the client side and server side framework.
B.2.1 Application Code
The following listing shows an example for a client application that uses the
framework. The actual communication is performed using the function
EMVY_secure_communication. The program code used at the sender side
is shown in listing B.1 and for the receiver side in B.2. If no keys had been
exchanged before, the key distribution is triggered via the EMVY master before
the payload is delivered.
Listing B.1: Application Code at Client Side (Sender).
2 static char GROUP_NAME [] = "group :// group1";
3 static char TEST_PAYLOAD [] = "Das Pferd frisst keinen Gurkensalat.";
5 /* Init security property set */
6 memset (& security_property_set , 0, sizeof(SecurityPropertySetStruct));
7 security_property_set.authentic = TRUE;
8 security_property_set.confidential = TRUE;
9 security_property_set.fresh = FALSE;
10 security_property_set.integer = FALSE;
12 /* Init group entity */
13 memset (&group , 0, sizeof(Entity));
14 OCTET_STRING_fromString (&group.identifier , GROUP_NAME);
15 OCTET_STRING_fromString (&group.description , "no description");
17 /* Init payload */
18 memset (&payload , 0, sizeof(CommunicationPayload));
19 OCTET_STRING_fromBuf (& payload.data , TEST_PAYLOAD , sizeof(TEST_PAYLOAD)
);
22 rc = EMVY_secure_communication (&group , &security_property_set , &
payload);
24 if (rc != EvitaReturnCode_evitaReturnOk) {
25 LOG_WARN("EMVY_secure_communication failed with error code %d", rc);
26 }
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Listing B.2: Application Code at Client Side (Receiver).
2 int process_group1_messages(OCTET_STRING_t * buf)
3 {
4 printf("Received message: %s\n", buf ->buf ,);
5 }
7 int main(int argc , char ** argv)
8 {
9 add_processing_function("group :// group1", process_group1_messages);
10 }
B.2.2 Client Framework Code
The program code itself is rather lengthy as it involves retrieving configuration
settings and initializing all possible key flags. Thus we show the programming
interface by giving function signatures for secure communication and the key
exchange in the following.
The communication itself is wrapped by the functions EmvyKmmCom_down and
EmvyKmmCom_up that are called from within the framework. These wrapper
functions use the previously exchanged session key to enhance the application
payload with a security payload. This additional payload is added at the sender,
and evaluated accordingly at the receiver side. The function exchange_key_with_group
is called to trigger key distribution for a certain group. The key handle of the
resulting session key is retained by the framework for future use by the wrapper
functions.
If a node receives a session key through its Client-RPC interface, the request is
first processed by the function process_incoming_push_key_kmm_request
and then by EmvyKmm_receiveGroupKey.
For unicast communication, a response can be received through the payload
buffer.
Listing B.3: Framework Program Code (Application/Client Side).
2 extern int EmvyKmmCom_down(
3 Entity* groupEntity ,
4 const size_t dinSize ,
5 const unsigned char* din ,
6 size_t *doutSize ,
7 unsigned char* dout );
9 extern int EmvyKmmCom_up(
10 const size_t dinSize ,
11 const unsigned char* din ,
12 Entity* groupEntity ,
13 size_t* doutSize ,
14 unsigned char dout[] );
16 enum EvitaReturnCode exchange_key_with_group(
17 char * group_identifier ,
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18 SecurityPropertySetStruct * security_property_set);
20 static EvitaReturnCode process_incoming_push_key_kmm_request(
21 PushKeyKMM * pushKeyCmd);
23 extern EvitaReturnCode EmvyKmm_receiveGroupKey(
24 const char* groupIdentifier ,
25 const size_t encryptedKeySize ,
26 const unsigned char* encryptedKey ,
27 const size_t authenticationTagSize ,
28 const unsigned char* authenticationTag );
B.2.3 Server Framework Code
The following listing shows a shortened extract of the code on the server side.
The server side is implemented in C++. The code excerpt has been rendered
more readable by omitting some details. We want to show the distribution as
the core function. The received request is first authorized, then group members
are retrieved, the session key payload is authenticated and imported, and finally
distributed to all group members in different threads.
Listing B.4: Framework Program Code (Server Side).
1 ReturnCode KMM:: KMM_start_groupcom(EmvyServer * server , const Entity&
endpoint ,
2 UINT8 session_nonce ,
3 const EMVY:: KeyStruct & session_key ,
4 const EMVY:: Group & group) {
6 ...
7 ret = PDM:: EMVY_request_authorization (endpoint , group , *operation ,
NULL);
8 if(ret ->getCode () == 0) {
9 authorized = true;




13 LOG_WARN("PDM: Operation Denied. PDM did not authorize communication
") ;
14 SWD:: SWD_log_event(new SecurityEventNotice(
15 "PDM did not authorize communication (in KMM_start_groupcom)",




21 ret = key_import( transport_key_handle ,
22 ... ,
23 (EXT_KEY_t *) session_key ->getData (),
24 ... );
27 for (Entity :: ConstIterator itr=group ->getFirstGroupMember (); itr!=
group ->getLastGroupMember (); itr++)
28 {
29 evita::util:: Thread * thread = new DistributorThread(
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30 *itr ,






B.2.4 Detailed MSC for Key Distribution
In the following figure, you can see a detailed sequence chart for the key distri-
bution protocol from Section 4.1. This chart was used as detailed specification
in [SIR+10]. The abbreviations relate to implementation specifics: PSK is an
ECU-specific Pre Shared Key for authentication and transport encryption, EAM
is the Entity Authentication Module, and PDM refers to the Policy Decision
Module of the framework. The OpenChannel_REQ message, is sent to the key
master through its Server-RPC interface. The session key (SeSK) is then re-
encrypted for all ECUs of the group and pushed to them via the Client-RPC
interface OpenChannel_CMD.
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loop for all ECUs of Group <GroupNumber>





{If not ACK from every ECU in specified time t:
 set state=partial. 





























Figure B.3: Detailed Group Communication Establishment: A key pair is generated at
the initiator, ECU1. The sign-key can not be exported and stays inside the HSM. The
verify-key is exported and transmitted via the KM to all other ECUs of the group.
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B.3 Secure Storage
Certain data needs to be stored securely on a platform. In addition to access
control, that is, who may access a certain resource, encryption can help to
ensure the confidentiality of data. Encryption also holds if more sophisticated
techniques to access protected data, such as reverse engineering contents of
memory, are applied. Encryption can be used to protect sensitive content, such
as system configurations, navigation data, or user content in order to provide
secure storage.
In this Section, we show how a simple secondary encryption protocol can be
employed together with the HSM and its platform register, in order to provide
Secure Storage. In contrast to the specification, the implementation of Secure
Storage has been integrated into the middleware framework by a partner of the
EVITA project, and was thus not part of the thesis work.
B.3.1 Key Access Control
Depending on the kind of storage (user data, application data or system data),
different measures are taken. Especially the cryptographic keys used for en-
cryption need to be protected. The ECU Configuration Register (ECR) is a
special register, which functions similar to a TPM’s trusted platform registers:
At certain points in the boot phase and while loading the operating system and
drivers, measurements of the system are taken, and a reproducible hash value
is saved in this register.
The HSM use-flags are a low-level access control for key usage, which we employ
for this protocol. Depending on the use of secure storage, different additional
measures are required:
• Use-flags of the key are bound to a securely booted platform via ECR.
• Use-flags of the key are bound to a specific execution context and boot-
strap phase via ECR
• Use-flags of the key structure are bound to an application-supplied cre-
dential (for application-data and user-data),
• Secondary key material (explained below) is protected by standard oper-
ating system measures such as file permissions.
B.3.2 Native Encryption
This method uses the HSM directly. Using the HSM processor may limit the
overall throughput for other applications utilizing the HSM. A symmetric key is
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generated with corresponding use-flags to enforce low level access control (see
above). It is then employed using the HSM API via the framework, notably the
functions _encrypt_init(), _update(), and _finish(). The output of the
update function is sequentially written into a file on the local filesystem.
B.3.3 Secondary Encryption
A way to limit the use of resources of the HSM is to use a secondary key that is
stored in non-volatile memory. This secondary key is stored using native HSM
encryption as explained above. In particular this means that only the secondary
key is directly encrypted and decrypted by the HSM. The use of this key must be
bound to a certain execution context with a specific ECR configuration, so that
platform integrity is ensured. In Figure B.4 a schematic illustrating secondary
encryption is shown. The actual encryption key k2 is used to encrypt data d
and is secured by a key within the HSM (k1). Data stored on the filesystem (k2
and d) are protected by encryption, while k1 is stored by the HSM internally,
guarded by low level use-flags. The schematic shows how the secure storage API
requests data (step 1), which itself uses the HSM API to retrieve and decrypt
the corresponding secondary key (steps 2–4) and finally decrypts data (5) and


















Figure B.4: Secure Storage in Software.
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B.4 Intrusion Detection Sensors
The intrusion detection framework described in Section 5.1 was prototypically
implemented as part of the EMVY framework. It already provided basic func-
tionality for receiving SecurityEventNotices from other modules of the frame-
work.
The sensors that can be part of the local EMVY instance, or stand-alone in-
stances distributed over the vehicle network send probe data. This data is
consumed by evaluator functions at the master node. They are subscribed to
specific sensors, e.g., one evaluator function may be subscribed to several net-
work detectors.
Testing our approach in the scope of real world vehicle attacks is rather difficult.
In contrast to normal computer systems, there are no widely known attacks
or signature databases, or standardized tests. Looking into the PC domain,
even there no tests have been standardized, although being discussed for years
[AMT08]. Due to that, malware detection may be very efficient on a small
specialized test set, but loses much of its applicability on a broader set, as
found in recent work comparing system-call based anomaly detection [CLB+12].
Due to the fact that we cannot show the effectiveness on a real on-board net-
work, we have implemented a small sensor based on the amount of TCP con-
nections being opened. The data is forwarded to the master, where a filter will
evaluate the absolute and the relative number of connections. An action is trig-
gered when either i) an absolute threshold is exceeded or ii) a relative threshold
of newly opened or closed connections is exceeded.
The Sensor The sensor that sends in order to obtain the network connection
number and type from Unix-compatible systems that served as proof of concept
(tested on Linux, MacOS X, cygwin-windows). The number of currently open
TCP connections is serialized and sent upstream to the evaluator function. A
sample is taken every second. We used very a basic approach to receive the
number of open connections: the netstat utility provides informations about
local connections, which we summed up using the grep and wc utilities and read
that into a local variable. This code provided new probe data every second.
fp = popen("netstat -t -n | grep ’EST’ | wc -l", "r");
fgets(inbuf, sizeof(inbuf)-1, fp)
int conns = atoi(inbuf);
The Filters We have crafted the filter in a way that it can be applied to
multiple of types of automotive sensor data.
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A large number of models for malfunction or anomaly detection rely on time
series. While some models can be as complex as correlating data streams or
event streams, a very simple evaluation of signals is, in most cases, sufficient.
In the automotive domain, typically a timed window is applied to a series of data
is a common approach in order to detect malfunction of vehicle components.
For instance, such detections rely on conditions like “The gasoline level of the
tank shall not drop by more than 20% within half an hour”. If such a condition
is met, the according ECU sets a so-called Diagnostic Trouble Code (DTC)
that is stored along with debug information. This indicates the potential fault
to mechanics at the next workshop visit.
Consequently, we have designed a generic derivate filter as well as a classic lim-
iting event filter: the LimitEventFilter can be parameterized with minimum
and maximum allowed values (also commonly used for vehicle diagnosis: for
instance, cooling-water temperature shall not exceed 120○ C.). To allow a more
fine-grained decision, the FirstDerivateFilter uses the actual differences
between measurements and can be parameterized with a maximum (negative
or positive) gradient (e.g., if the temperature rises by more than 20○ C in one
minute).
Figure B.5: UML Architecture of Generic Filter.
B.4.0.1 Experimenta Data
We have recorded data with a Probe and the FirstDerivate filter in place. You
can see the number of open TCP connections on the computer in Figure B.6.
The corresponding derivate plot is shown in Figure B.7. You can clearly see how
an absolute and a derivate filter can be engaged at certain thresholds, e.g., the
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amount of total open connections could be limited at 25 (LimitEventFilter) or
at 1.5 additional connections per second (FirstDerivateFilter).
Figure B.6: Absolute amount of open network (TCP) connections at a time. Samples
are taken every second.
Figure B.7: Relative amount of opening and closing network (TCP) connections per
second (first derivative). The time between adjacent data points is one second.
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B.5 CAN Ethernet Gateway
The CAN Ethernet Gateway is based on an example application that was part
of the SocketCAN ‘trunk’ repository’s experimental applications. The existing
application used a TCP-IP listening socket in order to relay input data (given
in ASCII hex) to the CAN interface.
The Gateway uses TCP/IP or UDP connections on the Ethernet side, and the
ISO-TP protocol on the CAN side. For communicating with an ECU on the
CAN bus, the ISO-TP protocol employs a pair of CAN identifiers that are used
for ingoing and outgoing traffic.
The gateway application was complemented with
i) an active connection mode (option -c),
ii) a raw data relay mode for 4095-byte packets,
iii) a UDP/multicast mode, in which group communication is forwarded to
individual CAN nodes.
In the following listing B.5, we show the help screen of the gateway applica-
tion that is implemented in user-space using SocketCAN and IP sockets in a
select() loop.
We contributed our program code to the SocketCAN open source community.
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Listing B.5: Usage screen of the CAN Ethernet gateway application.
1 Usage: isotp -gateway -l <port > -s <can_id > -d <can_id > [options] <CAN interface >
2 Or : isotp -gateway -c <IP:port > -s <can_id > -d <can_id > [options] <CAN interface >
3 Options: (* = mandatory)
5 ip adressing:
6 * -l <port > (local port for the server)
7 * -c <IP:port > (remote IP and port to connect to)
8 -u (UDP mode , default is TCP)
9 -M (multicast mode , combine with -c <IP:port >)
10 -A (ASCII on IP socket , input expected as HEX strings"<AABB >")
11 -R (default is RAW mode: binary data is relayed)
13 isotp adressing:
14 * -s <can_id > (source can_id. Use 8 digits for extended IDs)
15 * -d <can_id > (destination can_id. Use 8 digits for extended IDs)
16 -x <addr > (extended addressing mode)
18 padding:
19 -p <byte > (set and enable tx padding byte)
20 -r <byte > (set and enable rx padding byte)
21 -P <mode > (check padding in SF/CF. (l)ength (c)ontent (a)ll)
23 rx path: (config , which is sent to the sender / data source)
24 -b <bs> (blocksize. 0 = off)
25 -m <val > (STmin in ms/ns. See spec.)
26 -w <num > (max. wait frame transmissions)
28 tx path: (config , which changes local tx settings)
29 -t <time ns> (transmit time in nanosecs)
31 All values except for ’-l’, ’-c’, ’-m’, and ’-t’ are expected in hexadecimal values.
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B.6 Active Brake Prototype Demonstrator
As part of the Car2Car Forum 2011, the final EVITA workshop was conducted
with two demonstrator vehicles from BMW. As the work of this thesis was
contributed to this EU project, specifically the communication protocols and
their integration with the vehicle framework and the HSMs, were part of the
demonstrator prototype.
A similar setup with one vehicle was presented at a joint EURECOM/BMW
press event in September 2011 and on the 9th conference “embedded security
in cars” (escar) on November 8–9 in Dresden. The ECUs of the sending vehicle
were installed on a desktop and the brake signal was manually triggered.
In the following, we show two pictures of the demonstrator vehicles in Figures
B.8 and B.9. In Figure B.10 the simTD CCU can be seen on top of the EVITA
HSM case, which hosts four prototype boards.
Figure B.8: EVITA Active Brake on the Road. A red vehicle appears in the dashboard.
Picture courtesy of BMW Press [BP10a].
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Figure B.9: Active Brake Prototype Demonstrator at Car2Car Forum 2012: The send-
ing vehicle is shown in the background (brake lights engaged). The screen in the
background shows details of the key distribution protocol and secure communication:
console outputs of brake sensor, key master and brake unit are revealed. In the fore-
ground, the receiving vehicle shows a warning message to the driver: A white vehicle
with brake lights appears on the instrument cluster’s display.
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Figure B.10: Picture of the simTD CCU and EVITA HSM case. The case holds four
FPGA boards and is deployed inside the prototype vehicle.
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Appendix C
Glossary
C.1 Acronyms and Abbreviations
Both the vehicle industry and the computer industry use a large amount of
acronyms and abbreviations, which an outsider does not necessarily know. Many
of these acronyms are used in this thesis. We have deliberately not included
those, which are commonly known in computer science, but focused on those,
that are specific to the vehicle domain. This section compiles a list of the
acronyms used throughout the thesis. Every acronym is expanded within the
thesis at first occurrence. The electronic form of the thesis allows the reader to
navigate directly to the explanation by using pdf hyperlinks.
A/C Air Conditioning
ASIC Application-Specific Integrated Circuit
ASLR Address Space Layout Randomization
CAM Cooperative Awareness Message
CAN Controller Area Network
CCU Communication Control Unit, the communication ECU used for
Car2X communication.
CCM Communication Control Module, an EMVY component
Car2X Car-to-Car and Car-to-Infrastructure communication, sometimes
V2X for Vehicle-to-X communication.
CGW Central Gateway, the central network component of a vehicle.
DENM Distributed Environment Notification Message
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DIFT Dynamic Information Flow Tracking
DLNA Digital Living Network Alliance
DoS Denial of Service, a type of attack that hinders a service or device
from working.
DSRC Dedicated Short Range Channel, used to refer to the 5.9 GHz
channel for Car2X communication.
DTC Diagnostic Trouble Code
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECR ECU Configuration Register, similar to the TPM’s trusted
configuration registers.
ECU Electronic Control Unit
ESS Emergency Stop Signal
ETSI European Telecommunications Standards Institute
EMVY Embedded Vehicular securitY, a vehicular security software
framework from BMW, which was used for most prototype
implementations.
EVITA E-Safety Vehicle Intrusion proTected Applications, the FP7 European
Project in which this thesis was done.
FOT Field Operational Test
FOTA Firmware Over The Air
FPGA Field Programmable Gate Array
HIS Hersteller Initiative Software
HMI Human Machine Interface
HSM Hardware Security Module
HU Head Unit, the central infotainment ECU.
IC Instrument Cluster, the ECU that includes driver displays, e.g., the
speedometer.
IDK Identity Key
IDS Intrusion Detection System
IP Internet Protocol
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ITS Intelligent Transport Systems
KM Key Master, the central unit for Key Distribution
KMM Key Management Module, an EMVY component
LIN Local Interconnect Network
MAC Message Authentication Code
MCC Model Carrying Code
MOST Multimedia Oriented Systems Transport
MSC Message Sequence Chart
NFC Near Field Communication
OBD On-Board Diagnostics Socket
OBU On-Board Unit
OEM Original Equipment Manufacturer, the vehicle manufacturer.
PCC Proof Carrying Code
RFID Radio-Frequency Identification
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
ROP Return Oriented Programming
RDS Radio Data System
RPC Remote Procedure Call
RSU Road Side Unit
SHE Secure Hardware Extensions, an HSM for automotive use.
SPI Serial Peripheral Interface, a serial bus used in embedded systems.
TESLA Timed Efficient Stream Loss-Tolerant Authentication
TMC Traffic Message Channel
TPM Trusted Platform Module, an HSM established for Personal
Computers
UPnP Universal Plug and Play
VANET Vehicular Adhoc NETwork, the adhoc network created by Car2X
communication.
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VFB Virtual Function Bus
VIN Vehicle Identification Number
V2X See Car2X
WiFi Wireless Ethernet brand name, referring to the IEEE 802.11 family
of standards.
WEP Wireless Equivalent Privacy, the original encryption method used for
wireless ethernet networks (IEEE 802.11b)
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